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Abstract 
Medical education aims to train students to become safe and effective 
clinical practitioners. This includes the ability to make safe and 
effective clinical judgements and decisions (GMC 2009). It is assumed 
that trainee doctors acquire these skills through the hidden 
curriculum. This is not necessarily the case. There is reason to 
believe that medical education should include some explicit training 
for doctors to improve their clinical judgements and decisions. This is 
known as training in clinical reasoning. This thesis explored how to 
enhance doctors' clinical reasoning through effective training. The 
aims were to develop and evaluate an intervention informed by 
decision theory to Improve doctors' reasoning about clinical 
judgements and decisions. A series of empirical studies were 
conducted to achieve these aims. 
A systematic review and questionnaire study were conducted to 
evaluate existing interventions that aimed to enhance doctors' clinical 
reasoning skills. There was little agreement between medical 
educators on how to effectively enhance doctors' clinical reasoning 
through training. However, the minority of interventions that aimed to 
improve doctors' awareness about their own reasoning processes were 
effective. 
Little is known about how to improve the processes doctors use to 
make clinical judgements and decisions in practice. A qualitative 
interview study was conducted to explore doctors' views and 
experiences of how to make effective clinical judgements and 
decisions. Doctors had limited explicit insight into their own 
7 
reasoning processes, such as the methods that lead to good decisions 
and factors that bias their reasoning. 
A quasi-experimental study was developed to evaluate. the 
feasibility of an intervention to enhance doctors' understanding about 
their own reasoning processes. A brief tutorial was shown that 
explained the basic science underpinning human judgement and 
decision making. Doctors were receptive to learning about this 
information. They found it relevant to their clinical practice and 
gained knowledge about decision sciences concepts. Findings from 
this thesis suggest that, potentially, doctors can improve their clinical 
judgements and decisions through training to understand how they 
think about clinical problems. 
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1 . 
Introduction: concepts, theory and 
evidence of training doctors in 
clinical reasoning 
This chapter provides an overview of issues related to training doctors 
to make better clinical judgements and decisions. It starts with a 
discussion on the importance of good judgements and decisions in 
medicine. It introduces the theories and evidence about how people in 
general and doctors specifically make judgements and decisions. It 
provides evidence from a review of the literature about existing work 
on clinical reasoning training. The challenges and broader issues that 
influence the development of effective training are considered. The 
final part of the chapter identifies the aims and objectives of the thesis 
that are addressed in subsequent chapters. 
1.1. Importance of clinical judgements and decisions 
in practice 
It has been argued that a doctor spends more time making 
judgements and decisions about clinical cases than any other work 
related activity (Croskerry 2000). The ability to make good judgements 
and choices underlies the entire care process; from gathering clinical 
information, interpreting and synthesising data, making accurate and 
timely diagnosis and administering appropriate treatment plans (GMC 
2009). In the clinical context, making good judgements and decisions 
is an acquired skill. Doctors must be able to make judgements and 
decisions well in risky andj or uncertain situations. In risky 
23 
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situations, doctors make choices when the probabilities of an outcome 
are known to the doctor (Wu, Zhang, and Gonzalez 2004; Baron 
2008). An example is deciding whether to perform a particular 
operation on a patient or not. In uncertain situations, a doctor does 
not know the probabilities of an outcome and must estimate them to 
make a choice (Wu et al. 2004). Doctors also face working under 
emotive, time pressured situations with limited resources. These 
factors can also impact on their judgements and decisions, and the 
risk of making serious cognitive errors can be greater under such 
circumstances (Means, Salas, Crandall, and Jacobs 1993; Croskerry 
2003). 
1.2. Error in medicine 
Most of the work on error in medicine has focused on mistakes related 
to diagnosis. Diagnostic errors are associated with higher patient 
morbidity than other types of medical errors (Brennan, Leape, Laird, 
Hebert, Localio, Lawthers, Newhouse, Weiler and Hiatt 1991; Wilson, 
Runciman, Gibberd, Harrison, Newby and Hamilton 1995). Evidence 
from autopsy studies suggests that the risk of making a diagnostic 
error is between 10-15% (Goldman, Sayson, Robbins, Cohn, 
Bettmann and Wesiberg 1983; Kirch & Schafti 1996; Shojania, 
Burton, McDonald, and Goldman 2003; . It has been found that most 
diagnostic errors are caused by incorrect thinking about a clinical 
case. In other words, errors of a cognitive nature are more common 
that other types of medical error (Clarke, Spejewsk, Gertner, Webber, 
Hayward, Santora, Wagner, Baker, Champion, Fabian, Lewis, Moore, 
Weigelt, Eastman and Blank-Reid 2000; Kuhn 2002; Graber, 
Franklin, and Gordon 2005). These findings are significant as they 
demonstrate a doctor's vulnerability to make poor judgements and 
decisions in practice. While it is unlikely all medical error can be 
eradicated entirely, some authors believe that doctors' cognitive errors 
are preventable (Clarke et al. 2000; Famularo, Salvini, Terranova, and 
Gerace 2000; Glick, Workman, and Gaufberg 2000; Kuhn 2002; 
Croskerry 2002; Croskerry 2003). The introduction of formal training 
24 
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In medical education to improve doctors' clinical judgements and 
decisions is one possible way to reduce cognitive errors. This is often 
referred to as training in clinical reasoning (Higgs & Jones 1995). If 
this type of training is successful, the implications are an increase in 
patient safety and quality of care, cost-effective use of resources and a 
reduction in complaints or legal action against doctors. 
1.3. Introducing clinical reasoning training into 
medical education 
Medical education aims to train students to become safe and effective 
clinical practitioners. This includes the ability to make clinical 
judgements and decisions safely and effectively (GMC 2009). However, 
the development of judgement and decision making skills has received 
insufficient attention in medical education. Doctors do not receive 
training in clinical reasoning as a fonnal part of their medical 
education. There is an implicit assumption that doctors acquire good 
clinical reasoning through the hidden curriculum, usually by 
opportunistic observation of reasoning demonstrated by expert 
doctors (Howe, Holmes, and Elstein 1984; Chessare & Lieu 1998; 
Round 1999). The limitation with this approach is that their strategies 
and habits may be copied with little consideration to their value 
(Chessare & Lieu 1998). 
There is debate in the literature about the value of introducing 
formal training in clinical reasoning into medical education. One view 
is that doctors can and should receive training that will improve their 
clinical judgements and decisions (Elstein, Shulman, and Sprafka 
1978; Elstein 1981; Elstein, Rovner, and Rothert 1982; Kassirer 1989; 
Croskerry 2000; Graber et al. 2005; Croskerry 2009a). For more than 
thirty years, researchers have sought to identify and understand the 
reasoning processes doctors use to make judgements and decisions. 
This line of work was driven by the assumption that the reasoning 
processes of expert doctors could be taught to inexperienced doctors. 
This approach has been criticised as it assumes that by identifying 
25 
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these reasoning processes, doctors can be taught the generic 
underlying principles of making good judgements and decisions. 
An alternative view is that there are no general principles· that 
doctors can learn to enhance their judgements and decisions. Rather, 
the ability to make good judgements and decisions is acquired 
through years of repeated practical experience (Norman 2005). This 
view also rests on the assumptions that there is no one ideal way to 
solve a clinical problem, and the nature of learning is context specific 
(Eva, Neville, and Norman 1998; Schuwirth 2002; Nendaz & Bordage 
2002; Norman, Eva, and Schmidt 2005; Eva & Norman 2005; Norman 
& Eva 2010). This perspective implies that it is impractical to try and 
teach general principles or strategies of good judgement and decision 
making when evidence suggests that people do not recognise how to 
apply their learning to novel situations in different contexts (Gick & 
Hollyoak 1983; Norman, Tugwell, Feightner, Muzzin, and Jacoby 
1995). 
1.4. Challenge. of enhancing doctor.' clinical 
rea.oning through formal training 
Understanding how to improve doctors' clinical judgements and 
decisions through formal training is challenging. This is partly 
because terminology is poorly defined in the clinical reasoning 
literature and knowledge of several disciplines is required in order to 
understand how effective training programmes can be developed. 
These issues are discussed further in the sections below. 
1.4.1. DeftniDI term. from the decision .cleace. and clinical 
reaaoDiDgllterature 
In the decision sciences, judgement is a separate area of study from 
decision making. Their theoretical underpinnings and definitions are 
distinct. Judgement can be distinguished from decision making as the 
assessment of alternatives to form an opinion. Whereas making a 
decision can be defined as a choice of action or inaction between 
alternative options (Dowie 1993; Baron 2008). However. this 
distinction cannot be applied to the clinical judgements and decisions 
CHAPTER 1 
of doctors. Making a clinical decision is a more difficult concept to 
define because it does not just involve choosing a course of action for 
a patient. The doctor must gather the relevant clinical information 
through questioning, examining the patient and possibly through 
clinical investigations. This information then needs to be interpreted 
to understand the problem before a diagnosis can be made. Hereafter 
the doctor decides how to manage the condition, which could include 
active treatment, referral to a specialist, a period of watchful waiting 
or discharge (Croskerry 2002). In practice it is not clear when clinical 
judgements become clinical decisions. The clinical reasoning 
literature does not make a distinction between a clinical judgement 
and clinical decision. Rather, clinical decision making is often used 
synonymously with clinical judgement, clinical inference, clinical 
reasoning, diagnostic reasoning and clinical problem solving 
(Thompson & Dowding 2002; Norman 2005). 
The study of doctors' clinical judgements and decisions are both 
part of an area of research known as clinical reasoning (Higgs & Jones 
1995). This thesis was concerned with how to enhance both the 
clinical judgements and decisions of doctors. For this reason, the 
term clinical reasoning was used to refer to the cognitive processes 
informing both clinical judgements and decisions. This thesis was 
concerned with training doctors to improve their clinical reasoning. 
However, given that it is more correct from a decision sciences 
perspective to distinguish judgements from decisions, it was helpful 
on occasion to separate clinical judgements from clinical decisions in 
the following way. Making a judgement in the clinical context and 
improving accuracy of judgements is associated with forming an 
opinion about a diagnosis. Whereas a clinical decision is associated 
with making a choice about how to manage a patient's condition. In 
other words, doctors make judgements to diagnose a condition and 
decisions to manage the condition. At some points in the thesis this 
distinction has been used when referring to either clinical judgements 
specifically or clinical decisions. Below is a table that summarises 
how these key terms have been used in this thesis. 
27 
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Decision sciences Definition Clin ical context Definition 
context 
Judgement Assessment of Clinical judgement Forming opinions about 
alternatives to form an diagnosis 
opinion 
Decision Choice of action or Clinical decision Choosing how to manage 
inaction between patient's condition 
alternative options 
Clinical reasoning Cognitive processes that 
inform both clinical 
judgements and decisions 
Table 1: Defining judgements and deci ions. 
Most of the clinical reasoning literature is about understanding the 
diagnostic process and enhancing diagnostic accuracy (Norman 
2005). Further, when the term clinical decision is used in the 
literature , it is almost always referring to a diagnosis. Much less is 
known about the processes doctors use to make patient management 
decisions or how to enhance the way they make treatment choice 
(Norman 2005). A lot of work has been conducted on improving 
treatment decision making, but this work aims to help patients make 
better choices about their health. In erventions that have been 
designed to enhance treatment decision making include patient 
decision aids and ways to encourage shared decision making between 
the patient and doctor (O'Connor, Rostom, Fiset, Tetroe, Entwistle, 
Llewellyn-Thomas, Holmes-Rovner, Barry, and Jone 1999; B kk r 
2010; Legare, Ratte , Stacey, Kryworuchko, Gravel, raham, and 
Turcotte 2010). These areas are separate from the clinical rea oning 
literature and are not referred to in detail in this thesis. 
In order to help doctors make better clinical judgement and 
decision , there n eds to b an und r tanding of wh t m 
judg ment or decision good. It i d bat d wh d 
deci ion quali hould be ba d on ou tcom 
ucce 
choic 
of treatment) or pro uch a makjng w 11 r n 
unc rtain natur of m dicin crib d in 
poor judg m n and d ci ion can r ul in g 
2 
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th 
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and good judgements and decisions can result in adverse medical 
outcomes. This is summarised in Table 2. 
Good judgement/decision Poor judgement/decision 
Good medical outcome ././ x 
Adverse medical outcome ./ xx 
Table 2: Defining quality of judgements and decisions. 
The most desirable situation is when doctors make good judgements 
and decisions and the medical outcomes are also good. However it is 
inevitable that some patients will not respond well to treatments or 
ever recover from an illness or injury. In situations where the medical 
outcome is adverse, doctors' judgements and decisions may be 
challenged by colleagues and patients. They must be able to justify 
that the steps taken to reach their decisions were acceptable, even 
though a patient's condition worsened (GMC 2009). If it transpires 
that the process was good, then it does not necessarily mean that the 
doctor made a misjudgement or poor decision. It is a concern when 
doctors make poor judgements and decisions, even if the medical 
outcome is good. Poor decision making compromises patient safety 
and doctors risk facing litigation if their poor practice leads to adverse 
medical outcomes (Croskerry 2003). For these reasons, an increasing 
number of decision making researchers stress that the reasoning 
process is a better marker of decision quality than the consequence of 
the decision (Frisch & Clemen 1994; Sox 1999; Yates, Veinott, and 
Patalano 2003; Baron 2008; Schwartz & Bergus 2008; Bekker 2010). 
This defmition of decision quality is particularly relevant in medicine 
as it is a requirement for doctors to be able to always justify their 
decisions and actions (GMC 2009). 
In this thesis, a good judgement or decision is defined as one that 
is reasoned well. However, using this definition presented a challenge 
in terms of measuring a good reasoning process as there is no 
consensus on what constitutes good and poor thinking (Bekker 2010). 
Previous measures that have been used to indicate good clinical 
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reasoning processes were critical thinking about clinical cases (Round 
1999; Abraham, Upadhya, Torke, and Ramnarayan 2004; Beullens, 
Struyf, and Van Damme 2006) and evidence of a more considered use 
of heuristics and avoidance of bias (Wolf, Gruppen, and Billi 1988; 
Hershberger, Part, Markert, Cohen, and Finger 1995). There is no 
single measure that is widely accepted as a good measure of clinical 
reasoning quality. 
1.4.2. An interdisciplinary approach to clinical reasoning training 
Three different areas of literature were drawn on in order to inform 
understanding of how to improve doctors' clinical reasoning. In 
general, training interventions should be designed with reference to a 
theoretical basis so that underlying assumptions are explicit and 
possible mechanisms that contribute to the effectiveness of 
interventions can be identified (Chen 1990; MRC 2008). The decision 
sciences are the field of study about human judgement and decision 
making. They draw on theories, methodologies and evidence from the 
behavioural sciences, economics and mathematics to describe how all 
individuals make judgements and decisions. Evidence from the 
decision sciences provides a context for understanding that all people 
make judgements and decisions in largely the same way. Knowledge 
about the theories and evidence that describe how doctors, 
specifically, make judgements and decisions in the clinical context 
was also necessary. Finally, knowledge about medical education was 
necessary. For instance, it was important to have an understanding of 
the different methods that are currently used to train and assess 
doctors' competencies. Theoretical perspectives and the medical 
education literature are discussed further in the following sections. 
1.5. Theoretical perspectives of Jud,emeDt aDd 
decisioD makiD, 
There are two main types of theories that can inform the training of 
doctors in clinical reasoning. These are theories about generic and 
expert decision making. Generic theories explain the processes that 
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all individuals use to make everyday judgements and decisions. 
Expert theories explain the processes that doctors use to make 
clinical judgements and decisions. There are many generic and expert 
decision theories, bu t only a few are discussed in further detail below. 
These include the information processing approach, as an example of 
a generic decision theory and two expert theories of clinical 
judgement. 
1.5.1. Understancling how alllndividuala make judgements and 
decisions: an information processing approach 
The information processing approach has driven much of the research 
on judgement and choice (Payne & Bettman 2004). It is still one of the 
dominant frameworks to describe how all individuals make 
judgements and decisions from the information 'out there' (Payne & 
Bettman 2004; Baron 2008; Croskerry 2009a). According to the 
information processing approach, the brain has a given infrastructure 
that makes sense of and stores information from the outside world 
(Newell & Simon 1972). People need to process information when 
solving problems and making decisions, but the brain cannot 
consciously process all of the complex information 'out there'. The 
brain has a limited capacity for conscious attention (Simon 1972). 
Consequently, people are highly selective about the information upon 
which they focus. Their judgements and decisions are based on 
information which has been processed and not the full information 
available. The mechanisms people use to solve complex problems with 
a limited processing capacity are known as heuristics (Payne & 
Bettman 2004). These are simple rules of thumb that help people take 
short cuts when making judgements and decisions. 
Heuristics are generally accepted as one of the two main strategies 
that all individuals use to process information. The other strategy is 
known as a systematic strategy. Together heuristic and systematic 
strategies represent two systems of information processing. The way 
people use these two systems is represented in dual processing 
models of information processing (Chaiken 1980; Chen & Chaiken 
1999; Payne & Bettman 2004). A dual processing model proposes a 
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system 1 and system 2 mode of thinking (Stanovich & West 2000). 
System 1 thinking is characterised by a fast and frugal process via the 
use of mental shortcuts i.e. heuristics. Judgements and decisions are 
made quickly and easily because little, if any, conscious thought is 
involved. For example, people readily conclude that a baby dressed in 
pink is a girl, or they may buy a camera that is recommended by a 
trusted friend rather than spend time searching for the latest model 
or best value for money. Heuristics usually lead to correct judgements 
and satisfactory decisions, but this is not always the case. 
Occasionally, people can unknowingly focus on irrelevant information 
and ignore relevant information (Payne & Bettman 2004). This can 
lead to inaccurate judgements and poor choices. For example, 
choosing to attend a university based on the number of friends who 
also plan to go to the same university, rather than prioritising course 
quality, reputation of the university, fees and living costs etc. 
System two thinking is characterised by a systematic strategy. This 
is a more complicated and deliberative process that feels challenging 
and takes time to make a decision. It requires conscious effort to 
evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the consequences of 
several options. Systematic processing is sometimes used to reach 
decisions that have important consequences, for example when 
purchasing a house. Whilst this approach requires more effort to 
reach a decision, it is more reliable, errors are unlikely, people are 
less likely to regret their decisions and can justify them to others 
when necessary. 
Doctors use the same infrastructure to make judgements and 
decisions as everyone else. Some of their judgements and decisions 
are made using a heuristic method and at other times a systematic 
method may be used. For example, doctors are taught to always 
consider worst case scenarios in some cases such as pre-eclampsia 
when a pregnant woman feels breathless or angina in a person that 
experiences chest pain at rest. Doctors may also follow the advice of a 
more experienced colleague when unsure about the type of treatment 
to give a patient. These are examples of heuristic methods because 
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they simplify the way a clinical problem is solved. Doctors will think 
systematically about most novel clinical problems or when the 
situation involves high risk to the patient's health. For example, if a 
patient is not responding to a treatment in the way that is expected, a 
doctor may revisit the details of the case and consider alternative 
diagnoses. To decide whether to perform surgery that involves 
significant risk to a patient's health, the doctor may weigh up the 
risks and benefits of performing or not performing the surgery. These 
are examples of systematic methods because conscious effort is made 
to deliberate about the clinical problem. 
1.5.2. Expert clinical judgement theories: hypothetico-deductive 
and pattern recognition methods 
A number of theories have been proposed to describe how doctors 
make clinical judgements about diagnosis. However, it is the 
hypothetico-deductive and pattern recognition methods that have 
been the most influential in furthering understanding about the 
diagnostic process. These are outlined briefly below. 
1.5.2.1. Hypothetico-Deductive method 
The Hypothetico-Deductive method is one of the earliest theories of 
clinical diagnosis (Elstein, Kagan, Shulman, Jason, and Loupe 1972). 
It describes diagnosis as a process of hypothesis generation using 
deductive reasoning i.e. the conclusion necessarily follows the 
hypothesis (Eysenck & Keane 2000). Early observational studies 
established that, within a few seconds or minutes of first seeing a 
patient, the doctor considers one or more hypotheses (Elstein et al. 
1978; Barrows, Norman, Neufeld, and Feightner 1982). These 
hypotheses are used to guide subsequent data collection, for instance, 
searching for other signs and symptoms that are expected to be 
present in a particular condition (Elstein & Schwartz 2002). Each 
hypothesis is tested for how well it fits the medical condition and the 
doctor eliminates those hypotheses that are no longer accurate. The 
hypothesis that is deemed most accurate after the testing stage is 
accepted as the diagnosis. Even though generating and testing 
33 
LJOCTORS' CLINIC.~L DECISION MAJ.;ING 
hypotheses has been described as a serial process, in reality the 
diagnostician performs these simultaneously and in a rapid, 
automatic way (Elstein et al. 1978). 
The Hypothetico-Deductive theory has received some empirical 
support (Barrows & Tamblyn 1980; Donnelly, Sisson, and Woolliscroft 
1990; Nakamura 2008) however it was soon challenged on the basis 
that both expert and novice diagnostician were reportedly using a 
similar hypothesis testing strategy. This finding was at odds with the 
view that expert and novice doctors do not solve clinical problems in 
the same way (Patel & Groen 1986; Elstein & Schwartz 2002; Norman 
2005). Evidence shows that expert doctors do not usually make a 
diagnosis by generating and testing a set of hypotheses. It was found 
that they were able to make accurate diagnoses quicker and more 
efficiently using a recognition strategy (Groen & Patel 1985; Schmidt, 
Norman, and Boshuizen 1990; Brooks, Norman, and Allen 1991; 
Norman, Coblentz, Brooks, and Babcook 1992). 
1.5.2.2. Pattern Recognition method 
An alternative theory proposed was a Pattern Recognition method, 
that described diagnosis as a categorisation process (Kulikowski 
1970; Groen & Patel 1985). The doctor categorises the signs and 
symptoms of medical conditions and stores these categories in clinical 
memory (Higgs & Jones 1995). When a new case is presented to the 
doctor, any similar signs and symptoms are recognised and placed 
into an existing category and given the same diagnostic label (Higgs & 
Jones 1995). The already existing categories serve as a prototype that 
enables doctors to recognise and match clinical patterns to existing 
diagnostic categories. Overall, this method describes an ability to 
immediately recognise many medical conditions based on their 
collection of their signs and symptoms. In contrast with the 
hypothetico-deductive method, pattern recognition involves inductive 
reasoning and is also known as a bottom-up theory. This means that 
information processing is directly influenced by environmental 
stimuli, i.e. the signs and symptoms of a medical condition and that 
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specific information is examined to arrive at a general conclusion (i.e. 
a 'diagnosis') (Eysenck & Keane 2000). 
Pattern recognition has also received empirical support (Groen & 
Patel 1985; Schmidt et al. 1990; Brooks et al. 1991; Norman et al. 
1992). Further, other evidence found pattern recognition was most 
associated with diagnostic success when compared to other reasoning 
strategies (Patel & Groen 1986; Coderre, Mandin, Harasym, and Fick 
2003). A limitation of the pattern recognition theory is that it rests on 
the premise that a doctor must have previously experienced and 
categorised a particular clinical pattern in order to recognise any 
similar patterns. It offers no explanation as to how doctors are able to 
diagnose conditions of which they have no previous experience. In 
other words how the initial prototype patterns develop is 
unaddressed. The Hypothetic-Deductive and Pattern Recognition 
theories propose two different methods of clinical diagnosis. They 
have since been reconciled in the following way; in difficult or novel 
clinical situations doctors may use a hypothetico-deductive method 
otherwise diagnosis is usually a direct and automatic process of 
pattern recognition (Elstein & Schwartz 2002). 
1.5.3. Theoretical context for improving doctora' cUnical 
reasoning 
When evaluating the suitability of the hypothetico-deductive and 
pattern recognition method to inform a training intervention in 
clinical reasoning, the following limitations were noted. First, they did 
not offer guidance on how to enhance the quality of judgements and 
decisions. For example, there was an explanation of how incorrect 
judgements occur using both of these theories, but this information 
alone is of little use if there is no understanding of how to avoid 
errors. Second, doctors can make a diagnosis by drawing on other 
methods. In brief these include, ruling out the worst case scenario, an 
exhaustive search for and evaluation of all the medical facts, trusting 
intuitive feelings, following established clinical guidelines, and using 
established statistical proofs to calculate accurate probabilities of 
disease (Croskerry 2002; Croskerry 2009b). This suggests doctors 
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utilise numerous reasoning styles to solve clinical problems 
depending on level of expertise and the clinical presentation (Elstein & 
Schwartz 2002). Evidence shows that it is better that doctors ·do not 
limit themselves to one mode of thinking. Greater diagnostic success 
has been associated with explicit instruction to use a combined 
reasoning approach of both heuristic and systematic methods 
compared to when no instruction was given (Ark, Brooks, and Eva 
2006; Ark, Brooks, and Eva 2007; Eva, Hatala, leBlanc, and Brooks 
2007). 
1.5.4. An integrated model of clinlcal reuoninc 
Recently, a framework has been proposed that brings together generic 
theory of judgement and decision making from the decisions sciences 
with expert theory of diagnosis (Croskerry 2009b). Drawing on the 
established division between heuristic and systematic thinking, the 
various processes used to reach diagnosis can be grouped under two 
systems. Intuitive, heuristic approaches that involve no deliberate 
thought such as pattern recognition, gut instinct and learned rules of 
thumb are grouped under system 1. Whereas conscious, systematic 
approaches such as the hypothetico-deductive method or calculating 
disease probabilities are grouped under system 2 (Croskerry 2009b; 
Norman 2009). Figure 1 illustrates this dual processing model of 
diagnostic reasoning. It models the doctor's mind in the following way: 
the presentation of the patient's condition is either recognised or not 
by the doctor. At the simplest level, if it is recognised the system 1 
processes are engaged immediately and automatically to identify the 
cause of the condition. This is considered to be the default method of 
diagnosis. If the presentation is not recognised, then the slower 
systematic processes of system 2 are engaged to make a diagnosis 
(Croskerry 2009b). It is proposed that system 1 processes represent a 
set of reflex systems that have adapted for survival, while system 2 
processes represent the logical, rational part of the brain that develop 
through learning (Croskerry 2009b). 
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The two systems are not mutually exclusive from each other. While 
an unfamiliar clinical presentation is usually diagnosed using a 
system 2 process, repeated exposure leads to recognition and 
eventually a system 1 process is engaged. Furthermore, it is possible 
that a doctor may initially be engaged in one system of thinking before 
switching to the other. For example an initial assessment of a patient 
with vomiting and abdominal pain may suggest a gastroenteritis 
diagnosis, but if the patient's condition does not resolve in the 
expected manner system 2 can force a reassessment of the diagnosis. 
System 2 can function like a monitor of system 1 in order that the 
doctor stops to reflect critically on clinical situations when needed. 
This is referred to as a rational override (Croskeny 2009b). 
Alternatively, a doctor may be aware that applying an established 
statistical proof like Bayes theorem can help estimate the probability 
of a particular diagnosis more accurately, but chooses to rely on 
intuitive feelings in the actual clinical context. This describes an 
irrational override of system 2 by system 1 . 
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Figure 1: Dual processing model of doctors' diagnostic reasoning (adapted from 
(Croskerry. 2009bl· 
A limitation of the dual processing model is that it only describes 
the processes that underpin diagnosis. It does not describe the way 
doctors make decisions about managing patients. Therefore the 
framework could offer a useful theoretical basis for intervening in 
doctors' diagnostic judgements, but not for treatment choices. Its 
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strengths are (i) a coherent translation of the decision sciences in a 
way that may be of use for the busy doctor (ii) the doctor is positioned 
in a broader context of human cognition to demonstrate they' apply 
generic as well as expert reasoning processes in the clinical context, 
(iii) it reflects the complexity of clinical reasoning by integrating the 
repertoire of approaches used to make a diagnosis (iv) it shows how 
errors can arise occur in doctors' thinking e.g. not recognising an 
atypical presentation (v) it suggests how the quality of clinical 
judgements might be improved, for instance a cautious use of system 
1 processes and/or developing critical thinking skills to strengthen 
the use of system 2 processes. 
1.6. Evidence of heuristics and bias In clinical 
judgement and decision making 
Section 1.5.1 introduced the idea that people often simplify the way 
they make judgements and decisions by employing rules of thumb, 
known as heuristics. A large body of research has been devoted to 
identifying the heuristics people use and exploring the effects they 
have on human judgement and decision making. Most of this work is 
attributed to an extensive research programme by Kahneman and 
Tversky in the 1970's, where many types of heuristics and their 
characteristics were identified. Heuristics are recognised as a 
universal feature of human cognition (Croskerry 2003; Norman 2009). 
They are a resourceful, practical and effective way of achieving quick 
and satisfactory judgements and decisions (Croskerry 2000). Most of 
the time they will serve people well but occasionally a price will be 
paid for taking shortcuts (Croskerry 2000). A key finding is that 
heuristics are associated with systematic and predictable errors 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). That is, people make the same 
types of incorrect judgements when a particular heuristic strategy is 
used (Kahneman & Tversky 1972; Kahneman & Tversky 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman 1973). These cognitive errors are referred to as 
biases. 
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A number of these biases have been illustrated in the clinical 
context (Chapman & Elstein 2000; Bornstein & Emler 2001; 
Croskerry 2002). This does not mean that doctors are inherently bad 
decision makers, but they are human and have the same 
infrastructure as others to use when making clinical judgements and 
decisions (Elstein 1999). Biased information processing can occur in 
the clinical context at any stage of the doctor-patient interaction with 
potentially grave consequences. There are a large number of 
heuristics that have been identified that can be grouped under three 
main types: (i) confirmation, (ii) anchoring and (iii) availability 
(Kahneman et al. 1982). The following paragraph offers a brief 
description of how doctors may use each of these heuristics and the 
biases associated with their use. 
The confirmation heuristic is used to seek only data that confrrms 
a preconceived diagnostic hypothesis, rather than disconflrnl it. 
Disconfirming evidence is undervalued such as the absence of 
particular symptoms. The biases associated with this heuristic can be 
a fixation on a weak hypothesis that is based on first impressions 
rather than appropriate evidence. Failure to test other hypotheses 
may result in wasted time and effort and a doctor risks missing a 
correct diagnosis (Kahneman et al. 1982; Joseph & Patel 1990; 
Elstein 1999; Chapman & Elstein 2000; Croskerry 2002; ~roskerry 
2003; Baron 2008; Norman 2009). The Anchoring heuristic involves 
the fixation on salient features of a presentation early in the 
diagnostic process. This can lead to the failure to adjust initial 
impressions in light of later information, and therefore the correct 
diagnosis may be missed (Kahneman et al. 1982; Croskerry 2002; 
Croskerry 2003; Norman 2009). The availability heuristic is used 
when a diagnosis is judged to be more likely if it is easily retrievable 
from memory. Common conditions are readily considered, whilst 
conditions that are uncommon less readily come to mind. This may 
lead to inaccurate estimates of disease probabilities, and therefore 
inaccurate diagnosis (Kahneman et al. 1982; Chapman & Elstein 
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2000; Bomstein & Emler 2001; Croskerry 2002; Croskerry 2003; 
Baron 2008; Norman 2009). 
Doctors, like other people, use heuristics automatically and 
unconsciously. This means that unknowingly, they risk making 
incorrect judgements and poor decisions. In order to reduce the risk 
of these cognitive errors, it has been suggested that doctors should 
receive training in cognitive de biasing (Kassirer & Kopelman 1991; 
Croskerry 2000; Croskerry 2002). Cognitive debiasing involves 
learning to recognise the situations in which cognitive errors can arise 
and knowing how to avoid them (Croskerry 2002; Croskerry 2003). A 
number of debiasing techniques have been suggested by (Croskerry 
2003) but their effectiveness for training purposes remains largely 
untested. There is evidence that raising doctors' awareness of 
heuristics and bias can improve aspects of their clinical reasoning on 
hypothetical scenarios (Wolf et al. 1988; Gruppen, Margolin, Wisdom, 
and Grum 1994; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999; Abraham et 
al. 2004). 
An encouraging find in one study was reported by Bomstein, 
Christine Emler, and Chapman (1999). These researchers found that 
doctors were not influenced by the sunk-cost effect in medical 
situations, but were in non-medical situations. The sunk cost-effect 
describes a phenomenon where people are reluctant to consider 
alternative options because they have invested a lot of time, effort 
and/or money into a particular decision (Croskerry 2003). Treatment 
decisions were not biased by the amount of time and money already 
invested in a diagnosis and particular treatment plan, but these 
factors did bias non-medical decisions (Bomstein et a1. 1999). Despite 
the extensive work that has been carried out in this area, there is 
little evidence to suggest that gaining knowledge about heuristics and 
bias would improve actual judgements and decisions in practice. In 
the non-clinical context, awareness training about heuristics was not 
enough to improve their judgements in practice (Fischhoff 1975; 
Welsh, Begg, and Bratvold 2007). 
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1. 7. Evidence of training doctors in clinical reasoning 
The interest in formally training doctors to make better judgements 
and decisions began in the 1970s with The Medical Inquiry Project 
(Elstein et al. 1978). Elstein and colleagues were motivated to 
understand two main issues, namely, (i) how doctors reach a clinical 
diagnosis, and (ii) how to help doctors improve their diagnostic skills. 
From this work, it was proposed that diagnosis was a process of 
generating and testing multiple hypotheses (see Section 1.5.2.1). As a 
first step in developing a formal training course to improve clinical 
reasoning, Elstein and colleagues conducted two surveys on members 
of the Society for Medical Decision Making. Here they identified the 
individuals and institutions that were offering clinical reasoning 
courses for doctors, the types of courses that existed and obtained 
their views and preferences towards future courses (Elstein 1981; 
Elstein, Dawson-Saunders, and Belzer 1985). The vast majority of 
training was happening in North America. In 1981, twenty different 
institutes offered formal courses to doctors in clinical reasoning, and 
twelve offered a course that included some content on judgement 
and / or decision making (Elstein 1981). A few years later, sixty 
institutes were including some formal training to clinical reasoning 
(Elstein et al. 1985). It was not clear how many of these courses were 
devoted entirely to improving doctors' clinical reasoning or whether 
they had been integrated fully into medical curricula. 
The survey conducted by Elstein and colleagues found that the 
majority of courses aimed to teach doctors how to apply normative 
decision theories to their clinical judgements and decisions. 
Normative decision theories describe how people should make 
decisions if they want to select the optimum or rational choice (Baron 
2008). Decision making from this approach is based on mathematical 
and statistical proofs that require people to calculate the optimum 
choice. Most of the clinical reasoning courses taught doctors practical 
ways of applying Bayes theorem to clinical diagnosis and Expected 
Utility Theory (EUT) to treatment choices. Bayes theorem consists of a 
statistical formula that can be applied to the clinical context as a way 
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of helping doctors make accurate estimates of disease probabilities 
(Moreira, Bisoffi, Narvaez, and Van den Ende 2008). The principles of 
EUT are applied through decision analysis methods. Decision analysis 
offers ways of graphically representing decision problems with all of 
the options and consequences explicitly represented (Grant, Keirn, 
and Telfer 2006). Most of the courses that were surveyed taught 
doctors how to make optimal treatment choices by evaluating the 
possible consequences of each treatment option against their own 
preferences (van der Velde 2005; Moreira et al. 2008). 
These findings indicate that medical educators prioritise a 
statistical approach to inform the design of clinical reasoning training 
where the focus is on improving the outcomes (e.g. accuracy) of 
doctors' judgements and decisions (see Section 1.4.1). Other types of 
clinical reasoning courses were identified in the literature that also 
takes this approach. Examples include encouraging the use of 
guidelines and computer decision support systems that enhance 
diagnostic accuracy (de Dombal, Dallos, and McAdam 1991; Lagerlov, 
Loeb, Andrew, and Hjortdahl 2000; Akici, Kala~a, Ugurlu, Karaalp, 
and Cali S 2003; Hedrick & Young 2008). Also, manikins and 
standardised patients have been used to allow doctors to practice 
making real decisions in a safe learning environment (Chopra, Gesink, 
De Jong, Bovill, Spierdijk, and Brand 1994; Byrne, Sellen, Jones, 
Aitkenhead, Hussain, Gilder, Smith, and Ribes 2002). 
An alternative approach to improving doctors' clinical reasonmg 
has been identified in the clinical reasoning literature. This approach 
rests on the view that it is more important to teach doctors how to 
reason well about their judgements and choices. Applying normative 
decision theory to clinical problems is cumbersome, time consuming 
and an impractical way of enhancing the busy doctor's judgements 
and decisions in practice (Croskerry 2005). Improving doctors' ability 
to reason better about clinical problems has not received sufficient 
attention in medical education. This approach requires a translation 
of the work from the decision sciences, which are mostly unknown to 
doctors (Schwartz & Bergus 2008). Some authors argue that doctors 
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may gain benefit from an understanding of system 1 and system 2 
processes (see Section 1.5.1), the factors that contribute to poor 
thinking and ways to avoid them, and the importance of monitoring 
one's own thought processes (Croskerry 2002; Graber, Gordon, and 
Franklin 2002; Croskerry 2003; Schwartz & Bergus 2008). In this 
thesis, the term decision literacy has been introduced to describe an 
explicit awareness of, and ability to critically evaluate, one's own 
reasoning processes. There is little evidence that the effectiveness of 
enhancing doctors' decision literacy has been evaluated. 
1.8. Broader issues in developing a training 
programme in clinical reasoning 
A clinical reasoning course for doctors has to be designed, 
implemented and evaluated in the context of medical education 
(Campbell, Murray, Darbyshire, Emery, Farmer, Griffiths, Guthrie, 
Lester, Wilson, and Kinmonth 2007). This requires an understanding 
of the graduate outcomes as required from governing medical bodies, 
and current trends in learning and medical curriculum design 
(Barrow, McKimm, and Samarasekera 2010). To optimise the 
effectiveness of a new training course, the teaching, learning and 
assessment methods should reflect current good practices in medical 
education (Barrow et al. 2010). These issues are discussed in the 
following sections. 
1.8.1. Trends in medical education 
Medical education, like other disciplines, has gone through trends 
and shifts in philosophy in response to workplace demands and 
advances in learning (McKimm 2010). The emphasis has moved away 
from a teacher centred towards a learner centred curriculum. This 
involved a decrease in traditional lecture based teaching in favour of a 
more interactive problem based learning approach, an integrated 
interdisciplinary curriculum and an emphasis on student self-directed 
learning (Barrow et al. 2010). These recommendations were based on 
a model of curriculum developed, SPICES model proposed by Harden, 
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Sowden, and Dunn (1984). SPICES is an acronym that stands for 
student centred, problem based learning, integrated teaching, 
community based, electives and systematic. Medical educators have 
devised a number of educational strategies to achieve curriculum 
reforms based on SPICES model. For instance, to encourage problem 
based and active learning, tools and assessment methods were 
developed that demonstrate what trainees might do when faced with 
real clinical problems (Miller 1990). The use of clinical vignettes, case 
scenarios based on realistic clinical details, became important 
learning tools. They have been used as problem solving exercises for 
doctors to practice diagnosing and treating specific medical conditions 
(Peabody, Luck, Glassman, Jain, Hansen, Spell, and Lee 2004). 
Interactive learning in small groups and web based learning has 
become widely used as a supplement to traditional teaching (Ruiz, 
Mintzer, and Leipzig 2006). Web based learning, also known as e-
learning or online learning has been used for a variety of purposes 
such as to deliver tutorials, small group discussions, and informal 
assessments (Cook 2007). Clinical vignettes have been used to 
develop elaborate computer-based simulations of patient encounters, 
where students can practise taking histories, ordering and 
interpreting the results of diagnostic tests, and administering 
treatment (Cook 2007). These approaches may encourage students to 
understand material and take more responsibility for their own 
learning. Problem solving exercises and/or web based learning 
approaches encourage students to engage with tasks and material in 
meaningful ways, and the role of the educator changes from someone 
who teaches facts to a facilitator of learning (Ruiz et al. 2006; Barrow 
et al. 2010). To achieve a more integrated curriculum, different 
subject areas became clustered around common themes. Exposure to 
the clinical context was introduced in the first years to lessen the 
distinction between a pre-clinical and clinical phase. These 
integration strategies were introduced so that students could 
understand the commonalities between different su bject areas, and 
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how their theoretical learning relates to their professional practice in 
the clinical context (Barrow et al. 2010; McKimm 2010). 
1.8.2. Evaluating training programmes 
Evaluating the effectiveness of an innovative educational programme 
is an integral part of the process. The information that an evaluation 
provides is useful to decide whether to continue or discontinue the 
programme and/or identify where improvements could be made 
(Kirkpatrick 1998). Medical educators must demonstrate the 
effectiveness of their intervention using evaluation methods that are 
known to and valued by the medical education community (Anderson 
& Harris 2003). A number of frameworks have been developed to 
guide the design and evaluation phases of educational programmes in 
medical education. Some examples include Kirkpatrick's model to 
evaluate training programmes (Kirkpatrick 1998) and Miller's pyramid 
of clinical assessment (Miller 1990). Kirkpatrick recommended that 
the evaluation of any educational programme should be approached 
in a systematic manner. He proposed four broad outcomes that 
should be measured. These outcomes were arranged in a hierarchical 
sequence that requires increasing effort to evaluate. At the minimum 
level, an educational programme should at least assess participants' 
reaction to the training, followed by their learning. This could be 
change in knowledge or attitudes. At the higher, complex levels, 
training should be assessed in terms of transfer of learning to the 
desired context and finally long term changes at the workplace 
(Kirkpatrick 1998). 
Miller has described four stages of learning that doctors should 
demonstrate in clinical assessment. At the lowest level a doctor is 
expected to have gained knowledge, followed by evidence they know 
how to use that knowledge, at least hypothetically. These refer to the 
cognitive aspects of learning and can be measured using traditional 
assessment tools such as written and oral tests. Assessing the 
behavioural aspects of learning becomes more difficult. This includes 
assessing the ability to demonstrate correct use of knowledge during 
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practical examinations and then applying it appropriately in clinical 
practice (Miller 1990). This measures the ability to perform and can 
be achieved through observations and work place based assessments. 
1.9. Assumptions underlying thesis 
The preceding reviews introduce the theories, evidence and 
perspectives about enhancing doctors' clinical judgements and 
decision making skills. This thesis is based on the following 
perspectives: (i) doctors, like most people, are unaware of how they 
make judgements and decisions; (ii) they can and should be helped 
with formal training to make better clinical judgements and decisions; 
(iii) given the nature of the clinical context the emphasis of training 
should be on achieving well-reasoned judgements and decisions 
rather than desirable medical outcomes; (iv) the decision sciences 
offer a useful theoretical basis for intervening in doctors' clinical 
reasoning; and (v) interventions that aim to enhance doctors' decision 
literacy should be evaluated. 
1.10. Thesis aims and objectives 
Over thirty years has passed since research began on how to formally 
train doctors in clinical reasoning. The above reviews show that some 
training initiatives have been developed to help doctors make better 
clinical judgements and decisions. However it is unclear whether this 
type of training currently exists in medical curricula and how effective 
it is. Little attention has been paid to developing training courses that 
improve the reasoning processes doctors employ to make judgements 
and decisions. The aims of this thesis are: (i) to develop an 
intervention informed by decision theory to facilitate doctors' 
reasoning about clinical judgements and decisions, and (ii) to evaluate 
the feasibility of integrating the intervention within medical education. 
The objectives of this thesis include: 
identifying the evidence of interventions designed to enhance 
doctors' clinical reasoning; 
evaluating the effectiveness of these interventions; 
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describing how inteIVentions have been incorporated into medical 
curricula; 
exploring doctors' views and experiences about making clinical 
judgements and decisions effectively; 
making recommendations for the design and implementation of 
future clinical reasoning training for doctors. 
The chapters within this thesis address these aims and objectives. 
Chapter 2 describes a systematic review integrating the evidence 
designed to enhance doctors' clinical reasoning. Chapter 3 describes a 
questionnaire study that sUIVeyed inteIVentions that had not been 
evaluated or published as research. Chapter 4 describes an interview 
study to explore the views and experiences of doctors in making 
clinical judgements and decisions. Chapter 5 describes a quasi-
experimental study to evaluate the feasibility of an online decision 
literacy inteIVention. 
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Education and interventions to 
facilitate doctors' clinical 
reasoning: a systematic review 
This chapter describes a systematic review study that synthesised the 
evidence of interventions to enhance doctors' clinical reasoning. The 
chapter discusses the background, aims and objectives of the review. 
It then describes the details of the methods used. The results of the 
review are then discussed by narrative to answer the research 
questions. The strengths and limitations are then highlighted followed 
by recommendations for future work. 
2.1. Background 
There is increasing emphasis on the need for doctors to be taught how 
to be proficient in making good clinical judgements and decisions 
(GMC 2009). This area of training has been assumed to be acquired 
implicitly through the hidden curriculum, usually by opportunistic 
observation of reasoning demonstrated by expert doctors (Howe et al. 
1984; Chessare & Lieu 1998). Some have argued that the systematic 
principles of human judgment and decision making should be 
fonnally taught in medical education in order to improve doctors' 
insight into their own clinical reasoning (Elstein et al. 1978; Elstein 
1981; Elstein et al. 1982; Round 1999; Croskerry, Wears, and Binder 
2000)- Others have developed interventions designed to enhance 
specific skills such as diagnostic accuracy and treatment prescribing 
(Wolf et al. 1988; Hassan, Abdulla, Bakathir, AI-Amoodi. Aklan. and 
de Vries 2000; Akici et al. 2003). 
Several reviews have integrated the evidence for the effectiveness of 
interventions designed to improve specific skills such as diagnosis. 
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accuracy and treatment prescribing. In brief, Hunt, Haynes, Hanna, 
and Smith (1998) integrated findings from randomised controlled 
trials assessing the effects of computer-based clinical decision 
support systems (CDSSs) on doctor performance and patient 
outcomes. Two-thirds of the sixty-six studies reported that computer-
based clinical decision support systems improved doctors' 
performance for drug dosing and preventive care but the evidence was 
less convincing for diagnosis. Kawamoto, Houlihan, Balas, and 
Lobach (2005) evaluated randomised controlled trials (RCT) of 
decision support systems with an aim of identifying features critical 
for improving clinical practice. Of the seventy studies, 68% of 
computer-based clinical decision support systems significantly 
improved clinical practice. Four features were identified as active 
ingredients in facilitating clinical practice: automatic decision 
support; provision of recommendations rather than assessments; 
decision support at time and location of decisions making; 
computerised systems. Finally, Le Grand, Hogerzeil, and Haijjer-
Ruskamp (1999) carried out a structured review integrating findings 
from interventions to improve appropriate drug prescription in 
developing countries. Of the fifty studies reviewed, only six used an 
RCT design. The majority of interventions were aimed at increasing 
prescribing rates in public health settings rather than appropriate 
prescribing. Interventions such as essential drug lists and standard 
treatment guidelines were in wide use without being evaluated. 
To date, there is no systematic review that integrates evidence of 
interventions aimed at improving doctors' decision literacy, such as 
increasing awareness of the way doctors make judgements and 
decisions and the factors influencing their choices. Further, it is 
unclear whether or not this insight into the science behind human 
decision making impacts on their clinical judgments, choices and 
practice. The review introduces the term decision literacy to describe 
an explicit awareness of, and ability to critically evaluate, one's own 
reasoning processes. This review revisits studies designed to improve 
both clinical judgements and decisions. 
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2.2. Alms and objectives 
The aim of this systematic review was to integrate the evidence of 
strategies and interventions to facilitate doctors' clinical reasoning. 
The objectives were to: 
describe the interventions designed to facilitate clinical reasoning 
in undergraduate and postgraduate medical education; 
describe the ranges of measures used to assess clinical reasoning; 
evaluate the effectiveness of the interventions; 
identify the component parts of interventions that facilitate clinical 
reasoning; 
describe how these interventions have been incorporated into 
medical curricula; 
make recommendations for the design of future clinical reasoning 
in terven tions. 
2.3. Methods 
2.3.1. Dealgn 
The study was a cross-sectional survey of primary empirical research 
examining the interventions to facilitate doctors' clinical reasoning 
employing a systematic review method. There are several recognised 
advantages of systematic reviews over traditional non-systematic 
reviews (Chalmers & Altman 1995). The systematic review is an 
efficient method of summarising large quantities of information to 
make knowledge more accessible to others (Chalmers & Altman 1995; 
Torgerson 2003; Petticrew & Roberts 2006). They differ from 
traditional reviews in that they use scientific and transparent 
methods to identify and evaluate evidence. For example, a systematic 
review aims to identify all of the evidence that addresses a particular 
research question whereas the non-systematic review usually 
identifies only a subset of evidence (Torgerson 2003). The inclusion 
and exclusion of studies is based on a pre-defined criterion that 
makes the reasons for data extraction explicit (Chalmers & Altman 
1995; Torgerson 2003). A coding frame is developed and used as a 
CHAPTER 2 
guide to extract the same information from each included article. This 
standardises the data extraction process so the researcher can 
compare the details and quality of the evidence (Chalmers & Altman 
1995; Torgerson 2003). 
These rigorous and explicit methods reduce the chances of bias 
influencing the results and their interpretation. The effect of the 
researcher's subjective opinions are minimised at all stages of the 
review. Their assumptions and decisions can be scrutinised by others 
and methods can be replicated (Torgerson 2003; Petticrew & Roberts 
2006). Traditional reviews have been criticised as a haphazard 
overview of a convenience sample of the evidence (Torgerson 2003). As 
methods are not systematic, it cannot identify all of the relevant 
evidence that should potentially be included (Torgerson 2003). Articles 
are not selected on the basis of clear inclusion/ exclusion criteria, this 
means the selection process is driven by subjectivity of the researcher 
(Chalmers & Altman 1995; Petticrew & Roberts 2006). Furthermore, 
the quality of each study is not assessed rigorously and formally as it 
is in a systematic review. It is unclear what interventions have been 
designed and which of them are effective in enhancing doctors' clinical 
reasoning. A thorough and systematic review of the evidence provides 
answers to these questions and allows suggestions to be made for 
future work. 
2.3.2. Study selection criteria 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were revised during the course of 
the review in order to answer the research questions. In the initial 
stages the inclusion criteria were: training programmes to enhance 
either doctors' clinical judgements or decisions, medically trained 
participants, an experimental study design and publications in the 
English language. Excluded articles were: shared or patient decision 
making, participants not medically trained, case studies or those that 
report doctors' experiences of decision making, unpublished or non-
English language research. The rationale for these exclusion criteria 
were as follows: the focus of the thesis is enhancing the types of 
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judgements and decisions doctors specifically make e.g. diagnosis, 
prescribing and referrals. Shared or patient decision making was 
outside the remit of the thesis as were the clinical decisions -of non-
medically trained health professionals. Studies were excluded that 
featured shared or patients' decisions as well as participants that 
were not medical students or doctors. These were not relevant to 
understanding how to effectively enhance the clinical reasoning of 
doctors. Studies with a non-experimental design were excluded i.e. 
those without a comparative basis, qualitative and case studies. The 
effect of interventions could not be established without having been 
tested through an experiment. Studies not published or written in 
non-English languages were excluded due to time and financial 
constraints of the PhD programme. 
As the review progressed three types of article were retrieved for 
which their inclusion or exclusion was unclear. To clarify what should 
happen to these studies, the inclusion and exclusion criteria were 
refined. The first type of article included interventions that did not 
require participants to engage in much thinking. For example some 
computer technologies and guidelines would produce the optimal 
decision for the participant. These articles were excluded as they did 
not require participants to think and make decisions for themselves. 
Secondly, there were many studies of medical guidelines and decision 
support systems. These were initially included but later excluded as 
their main objectives were to evaluate effectiveness of their 
implementation in clinical practice. Thirdly, there were studies of 
interventions to enhance interpretation of clinical data. In all of these 
types of studies, confusion arose because doctors' decision making 
did feature implicitly. However they were excluded on the basis that 
the interventions were not primarily aimed at enhancing doctors' 
judgements or decisions. 
The final inclusion criteria were; training programmes to enhance 
doctors' clinical judgements or decisions, medically trained 
participants, experimental study design and publications in English 
language. The revised exclusion criteria were shared or patient 
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decision making, participants not being medically trained, studies 
without an experimental design, unpublished or non-English 
language research, studies not requiring participants to make 
decisions themselves, implementation studies and studies not 
assessing decision making related variables. These final selection 
criteria reflected a more precise evidence base of training programmes 
to enhance the clinical reasoning of doctors. 
2.3.3. Search strategy 
The purpose of a search strategy is to limit the number of articles 
retrieved to those that are most relevant to the review (Petticrew & 
Roberts 2006). For this to be achieved, a balance between a sensitive 
(broad) and specific search was required. A preliminary search was 
conducted with key words in the OVID database to determine types of 
articles retrieved and terminology used. A few key articles were 
retrieved but this preliminary search produced an unmanageable 
number of hits, many of which were irrelevant. 
To make the search more specific it required a more exhaustive list 
of key terms in order to retrieve relevant articles. Assistance was 
sought from the faculty librarian to develop a more effective strategy. 
The main research question was divided into the following topic 
headings: intervention, doctors and clinical decision making. However 
in order to maintain enough breadth in the search a list of synonyms 
for each topic heading was developed. Examples of these synonyms 
were training and teaching, clinicians and physicians, clinical 
judgement and reasoning. The purpose of including as many 
synonyms as possible for each topic heading was to prevent the 
search strategy being too specific. Bias can be introduced when the 
search strategy is highly specific as relevant articles can be omitted 
(Petticrew & Roberts 2006). Synonyms were particularly important in 
this review as decision making terminology is not used consistently in 
the medical literature. To check whether the search strategy worked 
effectively, the data sets retrieved from each database were screened. 
Relevant articles that were initially missed plus a recurrence of key 
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articles were consistently retrieved. This suggested that the revised 
search strategy had achieved a balance between sensitivity and 
specificity. The search strategy for each database is summarised in 
Appendix 8.1. 
2.3.4. Sources searched 
The following electronic databases were searched from their start 
dates until May 2010: Cochrane Library, Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination (CRD), Medline, Embase, PsyclNFO, Cambridge 
Scientific Abstracts and Web of Science. The rationale for selecting 
these databases is discussed further below. The Cochrane Library and 
CRD contain the details of existing systematic reviews in the health 
services. These were useful resources to establish whether the same 
or similar systematic reviews had already been conducted. Medline 
and Embase were selected as they are prominent resources of medical 
education research. PsychINFO was selected as it consists of research 
articles in the Behavioural Sciences and other disciplines related to 
Medicine. The databases selected from Cambridge Scientific Abstracts 
were Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA) and 
Educational Research Information Centre (ERIC). ASSIA provided 
abstracts from social sciences journals and ERIC from education 
research and practice. 
For a comprehensive search, it has been recommended that hand 
searches of selected resources should also be conducted to identify 
articles not found on electronic databases (Torgerson 2003; Petticrew 
& Roberts 2006). The journals Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 
Medical Education and Medical Decision Making were manually 
searched. These three journals were chosen as they publish research 
articles in health services, medical education and decision making 
theory, respectively. Research from these disciplines was considered 
most relevant to answering the review's research questions. The 
journals Quality and Safety in Healthcare and Medical Decision 
Making were searched from first issues in 1992 and 1981 respectively 
until May 2010. Medical Education predates both of the above 
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journals, but the manual search began from 1981 until May 2010. 
The year 1981 was chosen for the noticeable increase in research on 
principles of clinical decision making. This work was largely headed 
by Arthur Elstein who encouraged the design of educational 
programmes that would formally train doctors in clinical reasoning 
(Elstein 1981; Elstein et al. 1982; Howe et al. 1984; Elstein et al. 
1985). For this reason it was more likely that the majority of 
interventions were designed from 1981 onwards rather than before. 
The work of some academics was recurring throughout the search 
process. In addition to the above, searches for the work of each of the 
following people was conducted; Arthur Elstein, Jack Dowie, Theo De 
Vries, Peter Ubel, Gretchen Chapman, Angela Fargerlin. Reference 
lists of articles included in the review were also searched so as not to 
miss any relevant articles. 
2.3.5. Materials 
A data extraction form was developed from the literature (CRD 2001) 
and used to extract data systematically from each article identified as 
meeting the inclusion criteria (Appendix 8.2). The following types of 
data were extracted included the following; bibliographic details, aim 
of study, theoretical context, study design characteristics intervention 
details, task details, variables measured, results and conclusions. In 
addition, a judgment was made on the scientific rigour of the study, 
i.e. quality assessment. As most of the studies in this area employ a 
cross-sectional and/or before-and-after and/or cohort study design, 
the traditional hierarchy of evidence quality assessment was not 
sensitive enough to discriminate the scientific rigour of the empirical 
research identified by this review. A set of criteria for assessing the 
quality of the studies was developed using guidelines from the EPPI 
centre (EPPI 2007). This included: the use of theory, scientific rigour, 
coherence of the study, and generalisable results. To differentiate 
between high and low quality studies, each were rated according to 
the above criteria and assigned a total quality score out of 30. 
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2.3.6. Procedure 
Initially the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination databases and the 
Cochrane Library were searched to identify whether the same or 
similar systematic reviews existed. This was followed by a systematic 
search of the databases mentioned above. The study selection criteria 
were applied to potentially relevant abstracts. Full articles were 
retrieved when abstracts met the inclusion criteria or were in need of 
further analysis to make a decision. Articles not available online or 
from the University were ordered from the library services. Articles 
were categorised into three groups: include, exclude and borderline. 
Samples of articles to be included and excluded were reviewed by 
supervisors to check the suitability of the study selection criteria. All 
articles in the borderline category were discussed and reviewed by the 
supervisors in order to decide whether they met the inclusion criteria 
or not. During this process the selection criteria were refined to 
discriminate clearly between articles that should and should not be 
included in the review. 
The data extraction form was developed and piloted on a sample of 
included articles to assess its suitability. After a discussion with 
supervisors it was simplified to reflect the wide range of study designs 
in medical education. The data extraction form became more general 
with less tick boxes and space to record study details at length. This 
revised data extraction form was applied systematically to each article 
that met the inclusion criteria of the review. 
2.3.7. Analysis 
The studies' characteristics were summarised in frequency tables. 
Statistical integration was not possible as there was little consistency 
in the aspects of decision making being assessed and the types of 
designs and measures used to evaluate effectiveness. The synthesis of 
findings is integrated by narrative structured in a way to address the 
research questions. 
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2.4. Results 
The search identified 104,746 abstracts; 210 articles were evaluated 
in accordance with the review criteria; 64 were included in the final 
review. Figure 2 summarises the selection process of articles. 
Abstracts screened (n = 104, 746) 
Articles examined in full (n = 210) 
Articles excluded (n = 146) 
Articles included (n = 64) Extracted data (n = 64) 
Figure 2: The selection process of articles. 
Table 3 shows the study numbers and citations for all 64 articles 
that were included in the review. 
SN Author SN Author 
1 Round 1999 33 Byrne et al. 2002 
2 
Lee, Joynt, Ho, Gin, and Hazlett 
2007 34 de Dombal et al. 1991 
3 Hassan et al. 2000 35 
Vollebregt, Metz, de Haan, Richir, 
Hugtenburg, and de Vries 2005 
4 
Wigton, Poses, Collins, and Cebul 
1990 
DaRosa, Rogers, Williams, Hauge, 
36 Sherman, Murayama, Nagle, and 
Dunnington 2008 
Friedman, Elstein, Wolf, Murphy, 
S Franz, Heckerling, Fine, Miller, and 37 Moreira et al. 2008 
Abraham 1999 
6 
Akici, Kalaca, Goren, Akkan, 
Karaalp, Demir, Ugurlu, and Oktay 2004 38 
Akici, Goren, Aypak, Terzioglu, and 
Oktay 2005 
DeVries, Henning, Hogerzeil, Watson, Clements, Yudkin, Rose, 
7 Bapna, Bero, Katie, Mabadeje, Santosa, 39 Bukach, Mackay, Lucassen,and 
and Smith 1995 Austoker 2001 
8 Akici et al. 2003 40 Kopp, Stark, and Fischer 2008 
9 Lagerlov et al. 2000 41 Beck & Bergman 1986 
de Vries, Daniels, Mulder, Groot, 
Newton-Syms, Dawson, Cooke, Wewerinke, Barnes, Bakathir, Hassan, 
10 Feely, Booth, Jerwood, and Calvert 42 Van Bortel, Kriska, Santoso, Sanz, 
1992 Thomas, Ziganshina, Bezemer, Van 
Kan, Richir, and HogerzeiL 2008 
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Veninga, Lagerl0v, Wahlstrom, 
11 Muskova, Denig, Berkhof, Kochen, and 43 Essex & Healy 1994 
Haaijer-Ruskamp 1999 
12 Nilsson, Hjemdahl, Hassler, Vitols, Wallen, and Krakau 2001 44 Hoffrage & Gigerenzer 1998 
13 Veninga, Denig, Zwaagstra, and Haaijer-Ruskamp 2000 45 Mayou 1978 
14 Schwartz, Donnelly, Nash, Johnson, Young, and Griffen 1992 46 Seullens et ai, 2006 
15 Lernau 1989 47 O'Connell, Henry, and Tomlins 
1999 
16 Carter, Butler, Rogers, and Holloway 1993 
Frijling, Lobo, Hulscher, 
48 Akkermans, Sraspenning, Prins, van 
der Wouden, and Grol 2002 
Frijling, Lobo, Hulscher, 
17 Wolf et .11. 1988 49 Akkermans, van Drenth, Prins, van der 
Wouden, and Grol 2003 
18 
Noguchi, Matsui, Imura, Kiyota, and 
Fukui 2004 50 
Thomas, Boxall, Laha, Day, and 
Grundy 2008 
Lincoln, Turner, Haug, Warner, 
19 Grant et al. 2006 51 Williamson, Bouhaddou, Jessen, 
Sorenson, Cundick, and Grant 1991 
20 Abraham et al. 2004 52 
Karaalp, Akici, Kocabas, Lu, and 
Oktay 2003 
21 Hedrick & Young 2008 53 Chopra et al. 1994 
22 Warner, Woolley, and Kane 1974 54 
Lundborg, Wahlstrom, Diwan, Oke, 
Martenson, and Tomson 1999 
23 
Murray, Cupples, Barberm, Dunnm, 
Scottm, and Hannay 1971 
55 Wigton, Patil, and Hoellerich 1986 
24 
Rogers, Grenvik, and Willenkin 
1995 56 
Windish, Price, Clever, Magaziner, 
and Thomas 2005 
Tamblyn, Huang, Perreault, 
25 Hershberger et .11. 1995 57 Jacques James, Hanley, Mcleod, and 
Laprise 2003 
26 Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage 2002 58 
Anderson, McEwan, and Hrudey 
1996 
27 Rogers, Swee, and Ullian 1991 59 DeVries 1993 
Servais, LaMorte, Agarwal. 
28 Moschetti, Mallipattu, and Moulton 
2006 
60 Sintchenko, (oiera. Iredell. and 
Gilbert 2004 
29 
Kumta, Tsang, Hung, and Cheng 
2003 61 
Shekelle. Kravitz. Beart. Marger. 
Wang. and Lee 2000 
30 Cebul, 8eck, and Carroll 1984 62 Gifford. Mittman. Fink. lanto. lee. 
and Vickrey 1996 
31 Margolis, 8arloon S, and N, 1982 63 
Davidoff. Goodspeed. and Chve 
1989 
Junghans, Feder, Timmis, Eldridge, 
32 Sekhri, Black, Shekelie, and Hemingway 
2007 
64 
Terrell. Perkins. Dexter, HUI, 
Callahan, and Miller 2009 
Table J: Stud:-.' number~ and CItation!'! of Indudrd Hrtldt"l'I 
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2.4.1. Source of studies 
The majority of studies were carried out in Europe (Table 4) but one 
third of the studies were from North America (n = 23). Studies 
originated from a wide range of journals but most were either 
specialist medical or medical education journals (Table 5). 
Country Frequency Study Number 
North America 23 5,14,16,17,19,21,22,24,25,27,28,30,36, 41,51,55,56,57,58,61,62,63,64 
Other Europe (e.g. 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 20 6,7,8,9,11,12,13,26,35,37,38,40,44,46, Slovakia, Germany, Turkey, 48,49,52,53,54,59 
Belgium) 
UK 10 1,10,23,32,33,34,39,43,45,50 
East Asia (e.g. China, Japan) 4 2,4,18,29 
Other (e.g. Yemen, Australia, 7 3,15,20, 31,42,47,60 
India, Australia, various) 
Table 4: Country of study origin (N = 64). 
Journal Type Frequency Study Number 
Medical specialist 25 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 28, 16, 19, 20, 21, 24,32,33,35,38,42,45,48,53,54,59,64 
Medical Education 18 1, 2, 15, 23, 26, 27,4, 25, 17, 31, 36, 37,40,41, 44,46,52,55 
General Medicine 16 5,7,9,18,34,39,43,47,49,50,56,57,58, 61,62,63 
Information Technology 4 22,29,51,60 
Decision Making 1 30 
Table 5: Journal of study origin (N = 64). 
2.4.2. Study characteristics 
Half of the studies used a randomised controlled trial (ReT) study 
design (Table 6). Study 59 appears more than once in Table 6 as more 
than one study was conducted with different designs. The majority of 
studies recruited their samples using a purposive method i.e. a 
particular population was chosen to suit the purpose of the research 
(Table 7). Most studies were conducted with either medical 
undergraduate students only or doctors only, few used a mixed 
sample of both students and doctors (Table 8). One third of the 
studies were conducted in a university setting. Nineteen studies did 
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not report where their study was conducted and 17 were conducted in 
a health care setting (Table 9). 
Design Frequency Study Number 
Randomised Controlled Trial 2.3.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.15.22.26.29.32.33. 
(RCT) 32 35. 36. 39.40.41. 42. 47. 48. 49. 51. 53. 54. 56. 57.58.62.64 
Before/after same sample 12 5.18.19.20.24.28.31.34.43.46.50.52 
Non-randomised comparative 11 1.6.14.16.17.27.45.55.59.61.63 (experimental vs controls) 
Before/after different samples 
(comparisons within same 6 4. 21. 23. 25. 30. 38 group and/or between 
different groups before/after) 
Other (designs unknown) 3 37.44.60 
Table 6: Type of study design (N - 64). 
Sampling method Frequency Study Number 
1.2.8.9.10.11.12.18.19.20.21.23,24.25, 
Purposive 51 26.28.29.30.32.33,34.35.36.37.38,39,40. 41.42.43.44.45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52,53. 
54.55.56.57.58.59.60.61.62.63.64 
Volunteer/opportunistic 9 3.4. 5. 6. 7. 13. 22. 27. 31 
Not stated 4 14. 15. 16. 17 
Table 7: Sampling recruitment method IN - 64). 
Sample charaderistics Frequency Study Number 
Medical undergraduates 1. 2. 3. 7. 14. 15. 18, 20. 22. 23. 24, 26.27, 28. 
28 29.31.35.38.40.41.42.45.46.51.52,55.56. 
59 
Postgraduates/Doctors 8,9,10,11,12,13.16.19.32.33.34,36,37,39, 
28 44,47,48,49,50.53,54,57,58,60,61,62,63, 
64 
Both 8 4,5,6,17,21,25.30,43 
Table 8: Sample characteristics IN - 64). 
Study setting Frequency Study Number 
University 22 
2,6,7,15,17,18,19,20,22,25,26,28,30,31, 
35,37,38,42,46,52,56,58 
Not stated 19 
1,3,~8,9, 10, 14, 1~ 23,2~ 29,32,36,40,41, 
43, 45, 54, 55 
Healthcare setting (e.g. 17 11, 12, 13, 24, 30, 33, 34, 39, 44, 48, 49, SO, 51, hospitol, primory core) 53,57,63,64 
Cognitive Psychology 2 5,21 laboratory 
Other (e.g. moiled, web) 4 47,60,61,62 
Table 9: Study setting IN - 64) 
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2.4.3. Theoretical framework 
Most studies (two thirds) did not use any theory to inform the design 
of their interventions (Table 10). Theory that was incorporated into 
some interventions was of two main types; generic and expert decision 
making theories. Most theories referred to were associated with 
improving generic reasoning skills (Table 10) i.e. theories to explain 
psychological processes all individuals use when making judgements 
and decisions. A few interventions were informed by principles of 
expert theories i.e. these aim to describe the psychological processes 
doctors use when making specialist judgements in specific contexts, 
such as diagnosing a condition from a set of symptoms (Table 10). As 
some studies incorporated more than one theory, studies can appear 
more than once in Table 10. No studies explicitly discussed the 
theories or attributes of how to make good clinical judgements or 
decisions. 
Theory used Frequency Study Number 
4,5,6, 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 23, 24, 28,29, 
None 44 32,33,34,35,36,38,39,41,42,43,45,47,48, 49,50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61, 
62,63,64 
Generic decision making 1,2,3, 7, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 27, 30, 
theory 
17 31,37,44 
Bayes theorem 9 1,17,18,19,22,26,27,37,44 
EUT 7 2,3, 7, 16, 27, 30, 31 
Information Processing 4 1,17,15, 25 
Expert clinical judgement 
theory 6 14,15,18,27,40,46 
Hypothetico-Deductive 4 15,18,27,46 
Pattern Recognition 2 14,46 
Schema Theories 2 14,40 
Table 10: Theoretical framework of studies. 
2.4.4. Intervention Type 
Interventions were categorised as either: expert heuristic, experiential 
learning or decision literacy (Table 11). Two thirds of the studies 
consisted of expert heuristic interventions i.e. those that use 
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techniques to facilitate the specialist judgements and decisions 
doctors make, such as diagnosis and prescribing decisions (Table 11). 
These techniques were taught to people as useful strategies that could 
help people improve the outcome of their judgements and decisions 
rather than to help people understand their own reasoning processes. 
Fourteen studies focused on giving participants hypothetical or actual 
real world experience of making decisions in the clinical context i.e. 
experiential learning interventions (Table 11). A few interventions 
aimed to increase people's awareness of their own thinking i.e. 
decision literacy (Table 11). Over half of the studies did not integrate 
their interventions into existing medical courses but were carried out 
as one off research studies [3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 17,21,23, 
32,33,34,39,40,41,42,43,44,47,48,49,50,51,53,54, 55, 57, 
58, 60, 61, 63, 641. Twenty nine studies did integrate their 
interventions into medical training [1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 
22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37,38, 45, 46, 52, 56, 59, 
62J. Mostly these were integrated into existing undergraduate medical 
curricula rather than postgraduate training. 
Type of Intervention Frequency Study Number 
EXPERT HEURISTIC 43 
Practice recommendations 25 
3, 6, 7, 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 32,35, 38, 39,42.43, 
47,48,49,50.52,54.58.59,61.62. 
Theory based strategy (e.g. 
Bayes theorem) 9 2,18,19,26.27,31,37,44,63 
Computer decision support 9 4,5.16,34,40.55,57,60.64 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 14 
Course with teaching and 
clinical experience 
6 14.15.24.36,45,56 
Computerised scenarios. web 6 21,22,23.28.29,51 
based tutorials 
Simulation with manikins 2 33,53 
DECISION LITERACY 7 1. 17, 20, 25. 30,41.46 
Table 11: Main types of interventions IN e64J 
2.4.5. Variable. and eHcltatloD method 
Variables measured were of two types; outcomes or processes. The 
majority of studies measured variables that were outcomes i.e. direct 
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measures of the end point such as decisions, choice, knowledge, 
confidence and clinical skills (Table 12). The variables measured in 15 
studies were of processes i.e. indirect measures of thinking such as 
reasoning, judgement and attitudes (Table 12). A few studies 
examined a mixture of outcome and process variables and these study 
numbers appear more than once in Table 12. Three studies did not 
report the variables measured and it was not possible to determine 
what they were (Table 12). 
Many studies used more than one type of method to elicit data but 
there were three main types; clinical vignettes, questionnaires and 
patient records. Most studies obtained data via clinical vignettes 
and/or questionnaires (Table 13). The majority of clinical vignettes 
were delivered in paper format but some were also presented with use 
of computers (Table 13). The vignettes consisted of clinical scenarios 
that required participants to record their answers to open and closed 
questions about the scenario. Others required participants to develop 
a treatment plan for the hypothetical patient which was then analysed 
and scored for accuracy. A few studies presented the clinical scenario 
with a manikin [33, 53]. Participants were asked to 'work' on the 
manikin as if it were a real patient. One study also used the Objective 
Structured Clinical Examination (OSCE) where people were trained to 
role play patients [52]. 
Questionnaires were used in twenty-eight studies (Table 13). Some 
of them included short clinical scenarios and participants would 
answer associated questions in multiple-choice format (MCQ). 
Questionnaires without scenarios were used to obtain attitudes 
towards the intervention, factual knowledge and demographic 
information. Three studies included an observation checklist to record 
participants' observed behaviour [27, 36, 56]. The majority of 
questionnaires were study specific i.e. designed specifically for a 
particular study but a few used validated questionnaires. These were 
the Diagnostic Thinking Inventory and Inventory of Cognitive Bias in 
Medicine. The Diagnostic Thinking Inventory measures two aspects of 
diagnostic thinking across fifty-six items: the degree of flexibility in 
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thinking and the degree of knowledge structure in memory (Bordage, 
Grant and Marsden 1990). The Inventory of Cognitive Bias in 
Medicine consists of twenty-two clinical scenarios with a choice of 
multiple alternative answers. For each scenario at least one choice 
represents a biased prone decision and one is the statistically correct 
decision (Hershberger, Part, Markert, Cohen, and Finger 1994). 
Variable Frequency Study Number 
Outcomes (decisions, choice, 1,2,3,5,6, 7,8,9,10, l1, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
21,23,24,27,28,31,32,33,34,35,36,38,39, knowledge, behaviour, 50 40,41,42,43,45,47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54, 
confidence, skills) 55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62,63,64 
Processes (reasoning, judging, 15 1,4,18,19,20,25,26,37,43,44,46,52,54,56 
attitudes) 
Not stated 3 22,29,30 
Table 12: Variables measured. 
Elicitation method Frequency Study Number 
Clinical vignettes 31 
Computer 10 4,5,16,21,22,23,41,51,55,60 
Paper 21 3,6,7,8,14,17,24,26,29,31,32,35,37,38,39, 42,43,44,45,59,61,62 
Questionnaire 28 
Study specific 24 2,6,8,9, l1, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 23, 27, 28, 30, 35, 36,38,39,40,49,54,56,59,62 
Validated 4 1,25,46,56 
Patient records 14 
Routine prescriptions 12 8,9,10,11,12,47,50,54,57,58,59,64 
Additional patient information 2 48,49 
Not stated 1 34 
Table 13: Types of methods used to obtain data, 
Tlmln. of data collection Frequency Study Number 
2, 3,4,5, 7,8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 
Before and after intervention 49 20,22,23,24,25,26,28,29,30,31,32,35,36, 38,39,40,42,43,45,46,47,4849,50,52,54, 
56,57,58,59,63 
After intervention only 14 1,6,14,15,21,23,27,30,31,37,41,53,62,64 
During intervention 6 33,44,51,55,60,61 
Not stated 1 34 
Table 14: Timing of when data wa~ obtatnt"d, 
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Patient records were used in a small group of studies to obtain 
data (Table 13). Most were real world prescriptions used as a method 
of assessing doctors' prescribing habits (Table 13). These patient 
records were part of routine clinical practice. Comparatively, two 
studies required doctors to record patient information that was not 
part of routine clinical practice, rather these were tasks specific to the 
study (Table 13). These records were known as 'encounter forms' that 
doctors completed after each consultation with a patient. Information 
such as symptoms, diagnostic hypotheses and treatment given was 
recorded and then analysed by the researchers. 
The majority of studies administered the same data elicitation 
method before and after the intervention to assess its effectiveness 
(Table 14). Those studies that used multiple methods were 
administered at different time points of the study; these study 
numbers appear more than once in Table 14. 
2.4.6. QuaUty of studies 
The quality of each study was assessed on use of theory, scientific 
rigour, coherence and generalisability of results. Each study was 
given a score out of 30. The quality of evidence across the sample of 
studies was not high. The majority of studies were rated as average 
quality (Table 15). One quarter of studies were judged to be of quite 
poor or poor quality (Table 15). The main reason these studies 
received low quality scores was due to a lack of sufficient 
methodological detail. This made it difficult to understand the nature 
of the interventions, e.g. type of tasks participants were given and 
when, validity of measures used. However, it is important to recognise 
that poor reporting of methods does not necessarily mean that the 
interventions have been poorly designed (CRD 2009). For this reason, 
studies judged to be of low quality were included in the review's 
analysis. It does mean that some of the conclusions from the review 
are partly based on poor evidence and therefore need to be accepted 
with caution e.g. five effective and six partly effective interventions 
were judged to be of poor qUality. 
65 
[)()CT()R~' CLINICAL IlECISION MAKING 
The following methodological flaws were identified consistently 
across the sample of studies; poor use of theory, incomplete scientific 
rigour, limited generalisable results and poor coherence. Of the. twenty 
interventions that were informed by theory, only thirteen explicitly 
referred to an established theory i.e. they named theories and 
discussed how they were being operationalised [1, 2, 14, 17, 18, 19, 
22, 25, 26, 27, 37, 40, 44J. However, none of these studies discussed 
or evaluated the theories they had used in the discussion section of 
the articles (Table 16). Seven studies referred to a theory implicitly but 
did not describe how it was operationalised 13,7, 15, 16,30,31, 46J. 
Quality score Frequency Study Number 
3,5,6,8,10,11,12,14,16,19,20,21,23,24, 
Average (20-24) 43 25,26,28,30,31,32,35,36,37,39,40,42,44, 46,47,48,49,51,52,53,54,56,58,59,60,61, 
62,63,64 
Quite poor (15-19) 13 4,9,18,27,29,33,34,38,41,43,50,55,57 
Good (25-30) 5 1, 2, 7, l3, 17 
Poor (10-14) 3 15,22,45 
Table 15: Quality of study scores (N - 64). 
Criteria of quality assessment Frequency Study Number 
3,4, 5,6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, l3, 15, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
Poor use of theory 56 36,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49, 
50,51,52,53,54,55,56,57,58,59,60,61,62, 
63,64 
2,3,4,7,8,9,10,11,12,14,15, 16, 1~ 18, 19, 
Incomplete scientific rigour 47 
20,21, 22, 23, 25, 26.27, 28, 29, 34, 37, 38, 39, 
41,42,43,44,45,47,48,50,52,54,55,56,57, 
58,59,60,61,62,63 
3,8,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,22,23,25,27, 
lack of generalisable findings 32 28,29,30,31,37,40,41,44,45,46,50,51,53, 
55,58,60,61,63 
Poor coherence 25 
4,9,12,15,16,22,24,26,27,28,29,30,31,33, 
34,37,40,43,45,48,51,55,56,57,59 
Table 16: Criteria for quality assessment of studies 
Generally, the scientific rigour of studies was incomplete (Table 
16). In some studies the appropriateness of the sample was difficult to 
determine and the majority of studies did not report the validity and 
reliability of their measurements. Those that did commented on either 
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validity [1, 2, 13,40] or reliability [33,40,46,49] but not both. A few 
studies reported at least one of their measures was both valid and 
reliable [13, 14, 25, 30, 36, 56] but only seven reported evidence of 
validity or reliability with corresponding coefficients [30, 36, 40, 46, 
49, 51, 56]. Only 9 studies that used clinical vignettes reported they 
were reviewed by a team of experts of which content validity can be 
assumed [5, 23, 29, 32, 35, 59, 60, 61, 62]. Fewer studies reported 
that their clinical vignettes had been piloted before use [61, 62]. 
The generalisation of findings in half of the studies was difficult to 
ascertain as it was not clear if the sample was representative and/ or 
limitations of the study were not acknowledged (Table 16). The 
coherence or logical consistency of 25 studies was also difficult to 
determine as methods and results were poorly written (Table 16). 
2.4.7. Effect of intervention 
Thirty one studies reported significantly improved results in the 
experimental group compared to the control group on all outcome 
variables measured (Table 17). Twenty-six studies were partly effective 
(Table 17) when the intervention was associated with (i) significantly 
better results on some but not all outcomes, (ii) improved results but 
no significant differences and (iii) improved results but statistical 
evidence not reported. Seven studies reported their intervention had 
no effect on outcomes measured (Table 17). 
Effect of Intervention Frequency Study Number 
1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 
Effective 31 29,30,32,36,38,40,43,46,50,52,53,58,60, 
61,63,64 
Partially effective 26 2,4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 31, 34, 35, 39, 41, 42,44,45,48,49,51,54,55,56,57,59,62 
Not effective 7 15,18,22,27,33,37,47 
Table 17: Effect of intervention (N = 64). 
2.4.8. Effectiveness and other variables 
The following section examines whether relationships exist between 
effectiveness of interventions and other variables. Effectiveness is 
67 
DOC T ORS' eLI I C A L DE CISlO MAK I G 
analysed in relation to: type of intervention, integration of 
interventions, participants' stage of medical career, presence of 
feedback and quality of study. 
Type of intervention Effective Partly effective Not effective 
EXPERT HEURISTIC 
3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 32, 6, 11, 12, 13, 35, 
Practice recommendations 38, 43, 50, 52, 39, 42, 48, 49, 47 26 
58,61, 64 54, 59, 62 
Theory driven strategies 
(decision analysis, Bayes 19, 63 2, 26, 31, 44 18, 27,37 9 
theorem) 
Computer decision support 16, 40, 60 4,5,34,55,57 8 
EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
Computerised tutorials 21, 23,28,29 51 22 6 
Course with teaching and 24, 36 
clinical experience 
14,45,56 15 6 
Simulat ion with manikins 53 33 2 
Decision Literacy 
1, 17, 20, 25,30, 41 7 
46 
Total 31 26 7 
Table 18: Effectiveness and intervention type. 
Interventions that were most associated with effectiven s wer 
those that taught practice recommendations to participants, 
computerised tutorials of decision making problems and teaching 
decision literacy (Table 18) . The majority of the intervention \! r 
effective or partly effective with only a couple not b ing it cti e 122 
47]. The findings from the deci ion literac int rv ntion \ r 
particularly encouraging. Six out of s yen wer report 
(Table 18). 
Interventions that had b n integrat d into m dical training v. r 
no more effective than thos tha had no b n int a d . Th 
majority of the one off re arch tudi IT tiv or 
effectiv ; only two w r not rr: ctiv (T bl 1 ). 
int rv ntions int grat d in 0 m dical curri ul 
Hi ctiv bu flv w r no rr: tiv (T bl 1 ). Thi u m r 
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of the one off research studies were effective compared to those 
integrated into medical training. 
Integration of study Effective Partly Not effective Total 
3,9,10,16,17,21, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 34, 39, 
One off study 23, 32, 40, 43, 50, 41,42,44,48,49,51, 33,47 35 53, 58, 60, 61, 63, 
64 54,55,57 
Integrated into 1,7,8, 19, 20, 24, 2,6, 14,26,31,35,45, 15,18,22, 25, 28, 29, 30, 36, 29 
medical education 38,46,52 56,59,62 27,37 
Total 31 26 7 
Table 19: Effectiveness and integration of interventions. 
Medical 
Medical Effect of intervention undergraduates Doctors Total 
yrs 1 & 2 undergraduates yrs 3+ 
8,9,10,16, 
Effective 20,36 1, 3, 21, 23, 24, 25, 28, 19, 32, 50, 53, 28 29,30,38,43,46,52, 58, 60, 61, 63, 
64 
11, 12, 13, 34, 
Partly effective 4,26,55,56 2,5,6,31,35,51,59 39,44,48,49, 22 
54,57,62 
Not effective 22 15,18,27 33,37,47 7 
Total 7 22 26 
Table 20: Effectiveness and stage of participants' medical career. 
Not all studies reported details of participants' stage of medical 
career. Those that did (n = 55) showed that most effective and partly 
effective interventions were conducted with medical undergraduates 
beyond their second year andj or doctors of various levels of 
experience (Table 20). However this pattern may be misleading as not 
many studies were conducted with medical undergraduates below 
their third year (Table 20). Furthermore, the few that did include first 
and second year medical students were effective or partly effective; 
only one was not an effective intervention (Table 20). 
Two thirds of studies offered feedback to participants on their 
learning andj or performance (Table 21). However these studies were 
no more associated with effective interventions than those that did not 
offer feedback; the majority was effective or partl effective irrespective 
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of whether feedback was given or not. Furthermore, most non-
effective interventions did offer feedback to participants (Table 21). 
This suggests that the type, rather than the presence of feedback 
during the study may impact on effectiveness of interventions. 
Effect of Feedback given Feedback not given 
intervention 
Effective 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 20, 28, 29, 30, 36, 38, 40, 10,16,17,19,21,23,24,25,32,43, 
46,50,52,53,63 58,60,61,64 
Partly effective 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 31, 35,42,48, 2,26,34,39,41,44,45,59 
49,51,54,55,56,57,62 
Not effective 15,22,27,33,37,47 18 
Total 41 23 
Table 21: Effectiveness and provision of feedback. 
Study quality was similar irrespective of whether the intervention 
was effective or partly effective. Most of these studies were judged to 
be of average quality but a few were quite poor (Table 22). This implies 
that effective interventions were not associated with better study 
quality than partly or non-effective interventions. However, study 
quality of non-effective interventions was mostly judged to be quite 
poor or poor (Table 22). Few were average and none were judged to be 
of good quality. Generally the non-effective interventions were 
associated with more methodological flaws than other studies i.e. low 
quality scores. 
Effect of Good Average Quite poor Poor Total 
Intervention 
1,7, 
3, 8, 10, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 9, 29, 38, 43, 
Effective 25, 28, 30, 32, 36, 40, 46, 52, 0 31 17 53,58,60,61,63,64 50 
Partly 2,13 
5, 6, 11, 12, 14, 26, 31, 35, 39, 4, 34, 41, 55, 45 26 
effective 42,44,48,49,51,54,56,59,62 57 
Not 37,47 18,27,33 15,22 7 
effective 
Table 22: Effectiveness and study quality 
2.5. Discussion 
This review systematically evaluated 64 primary empirical studies of 
interventions to enhance doctors' clinical reasoning. It summarises 
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the types of training interventions and their effectiveness, the range of 
judgement and decision making measures, integration into medical 
curricula and recommendations for the design of future interventions. 
The review indicates that there is limited quality research evidence on 
how to acquire good clinical reasoning skills. The following discussion 
sections are based on studies that were judged to be of average 
and/or good qUality. Studies that received the lowest quality scores 
are not referred to as they offered little useful and reliable information 
about how to effectively enhance doctors' clinical reasoning skills. 
There is little formal training for doctors' in clinical reasoning in 
the undergraduate curricula. This is disappointing considering it was 
recognised more than thirty years ago that it can and should be 
included in medical education (Elstein et al. 1978). However, the 
review found that the integration of an intervention into medical 
curricula was not associated with effectiveness. This suggests that 
simply including clinical reasoning training in medical education is 
not enough. Rather, the timing and place need to be carefully 
considered to produce optimum benefit (Chessare & Lieu 1998). 
It was disappointing that only a few authors explained the 
rationale to how they integrated their intervention into medical 
education and/ or suggestions for how future interventions should be 
integrated. One suggestion was that learning needs to be reinforced at 
various stages throughout medical training rather than incorporate 
clinical reasoning training at just one point in the curriculum (Rogers 
et al. 1991; DeVries 1993; DeVries et al. 1995). A specific 
recommendation was to encourage development of knowledge and its 
application simultaneously, rather than a traditional sequential 
format of knowledge gain and the learning of its application (DeVries 
et al. 1995). Preclinical students effectively learned therapeutic 
problem solving without needing to master relevant pharmacology 
knowledge first before gaining clinical experience in making 
prescribing decisions (Abraham et al. 2004; Vollebregt et al. 2005). 
These findings imply that aspects of medical education traditionally 
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delivered in the final years of curriculum may be introduced earlier 
(Vollebregt et al. 2005). 
Most interventions trained doctors to employ specific expert 
strategies that would improve diagnostic or treatment decisions 
(expert heuristics). Most interventions measured effectiveness by an 
outcome such as improvements in diagnostic accuracy, a more cost-
effective treatment or a component of knowledge. There was little 
emphasis on improving the reasoning processes that doctors use to 
reach judgements and decisions. However, the few that delivered 
courses to enhance doctors' awareness of their own decision making 
processes (decision literacy), were effective. Doctors' clinical 
judgements and decisions improved after training in critical thinking 
and/or an awareness of how errors occur in the reasoning process 
that can lead to biased decisions. 
Training doctors to become more decision literate involves 
understanding about the generic aspects of human judgement and 
decision making that is applicable to all types of doctors and clinical 
decisions. Learning should be accessible over time and in different 
contexts (Metcalfe & Shimamura 1994) and the present review 
demonstrates that the majority of interventions have been designed to 
facilitate specific decisions or parts of the process to reach a 
judgement or decision. These types of interventions limit the transfer 
of learning to other contexts. Training doctors to have an awareness 
and ability to critique their own reasoning processes may be a way to 
overcome this limitation. 
It was unclear as to which component parts of interventions are 
associated with the enhancement of clinical reasoning skills. However 
based on existing literature it is recommended that future 
interventions are designed with the following factors in mind. 
Theoretical basis: Interventions should be designed with reference 
to a theoretical basis so that underlying assumptions are explicit 
and possible mechanisms that contribute to the effectiveness of 
interventions can be identified (Chen 1990; MRC 2008). It is likely 
that interventions will have to draw on evidence from the decision 
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sciences on how individuals and experts make judgements and 
decisions and the factors influencing their choices. 
Appropriate assessments: Medical education should employ 
assessment methods targeting not only knowledge components 
such as recall tests but methods that demonstrate what trainees 
will do when faced with real clinical problems (Miller 1990). There 
should also be some attempt at assessing the long-term impact of 
training and transfer of learning to clinical practice. 
Informative feedback: Feedback is an important aspect of 
successful learning and delivering informative feedback is a skill 
itself (King 1999; Race 2005). The review found there was an 
association between type of feedback given to participants and 
effectiveness of intervention. Good feedback was constructive, 
individualised to each participant and was encouraging of 
reflection and discussion (Chopra et al. 1994; DeVries et al. 1995; 
Akici et al. 2003; DaRosa et al. 2008). On the other hand, 
description of performance rather than explanation and no 
opportunity for participants to discuss their performance with 
others was likely to be less useful (Rogers et al. 1991; O'Connell et 
al. 1999; Byrne et al. 2002). 
Integrate into medical education: There is little value in 
designing a clinical reasoning intervention without at least 
considering where it could be placed in medical education. Issues 
such as where to place clinical reasoning training and who could 
teach it require careful consideration. It is important to have 
people delivering a new course who will champion it and 
imaginative ways to deliver them should be sought to encourage 
staff and students to take it seriously (Cuff & Vanselow 2004). 
2.6. Critique of Study 
The strengths of this review are the use of a ngorous method to 
integrate systematically the range of disparate research in this area. 
The broad set of search terms used ensured that a range of different 
types of clinical reasoning interventions were evaluated. Whilst an 
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effort was made to develop a sophisticated search strategy that 
reflected the interchangeable use of decision making terminology, 
there is a chance that some key words may have been missed during 
the search. Due to time and financial constraints the review was 
limited to studies that were published and reported in the English 
language. Therefore studies that have not been published and/or were 
reported in other languages were not reviewed. 
2.7. Summary 
Few studies have evaluated the effectiveness of training to enhance 
doctors' clinical reasoning. Overall, the quality of evidence reviewed 
was not high due to poor written presentation of methods and lack of 
scientific rigour. Although decision literacy interventions were few in 
number, the findings from this type of training were encouraging. 
Future research should consider improving doctors' decision literacy 
as a potentially successful way of enhancing the quality of their 
clinical judgements and decisions. It is not clear which components 
are associated with an effective clinical reasoning intervention. 
However the design of future interventions should consider the 
following guidance based on existing literature: explicit use of 
established theories of judgement and decision making to help 
contextualise and enable doctors to reason more explicitly about their 
choices; use of appropriate assessment methods that reflect learning 
objectives; incorporation of informative feedback into the learning 
experience and integration or at least consideration of where 
interventions can be integrated formally into medical education. A 
consensus should also be reached about the usage of the terminology 
used in the clinical reasoning literature. Currently, elements of 
training doctors in clinical reasoning appear under a variety of 
curriculum topics like communication skills, evidence based 
medicine, and critical appraisal. These elements are not explicitly 
identified or labelled as topics aimed to improve clinical judgements or 
decisions. It advised that conclusions are taken with caution as they 
are partly based on a selection of poor evidence. 
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Education and interventions to 
facilitate doctors' clinical 
reasoning: a questionnaire study 
This chapter describes a questionnaire study to survey the training 
courses designed to improve doctors' clinical reasoning. Chapter 2 
described a systematic review that was conducted to integrate the 
evidence of training interventions designed to facilitate doctors' 
clinical reasoning. The review focused only on interventions that were 
evaluated and published as studies in peer reviewed journals. From 
discussions with supervisors and colleagues who had an interest in 
improving doctors' clinical judgements and decisions, it was 
recognised that other courses may have been developed that had not 
been evaluated and/or which had not been published as research. It 
would have been inappropriate to summarise the evidence based 
published work only. As unpublished work was not included in the 
systematic review, this questionnaire study was conducted to extend 
previous findings reported in Chapter 2. 
3.1. Background 
Research into the formal training of doctors to improve their clinical 
reasoning has been underway for at least thirty years. This work has 
previously been surveyed to summarise details of training courses 
and document trends (Elstein 1981; Elstein et al. 1985). In 1980, 
Elstein distributed questionnaires to 100 members of the Society for 
Medical Decision Making (SMDM). The aims were (i) to develop a 
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network of contacts who were delivering clinical reasoning training to 
doctors and (ii) to survey the preferences for a variety of possible 
clinical reasoning courses (Elstein 1981). The number of people found 
to be offering such courses was low. Of the 80 respondents, 16 
reported that part of their training focused on improving clinical 
reasoning, whilst 28 said they offered formal courses in clinical 
reasoning. Respondents considered the most useful way to deliver this 
type of training to be through workshops, a dedicated journal and 
conferences. Medical students, junior doctors and medical school staff 
were thought to be the most important people to train. 
The SMDM members were surveyed again a few years later with 
two further questionnaires about clinical reasoning training (Elstein et 
al. 1985). These questionnaires focused on obtaining information 
about the structure and content delivered in their courses as well as 
topics of interest for future training. The combined results of both 
questionnaires indicated an increase in the number of individuals 
and / or institutions offering clinical reasoning training. There was 
noticeable emphasis on delivering some training in decision analysis. 
The majority of respondents stated they spent some time teaching 
principles and techniques of decision analysis delivered usually via 
lectures, informal rounds or case conferences. There was a consensus 
that a good clinical reasoning course teaches trainees the techniques 
to apply decision theory such as how to use decision trees, Bayes 
calculation and 2x2 contingency tables (see Section 1.7). 
3.2. Aims and objectives 
Surveys of previous work on clinical reasoning training provide a 
knowledge base for developing future training in this area for doctors. 
Over thirty years has passed since a survey of doctors' clinical 
reasoning training was conducted. The aims of the present study were 
to (i) extend findings from the systematic review study in Chapter 2, 
by surveying courses not evaluated and/or published in peer reviewed 
journals and (ii) to extend the findings of Elstein and colleagues by 
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surveying a broader specialist audience beyond members of the 
Society for Medical Decision Making. The objectives were to: 
describe the types of training courses in clinical reasoning for 
doctors in undergraduate and postgraduate medical education; 
identify whether courses have been incorporated into medical 
curricula; 
describe views and preferences of how clinical reasoning courses 
should be designed. 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Design 
This study used a cross-sectional survey design with a questionnaire 
method to elicit data. There are several advantages of using a 
questionnaire-based survey (Robson 2002). They are relatively simple 
to conduct and provide an efficient way of collecting a large amount 
of standardised data (Robson 2002; Schutt 2006). It is also a feasible 
way to survey the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours from a wide range 
of geographical locations. There is opportunity for questionnaires to 
be self-completed anonymously by respondents. This can help to 
reduce the influence the researcher has on the findings of the study. 
For example, self completion can lessen the tendency towards socially 
desirable responses, a potential problem associated with interviews 
(Robson 2002). 
However, the questionnaire method is associated with limitations 
such as low response rates and problems with the validity of data 
obtained. To encourage participation, the researcher needs to put 
considerable time and effort into developing a suitable questionnaire 
format and recruitment strategy. Ensuring that a questionnaire is 
widely distributed and potential volunteers are contacted with follow 
up reminders, are ways to increase the response rate (Coolican 1999). 
As the researcher has no control over how the questionnaire is 
completed, the validity and quality of data obtained can be limited by 
incorrect responses to questions and/or missing answers (Robson 
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2002). These problems may occur due to misunderstanding a 
question or not completing the questionnaire seriously. It is possible 
to increase the accuracy of the results by piloting the questionnaire. 
This helps to check that the questionnaire is worded clearly and the 
format is suitable to facilitate appropriate responses. In this study, a 
questionnaire method was considered to be a feasible way to survey 
an international community of medical educators about clinical 
decision making training. 
3.3.2. Ethical approval 
The study received ethical approval in 2009 from the University of 
Leeds Faculty of Medicine and Health Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix 8.3). 
3.3.3. Sample 
Medical educators that had taught doctors about an aspect about 
improving clinical reasoning were invited to complete the 
questionnaire. A purposive sampling method was used to recruit 
participants. In purposive sampling, the researcher selects the sample 
in a deliberate and non-random manner in order to fulfil the study's 
objectives (Robson 2002). A limitation of this method is that it may 
not truly represent the population of interest (Robson 2002). However 
it was appropriate in this study as it allowed the questionnaire to be 
distributed specifically amongst medical educators, who may have 
been involved in delivering clinical reasoning training to doctors. The 
questionnaire was distributed to members of the following groups; 
Evidence Based Shared Decision Making, Association for the Study of 
Medical Education, European Association of Decision Making and 
Society for Medical Decision Making. These groups were selected as 
many of the members were known to be involved in delivering medical 
education and/or had a specialist interest in doctors' improving 
clinical reasoning. 
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3.3.4. Materials 
3.3.4.1. Cover letter 
A cover letter was written to accompany the questionnaire. This 
explained to potential volunteers the study's purpose, how to 
participate and how long it was expected to take to complete the 
questionnaire. It also informed them about how the data would be 
used and that confidentiality and anonymity of participants would be 
maintained. The cover letter was addressed from the author's 
supervisor who was a member of some of the target groups (see 
Appendix 8.4). This was to encourage people to complete the 
questionnaire. 
3.3.4.2. Questionnaire 
One aim of this study was to extend the findings from the systematic 
review study in Chapter 2. To reflect this, the results from the 
systematic review were used to develop the focus of the questionnaire. 
Several draft versions of the questionnaire were developed and 
discussed with supervisors in order to achieve a suitable content and 
structure. A final version is appended as Appendix 8.5. A summary of 
this development phase is described below. 
3.3.4.3. Construction of questions 
The systematic review provided information about the following broad 
areas listed below. These areas were used as a basis to form related 
questions on the questionnaire. 
types of training interventions 
focus and content of training interventions 
theoretical framework 
methods of delivery 
effectiveness of training interventions 
timing of training interventions 
In order to increase the validity of the questionnaire, as well as the 
response rate, questions were developed according to the following 
recommendations. The total number of questions was minimised so 
that the length of the questionnaire would be no longer than two 
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pages and individual questions were written as succinctly as possible. 
This was to ensure that participants could complete the questionnaire 
quickly (within approximately five minutes) and with ease (Robson 
2002). 
An effort was made to phrase instructions and questions using 
clear and simple language to reduce potential misunderstandings 
(Coolican 1999; Robson 2002; Schutt 2006). Instructions on how to 
respond to each question were made explicit such as tick all that 
apply or tick one response. Further, each question was phrased in 
such a way that only one question was asked at one time and in a 
neutral manner. This was to maintain clarity and so as not to 
introduce bias (Coolican 1999; Robson 2002; Schutt 2006). For 
example, questions regarding the content of a course were phrased 
separately in the following way; 
What is the focus of your medical decision making course(s)? 
What theoretical perspectives do you draw on during your teaching of 
the course(s)? 
What applications do you refer to during your teaching of the course(s)? 
A wide range of response options were listed to ensure data were 
as representative of teaching in this area as possible (Coolican 1999; 
Robson 2002; Schutt 2006). To ensure all responses were available 
the option 'other' was presented where applicable. A neutral option 
was available on rating scales so as not to create opinions and an 
opportunity was given to leave further comments at the end of the 
questionnaire. 
3.3.4.4. Structure of questionnaire 
The questionnaire was structured so that it appeared clear and simple 
to complete for participants (Robson 2002; Schutt 2006). In addition 
to a cover letter, a brief introduction was written at the top of the first 
page of the questionnaire. This summarised the purpose of the study, 
the participant's task, and information about the author. The text was 
formatted in such a way that the title, instructions, questions and 
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response options were distinguishable from one another. The 
response options for each question were presented in a table. This 
allowed participants to respond using the familiar tick box format 
(Robson 2002). Where response options were presented on a rating 
scale these were structured in a matrix to standardise the layout 
(Schutt 2006). This was appropriate for questions 9 and 10. These 
questions were structured as a series of statements associated with a 
common question and the same response format for each statement. 
To give the questionnaire a logical framework, questions were ordered 
in a sequence. This was done by separating the questions into two 
main themes. The first page of the questionnaire focused on obtaining 
factual information about an existing clinical reasoning course. This 
included questions about how and where it was delivered, and the 
content of the course. Whereas the second page of the questionnaire 
focused on participants' views of what they think makes a good 
clinical reasoning course. This included questions around how to 
deliver teaching, content, timing and assessment. 
3.3.5. Pilot study 
The questionnaire was piloted at the thirty-first annual meeting for 
the Society of Medical Decision Making (SMDM). This was considered 
appropriate as it attracts an international audience of medical 
educators who have a specialist interest in doctors' clinical reasoning. 
The conference organisers agreed to accommodate the questionnaire 
by including a printed version in each of the delegates' conference 
packs. The questionnaire was tested for clarity, comprehension and 
distribution method. The pilot study did not result in any major 
changes to the questionnaire. Participants completed the 
questionnaire correctly so it was assumed that the format and 
instructions of the questionnaire were clear. However, the response 
rate was low with only five people completing the questionnaire. One 
possible reason for this was that it was not convenient for people to 
complete a questionnaire at a meeting with a demanding schedule. 
Thereafter the questionnaire was sent electronically to the Society of 
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Medical Decision Making distribution list, where more people 
responded. This suggested that people found it more convenient to 
complete an electronic rather than paper version of the questionnaire. 
3.3.6. Procedure 
The majority of delegates at the SMDM meeting did not respond to the 
questionnaire. To increase response rates the survey was e-mailed to 
members of the SMDM. This usually incurs a fee however a sub-group 
known as the Diagnostic Errors in Medicine group, agreed to pay this 
cost by sponsoring the study. Electronic versions of a cover letter and 
questionnaire were e-mailed to members of the SMDM. The following 
groups also agreed to accommodate the study where the materials 
were also distributed electronically; members of the Association for 
the Study of Medical Education's Education Research Group, 
Evidence Based Shared Decision Making and European Association of 
Decision Making. For each group, the materials were distributed by a 
member of the societies' administrative team. Potential participants 
were instructed to complete the questionnaire anonymously and 
return it via e-mail by the specified date. To increase the response 
rate the respective administrators sent a follow up e-mail to each 
group that reminded people about the study. 
3.3.7. Analysis 
The data were summarised in frequency tables. This was considered 
suitable as the aims of the study were to describe clinical reasoning 
courses. Statistical analysis was not performed as the study was not 
interested in comparisons between participants' responses or 
correlations between variables. For each question a frequency table 
was constructed that described the number of people that selected 
each of the associated options. This clarified the most and least 
common practices and opinions of the sample group. 
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3.4. Results 
Questionnaires were completed by 40 individuals involved in teaching 
doctors about an aspect of clinical reasoning. The following sections 
summarise the frequency of responses to each questionnaire item as 
well as total number of responses, missing responses and multiple 
responses i.e. where more than one response option was selected. 
Results are presented according to the study's objectives. 
3.4.1. Types of clinical reasoning courses 
Most of the courses took place somewhere in the USA and/or Canada, 
with just over half of all respondents selecting this location. Roughly a 
third of respondents stated that their training is offered in a European 
country. A few respondents did not state which country their training 
takes place and one respondent stated their training happens in 
various countries. 
The vast majority of training was delivered in a university and a 
third of courses took place at conferences. Less than a third offered 
training for medical professional bodies and public health facilities. 
Examples of types of medical professional bodies were the General 
Medical Council and the Norwegian Medical Association. Examples of 
public health facilities were hospitals and clinical and research ethics 
committees. Training at other organisations included a cancer 
helpline and resource centres for patient support. Almost half of the 
respondents stated that they have offered clinical reasoning training 
at more than one type of organisation. 
Focus of course Freq. Theory used Freq. Applications Freq. 
referred to 
Helping doctors make 
better clinical 29 Classical/normative 37 Risk presentation 23 judgements and 
decisions 
Helping doctors skills in Information 
patient centred care or 29 processing/heuristics 28 Decision analysis 22 
shared decision making and bias 
Helping doctors develop Expert models of 
general awareness of 23 decision 12 Bayes theorem 21 
clinical reasoning making/naturalistic 
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Helping doctors make Social cognition Patient decision better team judgements 11 7 21 
and decisions models aids 
Informing doctors about 7 Self regulation 4 Utility elicitation 14 
social sciences theories methods 
Other 6 None 2 Smart heuristics 9 
Total responses 40 Other 9 Other algorithms 3 
Multiple responses 30 Total responses 40 Other 3 
Multiple responses 33 Total responses 39 
Missing responses 1 
Multiple responses 33 
Table 23 : Content of clinical reasoning courses. 
Clinical reasoning courses most commonly focused on helping 
doctors make better clinical judgements and decisions and/or 
developing skills in patient centred care or shared decision making. 
Just over half of all courses focused on h elping doctors to develop a 
general awareness of their clinical reasoning (Table 23). Examples of 
other responses included teaching researchers about studying 
decision making, enhancing ethical decision making and teaching 
about a new model developed from neuroscientific evidence. The 
majority of courses were based on one theoretical perspective or more 
(Table 23). The commonest theories referred to were a combination of 
both classical decision making theories and information processing. 
Examples of responses that people referred to as other theories were 
Risk Communication, Moral Reasoning Theories, Evidence Based 
Medicine, Systemic and Constructivist Communication Theory, and 
the Ottawa Decision Support Framework (Table 23). The majority of 
respondents stated that they referred to more than one application in 
their course, the most common being risk communication, decision 
analysis, Bayes theorem and/ or patient decision aids. 
3.4.2. Integration into medical curricula 
Nearly half of the respondents stated that they deliver clinical 
reasoning courses in more than one way (Table 24). Approximately 
two thirds of respondents included some teaching on clinical 
reasoning in medical curricula, usually delivered as a module on 
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clinical reasoning specifically making or a module on a broader topic 
(Table 24). Modules on broader topics included shared decision 
making, communication skills, problem based learning and evidence 
based learning. Of those that had included the training in medical 
curricula, it is not known how many courses were temporary or 
permanent features in medical education. Nearly half of the 
respondents stated that training was delivered as specialist courses, 
most of which lasted for half a day. These were not usually part of 
medical curricula. They were more commonly aimed at introducing 
principles of decision making to other health professionals that were 
not doctors, usually at conferences or their workplace (Table 24). 
Other delivery methods of courses included short introductory or 
overview lectures to students andj or doctors, longer specialist 
courses ranging from three to five days and a fifteen week online 
course. 
Delivery Method Frequency 
Module on medical decision making 15 
Part of module on broader topic 14 
Half day specialist course 12 
One-two day specialist course 6 
Other 9 
Total responses 40 
Missing responses 0 
Multiple responses 18 
Table 24: Delivery method of teaching clinical reasoning. 
3.4.3. Views and preferences towards future courses on improving 
cUnical reasoning 
There was no topic that was considered to be the key feature to 
include in teaching about clinical reasoning. Most options were 
selected by over half of all respondents each time. Fifteen respondents 
thought that all, or nearly all, of the topics should be included in a 
clinical reasoning course (Table 25). Similarly, there was also no 
single method of teaching that was considered the most important 
way of teaching to improve clinical reasoning (Table 25). Most 
respondents thought that courses should be delivered using more 
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than one method (n = 33). Nine people thought that all, or nearly all of 
the above methods of teaching were important to use (Table 25). 
Examples of other methods suggested were role plays, interactive 
group seminars, positive critical incidents and video recording with 
feedback. 
Topics to include Frequency Method of teaching to use Frequency 
Risk perception 29 Real patient care experience 28 
Probabilities 27 Paper based clinical scenarios 25 
Decision aids 27 Standardised patients/actors 20 
Diagnostic test accuracy 26 Erroneous clinical examples 14 
Decision analysis 24 Anecdotes of doctors 14 
Clinical practice guidelines 24 Computerised clinical scenarios 13 
Clinical reasoning strategies 24 High fidelity simulation 7 
Heuristics and bias 23 Other 11 
Cost effectiveness analysis 14 
Other 10 
Total responses 40 Total responses 39 
Multiple responses 38 Multiple responses 33 
Missing responses 0 Missing responses 1 
Table 25: Importance of topics and teaching methods for future courses. 
Table 26 summarises how relevant people thought each of the 
above statements were towards clinical reasoning courses. Some 
people did not respond to every statement, with a range of three to 
eight responses missing from some questionnaires. Most people 
strongly agreed with integrating a course on clinical reasoning into 
professional training post first degree but that if it is to be included in 
undergraduate training then integrated within communication skills 
and/or during the clinical attachment phase is the most appropriate 
time (Table 26). All respondents showed some agreement with the 
inclusion of clinical reasoning training as a means of increasing 
patient safety, however over 50% believed it was unlikely to gain wide 
support in medical education (Table 26). 
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Statements Not relevant Possibly Very 
relevant relevant 
Integrated with social sciences courses in 32% 41% 26% 
undergraduate training (n = 34) 
Integrated into communication skills courses in 11% 25% 64% 
undergraduate training (n = 36) 
Integrated with clinical attachment in 6% 31% 63% 
undergraduate training (n = 32) 
An optional specialist topic in undergraduate 34% 44% 22% training (n = 32) 
Integrated into professional training post first 
3% 12% 85% degree (n = 33) 
An optional component in continuing professional 12% 48% 39% development portfolios (n = 33) 
A work based learning activity (n = 37) 5% 50% 49% 
Doctors' decision making should be assessed in the 3% 31% 66% 
workforce (n = 35) 
Formal decision making training will increase 0 50% 54% patient safety (n = 37) 
It is unlikely formal decision making training will 
42% 33% 24% gain wide support in medical education (n = 33) 
Table 26: Views about when to teach clinical reasoning and its impact on medical 
education. 
3.4.4. Advice to medical educators 
Eighteen respondents offered advice to other medical educators 
regarding how to approach the design and implementation of future 
clinical reasoning courses. These were summarised into the following 
three themes: (i) what to teach (ii) how to teach and (iii) where to place 
the course in medical education. 
Advice on what to teach: There was a range of general and specific 
suggestions by seven respondents. More than one respondent stated 
that enhancing doctors' understanding of risk was important and one 
suggestion was to present risk information in different formats. A few 
people thought doctors need to be encouraged to use decision aids 
more, whereas one person stated that decision analysis and decision 
aids should only be introduced as a conceptual tool (i.e. little practical 
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relevance). The importance of teaching ways to facilitate patient 
involvement in decision making was raised by more than one person. 
Two people from the same department believed that the role of ethics 
in decision making is not given enough importance. Their advice was 
to train doctors to be aware of the ethical issues that arise in practice. 
Three people gave advice on teaching some generic aspects of decision 
making. Examples were (i) focusing on understanding one's own 
reasoning with less emphasis on memorising facts so that processes 
are understood and decisions can be justified, (ii) emphasising the 
problem of bias inherent in human jUdgement and decision making. 
Advice on how to teach: Nine respondents gave suggestions about 
how clinical reasoning courses should be taught. These were mostly 
broad suggestions about the importance of using clinical scenarios to 
allow doctors to practice making judgements and decisions. Examples 
were via role plays, computers and simulated patients. Five 
respondents highlighted the importance of increasing doctors' 
perceived relevance of clinical reasoning training. Two people noted 
that motivation towards participating in such courses is low and that 
medical educators should invest time in raising awareness about the 
importance of good clinical reasoning as a lifelong habit. It was 
stressed that imaginative ways should be sought to teach it so that 
doctors become active investigators of their own behaviour. One 
suggestion to increase active participation was to encourage doctors 
to develop their own decision aids or clinical scenarios based on their 
personal and professional experiences. Another respondent suggested 
that decision making training should be delivered using a range of 
multiple methods including experiential learning, self-directed 
learning and some didactic teaching to get the main issues across. 
Advice on where to place training: Six respondents gave suggestions 
about where to integrate clinical reasoning training in medical 
education. Four people believed it should be included explicitly at the 
undergraduate level as standard training. Whereas two other people 
suggested that training in clinical reasoning should coincide with the 
clinical phases of medical training and would be of most benefit at the 
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postgraduate level, i.e. part of specialised rather than general training. 
One respondent identified that clinical reasoning training should be 
linked with courses in evidence based medicine, although did not 
state why and another was sceptical that it would be successfully 
integrated in medical education at all due to emphasis on other 
subjects. 
3.5. Discussion 
This study reports the results of a questionnaire study completed by 
medical educators involved in teaching doctors about or an aspect of 
clinical reasoning. Most courses took place somewhere in the USA 
and/or Canada. The vast majority of training was delivered in a 
university. The content of courses usually included a focus on helping 
doctors make better clinical judgements or decisions and/or 
developing skills in patient centred care or shared decision making. 
Most courses were informed by more than one type of theoretical 
framework, usually classical decision making theories and the 
information processing approach. There was also reference to more 
than one type of application of decision theory such as risk 
communication, decision analysis or Bayes theorem. Courses that 
were integrated into medical curricula were mostly delivered as a 
module on clinical reasoning or a module on a broader topic. With 
regard to the design of future courses, respondents believed a variety 
of topics should be taught using different forms of teaching methods. 
There was a consensus that a course on improving clinical reasoning 
is more appropriately integrated at the postgraduate level. However, 
the best time during undergraduate training was considered to be 
alongside communication skills training and/or during times of 
clinical attachment. There were mixed views about the likelihood that 
clinical reasoning training would gain wide su pport in medical 
education. These results are discussed in more detail below to answer 
the study's objectives. 
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3.5.1. Types of clinical reasoning courses in undergraduate and 
postgraduate medical education 
Two types of clinical reasoning courses in undergraduate and 
postgraduate medical education were found to be common. One type 
was enhancing doctors' communication and shared decision making 
skills and the other type was helping doctors make better clinical 
judgements and decisions. Courses that focused on improving 
communication and shared decision making, emphasised the role of 
the patient in the decision process. This view may exist because 
shared decision making is advocated as an ideal approach to making 
clinical decisions (Charles, Gafni, and Whelan 1997; GMC 2009) 
and/or it reflects the specialist interest of the people approached to 
volunteer in the study. Other courses that were aimed at helping 
doctors improve their own clinical reasoning typically drew upon 
normative decision theory. These courses taught doctors how to 
convey risk accurately, apply decision analysis and/or Bayes theorem. 
This finding is in line with Elstein's earlier surveys (Elstein 1981; 
Elstein et al. 1985) and the systematic review (Kurzenhauser & 
Hoffrage 2002; Grant et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2007). Learning to 
communicate risk accurately to patients was considered to be an 
aspect of good clinical reasoning. This was not emphasised as it was 
in earlier surveys (Elstein 1981; Elstein et al. 1985). It suggests that 
risk communication has gained importance in medicine over the 
years, particularly with increasing interest in shared decision making 
(Godolphin 2003; Sedgwick & Hall 2003; Edwards, Elwyn, Wood, 
Atwell, Prior, and Houston 2004). 
Overall, these results indicate medical educators still believe in the 
importance of training doctors to calculate optimum decisions by 
using applications of normative decision theories. Whilst this 
approach offers logical ways of resolving difficult decision problems, 
the practical relevance to the clinical context is likely to be limited to 
situations when time is plentiful and distractions are minimal 
(Croskerry 2005). Often the doctor is working under conditions that 
would not permit enough time to allow decisions to be calculated 
using decision trees or Bayes statistical formula. Little attention has 
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been given to investigating how doctors can be trained to make 
decisions better with these factors in mind. 
The systematic review suggested that teaching doctors to be aware 
of how they reason about decisions is associated with better clinical 
decision making, at least hypothetically. For example, participants 
trained to be aware of heuristic thinking and cognitive errors in the 
clinical reasoning process developed enhanced decision making skills 
(Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999). In this study, 
heuristics and bias was identified by most people as a topic that 
should be taught in a course seeking to improved doctors' clinical 
reasoning. In practice, few respondents said they included this in 
their training courses. Whilst nearly two thirds of respondents stated 
they referred to the information processing approach, there was little 
evidence that improving the way doctors reason about clinical 
problems was important. 
3.5.2. Inclusion of courses into medical curricula 
The majority of courses had been integrated into medical curricula. 
This finding differed from that of the systematic review (Chapter 2) 
where the majority of courses had been designed as one off studies 
that were not included in medical curricula. Together, the results 
from both studies demonstrate that training doctors improve their 
clinical reasoning has not gained importance in medical education. It 
was unclear as to whether courses were temporarily included in 
curricula as a trial or became a permanent feature. Some of the 
courses were delivered as modules on clinical reasoning, but mostly 
aspects of clinical reasoning were included in a communication skills 
module. This suggests there is a view that communication and 
making judgements and decisions are interrelated in clinical practice 
(Windish et al. 2005). 
There was a shared belief that the success of clinical reasoning 
training depended on a sufficient amount of clinical experience. Most 
respondents believed that clinical reasoning training should be 
introduced at the postgraduate rather than undergraduate level. 
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There was concern that undergraduate students would not recognise 
its relevance due to their limited experience of making judgements 
and decisions in the clinical context. This is contrary to an alternative 
belief that the early inclusion of formal training in clinical reasoning 
during undergraduate years is necessary (Elstein et al. 1978; Elstein 
1981; Elstein et al. 1985; Round 1999; Croskerry 2005; Croskerry 
2009b) and contradicts evidence suggesting that medical students 
without any clinical experience can benefit from formal clinical 
reasoning training (Margolis et al. 1982; Vollebregt et al. 2005). These 
findings are encouraging for educators who are keen to introduce 
training in clinical reasoning early on in medical education to 
students with little experience in practice. 
Most people held ambivalent attitudes towards the impact of 
clinical reasoning training in medical education. There was a disparity 
between the perceived importance of this type of training and its 
practical implementation in medical education. Whilst educators In 
this study believed that improving clinical reasoning would help to 
increase patient safety, many also believed that training in this area 
would not gain support in medical education if others in senior 
positions would not prioritise it. Currently this perception is a barrier 
to the implementation of clinical reasoning training in medical 
education (Taut & AIkin 2003). In response to another questionnaire, 
all respondents believed that making clinical judgements and 
decisions was very important to their practice, but the overwhelming 
majority had not received any formal training or read material 
explicitly on this area (Croskerry 2005). 
3.5.3. Views and preferences of how clinical reasoning courses 
should be designed 
There was an agreement that the content of future clinical reasoning 
courses should include a range of topics and that a range of teaching 
resources should be used to deliver courses. Participants thought the 
breadth of topics should include risk perception, decision analysis, 
diagnostic test accuracy, clinical reasoning, heuristics and bias, 
practice guidelines and cost-effectiveness analysis. Elstein et al 
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(1985) also found similar topics were also considered important in 
future clinical reasoning courses. This further supports the traditional 
view that doctors should be trained to use techniques that improve 
the outcomes of their judgements and decisions, for example an 
accurate diagnosis. The teaching of clinical reasoning methods and 
heuristics and bias was considered important by most respondents, 
but very few courses included these topics. This indicates a gap 
between what is perceived to be important to teach trainees and what 
is actually being taught. 
It is unlikely that it would be feasible to cover a range of diverse 
topics in one session or a short course about clinical reasoning. 
Further, the inclusion of too many topics in one course may not 
necessarily be ideal. In the systematic review, most interventions 
focused on teaching one aspect of improving clinical reasoning, such 
as decision analysis (Margolis et al. 1982; Lee et al. 2007) Bayes 
theory, (Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage 2002; Grant et al. 2006) or 
heuristics and bias (Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 
1999). Only one intervention delivered a wide range of topics 
(diagnostic test accuracy, decision analysis, cost-effective analysis, 
critical appraisal of literature) and this was not well received by 
medical students, who found the volume of information to be too 
much (Cebul et al. 1984). Participants' reactions towards a training 
programme influences whether they go onto apply their learning (Noe 
& Schmitt 1986; Kirkpatrick 1998). It is important that any clinical 
reasoning course is well received in the first instance. 
3.5.4. Implications of findings to medical education 
If improving doctors' clinical reasoning is to gain importance in 
medical education, there needs to be a shared understanding 
amongst medical educators about how to improve doctors' clinical 
reasoning. Amongst the courses that had been designed, there was 
little shared understanding about how to improve doctors' clinical 
reasoning. Further, for this training to be effective the design of future 
courses should be informed by the evidence reviewed in Chapter 2. 
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The results of the systematic review and this study indicate that 
educators prioritise the improvement of decision accuracy (outcome) 
rather than the quality of reasoning about clinical problems (process). 
Teaching doctors how to reason well should not be overlooked, 
particularly as the effectiveness of this approach is supported by 
evidence (Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999; 
Abraham et al. 2004). The value of this approach should be promoted 
amongst medical educators as another way to improve the quality of 
doctors' clinical judgements and decisions. 
3.5.5. Critique of study 
This study has some limitations. Whilst effort was made to seek out 
the main medical decision making related groups for distribution of 
the questionnaire, the study sample may not be truly representative. 
It is possible that some educators chose not to participate or they 
were unaware of the study, and so their course details and views are 
not represented here. The responses to questions 7 and 8 did not 
discriminate between a most important and least important topic and 
method of teaching to use. The majority of people felt most or all 
topics that were listed should be included in a clinical reasoning 
course. This was a limitation of the wording as respondents were 
instructed to tick all options that apply. Perhaps it would have been 
more informative to allow respondents to select one option only or to 
rate each option in order of importance. 
The strengths of this study are that it builds upon previous work. 
It updates the findings of earlier surveys (Elstein 1981; Elstein et al. 
1985) and provides more detailed information about the types of 
clinical reasoning courses that have been developed. The data 
represents information from a wider range of medical educators, not 
just those associated with the Society for Medical Decision Making. 
This study supplements the findings of the systematic review (Chapter 
2) by integrating unpublished information about training doctors in 
clinical reasoning. The results of this study with the systematic review 
provide an evidence base that should be used to guide the design of 
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future courses to help doctors improve their clinical judgements and 
decisions. 
3.6. Summary 
The results of the systematic review and this study show that not 
many courses to improve doctors' clinical reasoning have been 
developed. Even fewer have managed to gain inclusion into medical 
curricula. This indicates that clinical reasoning training has not 
gained importance in medical education. There is little agreement 
between educators about how to enhance doctors' clinical reasoning 
effectively. However, training to improve the outcome of a judgement 
and/or decision remains a more common approach than training to 
improve the process. 
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Doctors' perceptions of making 
clinical judgements and decisions 
effectively: an interview study 
This chapter describes a qualitative survey carried out to explore the 
perceptions and experiences doctors have when making clinical 
judgements and decisions. It first reviews the qualitative literature 
that has explored doctors' clinical reasoning and states the aim and 
objectives of the current study. The methods are described, including 
the rationale for using interviews for data collection, development of 
an interview schedule as well as a coding frame to analyse the data 
using a thematic framework approach. The themes generated from the 
analysis are discussed and presented according to the study's 
objectives. The chapter ends with a discussion about the findings in 
relation to existing literature and the implications to medical 
education and practice. 
4.1. Background 
In chapters 2 and 3, the existing evidence base of evaluated and non-
evaluated clinical reasoning interventions was identified. The present 
study was concerned with gaining in depth information about doctors' 
perceptions and experiences about how they make clinical 
judgements and decisions. Research attempting to understand the 
nature of clinical reasoning methods began over thirty years ago. 
Initially, evidence from experimental studies suggested that diagnosis 
was a process of hypothesis generation and testing (Elstein et al. 
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1978). This was soon challenged in favour of a more automatic 
process that involved categorising and recognising clinical signs and 
symptoms (Patel & Groen 1986; Barrows & Feltovich 1987). More 
recently, the complexity of doctors reasoning about clinical problems 
has been recognised. Authors have now suggested that doctors draw 
upon a repertoire of different reasoning methods depending on the 
nature of the clinical problem (Elstein & Schwartz 2002; Croskerry 
2002; Norman 2005). These different reasoning methods have been 
categorised broadly into two main types; a heuristic and systematic 
processing method (Chaiken 1980; Chen & Chaiken 1999; Payne & 
Bettman 2004; Croskerry 2009b) (Section 1.5.1). 
A review of doctors' clinical reasoning in the qualitative literature 
was conducted. Most studies focused on gaining deeper insight into 
how doctors experience and manage uncertainty during decision 
making, or on identifying factors that influence their clinical 
judgements and decisions (Bendtsen, Hensing, Ebeling, and Schedin 
1999; Lockey & Hardern 2001; Grant & Dowell 2002; Fauriel, Moutel, 
Duchange, Montuclard, Moutard, Pierre Cochat, and Herve 2005; 
Farnan, Johnson, Meltzer, Humphrey, and Arora 2008). A few studies 
were identified that had explored doctors reasoning processes using 
qualitative methods. In brief, Coderre et al. (2003) explored the 
relationship between diagnostic reasoning strategies and diagnostic 
success. A think aloud method revealed doctors employed three types 
of reasoning strategies when making diagnoses; pattern recognition, 
schema-inductive and hypothetico-deductive method. Diagnostic 
judgements were more likely to be correct when doctors had used 
pattern recognition or schema-inductive method. The hypothetico-
deductive method was the least associated with diagnostic success. 
Two studies have described the types of reasoning processes doctors 
used when deciding how to manage specific conditions (Denig, 
Witteman, and Schouten 2002; Jacklin, Sevdalis, Darzi, and Vincent 
2008). General Practitioners were required to think aloud when 
making decisions for scenarios of patients with urinary tract 
infections and stomach complaints. Results indicated that the clinical 
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decision process resembled a heuristic rather than systematic 
approach. Doctors did not always reach decisions by evaluating all 
known options, rather, many were based on routine prescribing 
habits (Denig et al. 2002). Surgeons were asked to describe the most 
important decisions they had to make when operating on patients 
with gallstones (Jacklin et al. 2008). On average 18 decisions were 
important. Two decision making strategies were described, one being 
an intuitive method based on doctors' clinical experience and another 
was the use of specific personal decision rules. Both resembled a 
heuristic approach to decision making. The researchers noted that the 
type of strategy employed depended on the decision problem. Doctors 
were more inclined to rely on their intuition and past experiences 
when considering whether to operate or not. Whereas decisions in 
theatre tended to be more systematic. Doctors used personal decision 
rules that resembled an 'if-then' approach. For instance, if the gall 
bladder is perforated then it should be extracted (Jacklin et al. 2008). 
The findings above demonstrated doctors' use of heuristic and/or 
systematic cognitive processes to reach clinical judgements and 
decisions. These qualitative studies corroborate the findings from 
previous experimental studies. The same types of clinical reasoning 
methods were identified and the idea that doctors draw on a 
repertoire of various reasoning processes was reinforced. Overall the 
quantitative and qualitative literature has furthered our 
understanding of the cognitive processes doctors use to make clinical 
judgements and decisions. However, a limitation with previous 
experimental studies is an emphasis on identifying diagnostic 
reasoning strategies. This has led to better understanding about how 
doctors' think about diagnosis compared to their reasoning about the 
management of patients (Norman 2005). A limitation of the qUalitative 
studies is that clinical reasoning processes were studied in relation to 
specific conditions in specific clinical contexts. While this provides in 
depth information about how doctors solve particular clinical 
problems, it does not capture the complexity of clinical reasoning. The 
present study built on this qualitative evidence from a broader 
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approach. Doctors from a range of clinical specialties were included so 
that discussions were not restricted to decision making about specific 
conditions in one clinical context. The study also focused on 
understanding the processes used to make diagnoses and patient 
treatment decisions. 
4.2. Aims and objectives 
The aim of the interview study was to explore doctors' VIews and 
experiences of how to make clinical judgements and decisions 
effectively. The research objectives were to: 
identify factors that influenced doctors' clinical reasoning about 
clinical cases; 
describe doctors' perceptions of an ideal or 'gold standard' way of 
making effective clinical judgements and decisions; 
describe the strategies doctors report they use to make clinical 
judgements and decisions; 
explore doctors' views about how to develop clinical reasoning 
competency. 
4.3. Method 
4.3.1. Design 
This study used a cross-sectional survey design employing qualitative 
methods. A semi-structured interview technique was used to collect 
data. There are circumstances when a qualitative method of study is 
more suitable than quantitative methods (Coolican 1999; Willig 2001; 
May 2002; Robson 2002; Smith 2008). These include studies that 
focus on describing perceptions and experiences of a particular 
phenomenon (Coolican 1999; Willig 2001; May 2002; Robson 2002; 
Smith 2008), an in depth exploration of an under researched area, 
and making use of a rich data source to inform the design of future 
quantitative studies (King 1994). The present study focused on 
exploring a range of doctors' views and experiences of making clinical 
judgements and decisions, therefore the choice of a qualitative 
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method of study was appropriate. It also sought to provide a rich and 
detailed description of the learning of clinical reasoning skills and 
methods doctors believe they use to make judgements and decisions. 
In addition, it was anticipated that the rich data source may be used 
to inform the design of an intervention to improve clinical reasoning 
and to make recommendations for future training purposes. 
For this study, interviews were the preferred method of data 
collection. Interviews are advantageous because they enable 
interaction with participants in a way that questionnaires or 
observations did not permit. This creates opportunity for the 
researcher to develop rapport with participants and gain detailed 
information about the topic of interest. Interviews offer a flexible 
method of data collection, the researcher is able to clarify participants' 
comments and follow up interesting ideas. This is especially useful for 
exploring a poorly understood topic in detail (Robson 2002). However, 
an interview method is not without limitations. The presence of an 
interviewer may introduce bias into the data collected, in the follOwing 
ways. First, participants may feel inclined to respond to questions in a 
way they think is expected of them - a phenomenon known as social 
desirability bias. Second, the researcher's prior knowledge, beliefs and 
assumptions about the discussion topic can affect the way the data is 
interpreted at the analysis stage (May 2002; Robson 2002). The 
interviewer can reduce the chances of socially desirable responses by 
wording questions neutrally and refraining from sharing their 
opinions during the discussion. To reduce the researcher's subjective 
interpretations of the data, interviews can be audio recorded so there 
is an accurate, permanent record of the entire discussion. The data 
can also be coded using participants' own words and phrases at the 
analysis stage. As with most research designs, it is possible that there 
are differences in the type of people that volunteer for interviews 
compared to those who do not. This means the data generated may 
not represent the views and experiences of the entire popUlation of 
interest. However, qualitative research is more concerned with gaining 
in depth information about the views and experiences of the study 
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sample and less concerned with making broader generalisations 
(Willig 2001). 
Interviews can be conducted over the telephone, in a group setting 
and/or individual face to face (Coolican 1999; Robson 2002; Fontana 
& Frey 2005). Telephone interviews may have been more convenient 
than face to face interviews or encouraged greater participation. 
However, the less interactive nature of the discussion meant that 
rapport was less likely to develop between the author and participant. 
Further, the data may have been difficult to interpret accurately if 
participants had not been physically present during the discussion 
(Robson 2002). An alternative may have been to hold a focus group 
discussion. This is an efficient way of gaining a large amount and 
range of data from several people at the same time. The group 
interaction enables shared and opposing views to be identified with 
ease (Robson 2002). However, group interviews are difficult for 
researchers to control (Robson 2002; Fontana & Frey 2005). The 
traditional question-then-answer format may have been more difficult 
to maintain in a group setting as participants speak over one another. 
Also the personalities and views of some members might have 
dominated over others in the group (Robson 2002; Fontana & Frey 
2005). There is also a lack of anonymity and confidentiality in a group 
setting which may discourage some people from participating. 
Interviews that are conducted individually and face to face with the 
researcher do not have the above disadvantages. It was particularly 
important that good rapport was established so that participants 
spoke frankly about their experiences of making judgements and 
decisions in practice. Individual face to face interviews were more 
likely to ensure a feeling of anonymity and confidentiality than 
telephone or group interviews (May 2002). Consequently this was the 
chosen method of interview format. 
Interviews can be conducted from several different approaches that 
range from structured, unstructured or semi-structured. In a 
structured interview, each participant is asked the same questions in 
the same order with a choice of pre-selected answers (Robson 2002; 
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Fontana & Frey 2005). This approach is similar to a participant self 
completing a questionnaire, except it is completed by an interviewer. 
This can be useful if a study aims to reliably compare responses of 
different participants and possess a method that is easily replicated 
by others (Coolican 1999). However, this method would not have 
allowed the author to engage in natural conversation with 
participants, and consequently the data collected would have lacked 
detail (Coolican 1999; Fontana & Frey 2005). In contrast, 
unstructured interviews have little or no standardisation between 
interviews. Researchers do not necessarily need to have planned 
specific questions to ask, rather general topic areas guide the 
discussion (Coolican 1999; Robson 2002). Consequently participants 
have a lot of control over the topics of conversation and are free to 
speak about what they like. This approach has the advantage of 
encouraging an interactive discussion between researcher and 
participant that resembles a natural conversation. However, as the 
present study had a defined agenda to meet, a more structured 
interview approach was necessary (Robson 2002). 
An alternative approach that offered a combination of structure 
with flexibility was the semi-structured interview (Ritchie & Lewis 
2003). A sufficient balance of control over the interview is achieved for 
both researcher and participant. Like a structured interview, the 
researcher can use the interview schedule as a guide rather than a 
script to ensure the data generated answered the research questions 
appropriately (Robson 2002; Fontana & Frey 2005). Questions are still 
pre-determined to ensure the study objectives are fulfl1led, but the 
wording and/or order of questions may be changed to suit individual 
interviews. The researcher can also use a range of probing techniques 
to ensure important issues raised spontaneously by the participant 
are followed up in enough depth (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). At the same 
time the participant is allowed enough scope to share the views and 
experiences of their choice and the discussion still resembles a 
relaxed and informal conversation (Willig 2001; Robson 2002). 
Overall, it was considered that a semi-structured approach to 
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interviewing combined the advantages of structured and unstructured 
interviewing approaches. Participants of the present study were 
interviewed face to face using a semi-structured approach because of 
the advantages of structure and flexibility. 
4.3.2. Ethical approval 
The study received ethical approval in April 2009 from the Leeds 
(East) NHS Research Ethics Committee (see Appendix 8.6). 
4.3.3. Sample size 
Within flexible research designs it is difficult to pre-specify how many 
participants are required. It is acceptable that the researcher makes a 
judgement as to when data collection has reached saturation (Robson, 
2002). This point is reached when the researcher feels that further 
data will not contribute anything new to the current data set. Factors 
such as the breadth and nature of the research topic and the data 
collection method used are likely to influence the number of 
participants required to reach a level of saturation with the data 
(Morse 1995). Some authors have estimated that a minimum of 6 
interviews are necessary to reach saturation and a maximum of 
somewhere between 20 and 30 interviews should be conducted (Morse 
1995; Creswell 1998; Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006). Guest et al. 
(2006) reported that although 60 interviews had been conducted, 
saturation had occurred within the first 12 interviews. Based on this 
guidance it was estimated that between 6 and 20 interviews were 
sufficient for the present study. 
4.3.4. SampHng method 
Participants were selected using a purposive sampling recruitment 
method. Purposive sampling is suitable in flexible research methods, 
particularly when the sample needs to reflect the views from a range 
of individuals (Robson 2002). In the present study, it was important to 
represent a range of doctors' views according to different clinical 
specialty and expertise level. Therefore a purposive sampling method 
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permitted the researcher to deliberately recruit participants with these 
objectives in mind. A purposive sample is one type of non-probability 
sampling method that does not make any statistical inferences about 
the likelihood of selecting individuals (Robson 2002). For this reason, 
a limitation of selecting participants purposefully is that the findings 
may not represent the views and experiences of all doctors. However 
the importance of fulfilling the study objectives outweighed this 
limitation. 
The author used contacts from the School of Medicine to approach 
doctors who worked at the Leeds teaching hospitals and Leeds 
Institute of Health Sciences. These people were initially invited to 
participate in the study via e-mail. On behalf of the author, the School 
of Medicine's Director of Student Support sent a mass e-mail to fourth 
and fifth year medical undergraduates. Those that responded with 
interest were sent a study information sheet electronically. Paper 
copies of the information sheet were also distributed to postgraduate 
students studying for the Certificate in Health Research. This 
particular course was targeted as a proportion of the students were 
known to be medical doctors. Further participants were sought from 
the contacts of individuals that had agreed to take part in the study. 
4.3.5. Sample characteristics 
To represent a range of views and experiences about decision making, 
the sample included doctors that worked in a variety of clinical 
specialities and who were at different stages of seniority. The sample 
included doctors that worked in primary care and a range of medical 
and surgical secondary care specialties. Specifically, the sample 
consisted of (i) general practitioners so that judgement and decision 
making around a wide range of acute, chronic, mild and severe illness 
was represented, as well as decisions to refer patients to specialists, 
(ii) an anaesthetist, obstetrician and paediatrician for their experience 
of making decisions under particularly high risk and emergency 
conditions, (iii) a nephrologist and psychiatrist for their experience of 
making judgements and decisions about long term conditions with 
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kidney and mental health patients and (iv) a vascular and paediatric 
surgeon for their experience of making decisions in theatre. 
The sample also included a range of seniority levels from novice 
medical students, newly qualified doctors and consultants at the most 
experienced level. There is evidence to suggest that doctors of different 
levels of clinical experience make decisions differently (Jensen, 
Shepard, and Hack 1990; Croskerry 2002; Schmidt & Rikers 2007). 
The sample included undergraduate medical students in their fourth 
and fifth year of study, newly qualified postgraduate FY I and FY2 
doctors, specialist trainees and consultants. Undergraduate medical 
students below fourth year were not invited as they would have little 
experience of making judgements and decisions in practice due to less 
exposure to clinical settings. For analysis purposes, the sample was 
divided into three broad categories to reflect doctors' different levels of 
seniority. Junior doctors were classed as medical students and 
postgraduates in their foundation years of training (FYI and FY2's). 
Middle grade doctors were general practitioners with less than five 
years of general practice experience and specialist trainees. Senior 
doctors were general practitioners with more than five years of general 
practice experience and those who had reached consultant level. 
4.3.6. Materials 
The study's materials included an information sheet, consent form, 
interview schedule and a coding frame for the analysis. The details of 
each material are described further below. 
4.3.6.1. Study information sheet 
A study information sheet was designed according to the NHS ethics 
committee and university ethics committee guidelines (Appendix 8.7). 
The information sheet explained the purpose of the study, why the 
individual had been invited to take part, what the study involved and 
how the data would be used and stored. Contact details of the author 
were provided and it was explicitly stated that participation was 
voluntary, their identities would be hidden and the data they 
generated would be used strictly for research purposes only. 
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4.3.6.2. Consentform 
A consent form was developed according to the standard format of the 
Leeds NHS Research Ethics Committee (Appendix 8.8). Informed 
consent was obtained upon completion of this form. Participants were 
required to indicate they had read each statement and were required 
to sign and date the form. 
4.3.6.3. Interview schedule 
The content and format of the interview schedule was developed using 
good practice guidelines in qualitative methods (Coolican 1999; 
Robson 2002; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Questions were generated based 
on a review of the clinical reasoning literature and in accordance with 
fulfilling the study's objectives. To achieve good rapport with 
participants and data of sufficient breadth and depth, a mixture of 
open and closed questions were included. Open ended questions were 
formed from the key topic areas in order to explore answers in a 
flexible and deep manner (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Key areas were 
related to challenges at the workplace, good and poor clinical 
reasoning, factors that may affect judgement and decision making 
and learning to acquire clinical reasoning skills. Prompts were also 
prepared in anticipation to ask participants to expand on interesting 
comments and/or provide them with clarification for some of the 
broad questions. Prompts and follow ups were phrased as open 
ended, but on occasions as closed, questions and this proved a useful 
way of maintaining focused and detailed discussions (Ritchie & Lewis 
2003). Effort was made to word questions in short sentences using 
clear and neutral language to encourage participants to speak frankly 
(Coolican 1999; Robson 2002; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). The interview 
schedule was structured in a sequence considered to be good practice 
in qualitative research. Straight forward questions were asked at the 
beginning to ease participants into the interview and create some 
rapport with the author (Robson 2002; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). 
Participants were asked to introduce themselves in terms of their 
seniority level and the clinical specialty they currently worked in. The 
interview then moved on to the main body of questions that 
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represented the purpose of the interviews. Questions in the main body 
were divided into two main areas related to the experience of making 
clinical judgements and decisions in practice and the development of 
clinical reasoning skills. When answering these main questions, 
participants were asked to describe examples from their clinical 
experience and formal medical education to illustrate clearly their 
perceptions and experiences. Interviews drew to a close with the 
author signalling which question would be the last and ended with 
inviting participants to say anything they wished to add to the 
discussion (Robson 2002; Ritchie & Lewis 2003) (see Appendix 8.9 for 
interview schedule). 
4.3.6.4. Coding frame 
A coding frame was developed in order to classify the transcript data 
by categorising the texts into categories and themes (Appendix 8.10). 
The development of the coding frame is described in more detail in the 
analysis section 4.3.7. Thematic framework analysis method was used 
to inform the design of the coding frame (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). The 
coding frame organised the transcript data into the following six 
themes: (i) perceptions of clinical specialty, (ii) factors which 
influenced reasoning, (iii) perceptions of making judgements and 
decisions, (iv) novice and expert,(v) professional practice, (vi) role of 
learning. Each theme was associated with five or six categories. 
4.3.6.5. Pilot study 
A pilot interview was conducted to evaluate the suitability of the 
interview schedule and the author's interviewing skills. It is important 
to check that a researcher's style of interviewing and questions asked 
obtain a full and coherent account of the main topics (Robson 2002; 
Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Particular attention was given to assessing the 
suitability of the sequence of questions, the use of language and ease 
of understanding questions. This also gave some prediction of the 
duration other interviews may take. 
The pilot interview was conducted with a consultant obstetrician 
who was selected due to his senior level of clinical experience and 
research experience at the university. The pilot interview followed the 
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format of the interview schedule, the participant answered a question 
and then gave feedback about the nature of that question until the 
interview reached the end. For each question the participant was 
asked to comment on its clarity, appropriateness and whether they 
had any suggestions for improving the interview schedule. This 
feedback was also used to determine whether the study's objectives 
had been fulfilled. The audio recording was listened to and 
transcribed verbatim by the author. The transcript and the author's 
impressions of the pilot interview were then discussed with 
supervisors. 
As a result of the pilot interview, some problems were identified. 
The interview schedule had not generated data of sufficient clarity, 
scope or depth. It was decided that the interview schedule should be 
revised in its entirety. The main problems were that questions were 
unclear and too broad and this caused the author to over prompt the 
participant. Consequently the data elicited was unfocused and did not 
sufficiently fulfil the study's objectives. On reflection questions about 
abstract concepts were worded in an overly direct manner, for 
example 'Can you talk me through the process of how you make a 
clinical decision?'. This proved too challenging for the participant to 
describe clearly and it highlighted the difficulty others may face when 
trying to articulate their thought processes. To combat this, questions 
about how decisions are made and how this skill is developed, 
questions were phrased in a more implicit but specific manner. This 
was achieved by asking participants to narrate examples when 
answering each question to illustrate their points more clearly. 
Examples were 'Can you think of an example of a patient who had a 
good medical outcome but you felt uncomfortable with an aspect of 
your clinical judgment?' and 'Are there any examples of when you 
would have made a decision differently?'. Such questions were 
answered with ease and enough detail and the author was able to 
gain an implicit insight into participants' decision making processes. 
The emphasis on participants' providing examples from their clinical 
and formal education experiences became the key technique to 
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achieve coherent and meaningful discussions. This worked well and 
was implemented in every subsequent interview. 
4.3.6.6. Procedure 
Interviews were organised at a mutually convenient time with those 
who agreed to take part, usually in a quiet setting at a participant's 
place of work or study. This included various departments around 
Leeds teaching hospitals and the University of Leeds. Participants 
were recruited until no new themes of data emerged and a sufficient 
number of doctors of varying seniority levels and clinical specialties 
had been interviewed. 
A few days prior to each interview, those that agreed to participate 
were asked to think about the following questions from the interview 
guide in preparation; 
Can you think of an example of a patient who had a bad outcome but 
you felt comfortable with your clinical judgment? 
Can you think of an example of a patient who had a good outcome but 
you felt uncomfortable with an aspect of your clinical judgment? 
Are there any examples of when you would have made a decision 
differently? 
These questions might have been difficult for participants to 
answer spontaneously during the interview. As they were expected to 
generate an insight into the processes doctors use when making 
judgement and decisions, these questions represented a key part of 
the interview. Therefore it was considered appropriate to ask 
participants to prepare their answers to these questions in order to 
avoid situations of not being able to think of examples during the 
interview. This procedure worked well as all participants came to their 
interview with examples they had prepared in advance, which led to 
stimulating discussions. 
At the beginning of each interview, participants were asked to 
spend a few minutes reading a paper version of the information sheet 
and then complete and sign the consent form. The interview always 
began with a discussion of participants' stage of medical career and 
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their current clinical specialty of work. This background information 
was helpful in guiding the rest of the discussion. For most interviews, 
questions were asked in the order they appeared on the interview 
schedule and prompts were added spontaneously as the discussion 
progressed. Also, on a few occasions, the order of questions was 
changed spontaneously in response to the direction of the discussion, 
but all questions were asked at some point. This helped maintain a 
conversational manner. On completion of the interview schedule, 
participants were asked whether they would like to add anything else 
to the discussion. Interviews ended with a debriefing of how 
participants felt about the interview, if they had any questions and 
whether they were happy for the audio-recording to be analysed. Each 
person was thanked for their time and invited to contact the author in 
the event of any issues arising. On average, interviews lasted 45 
minutes but ranged from 25 to 60 minutes. 
Immediately after each interview, the author listened to the 
recording and noted down her initial thoughts and impressions of how 
the discussion went and the main themes that emerged. These notes 
became memos that formed a preliminary analysis of the data. Each 
recording was copied for back-up purposes and transcribed by a third 
party. The qualitative data analysis package NVivo (QSR international, 
version 8) was used to organise and store the data during the analysis 
process. 
There were several methods adopted to increase the reliability of 
the study. This included the use of a good quality audio-recording 
device, a professional transcriber and the qualitative data analysis 
software, NVivo. The interviews were audio-recorded for several 
reasons. Firstly, it eliminated the need to take notes during interviews 
so the author was able to devote full attention to the discussions 
(Coolican 1999; Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Secondly it provided a 
verbatim permanent record of each discussion from beginning to end. 
This helped increase reliability as the author could use feedback 
received between each interview to improve her interviewing skills 
(Robson 2002). Also, verbatim transcriptions of the recordings 
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enhanced the reliability of the data analysis process as each 
transcript was analysed in full. This meant that all of the data rather 
than a selection of data were closely examined. This reduced the 
chances of a biased interpretation of the data based on the author's 
prior assumptions (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). A potential disadvantage of 
audio-recorded interviews is that some individuals may feel inhibited 
due to anonymity and confidentiality reasons (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). 
This was not perceived to be problematic during the present study as 
the topic of discussions were not of a sensitive nature. The author 
explained the value of audio-recording and reassured participants 
that she would be vigilant to conceal any identifying information. 
Procedures to maintain confidentiality were also clearly explained in 
terms of how the recordings and transcripts would be stored and 
used. Each interview was transcribed by an experienced, professional 
transcriber using a word processor. Interview recordings were 
transcribed verbatim to produce an authentic electronic version of the 
discussions, including expressions pauses and laughter. 
Transcriptions were checked by the author for accuracy to further 
increase reliability. Finally, NVivo software provided an efficient filing 
system to navigate through and organise a large textual data set. 
4.3.7. Analysis 
The aim of the analysis was to accurately describe participants' views 
and experiences of making effective clinical judgements and clinical 
decisions. This was achieved by summarising the data set in the form 
of themes with related subcategories, using a thematic framework 
method (Ritchie & Lewis 2003; Braun & Clarke 2006). A thematic 
framework method was suitable as it generates themes and categories 
from the data itself. This was important as the focus of the present 
study was to illustrate the participants' own perceptions and 
experiences of making clinical judgements and decisions. Other 
methods of qualitative data analysis were considered such as 
Grounded Theory and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. 
Grounded Theory aims to discover a theory about a particular 
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experience that emerges from the data (Glaser & Strauss 1967). 
However, as Grounded Theory is not a descriptive method of 
qualitative data analysis, this was not selected as the aim of the 
present study was to describe the data, rather than generate a theory 
that explains people's views and behaviours (Coolican 1999). The 
central focus of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis is to provide 
detailed insight of how people experience and make sense of 
particular phenomena (Smith & Eatough 2007). Its idiographic 
emphasis encourages the study of small homogenous groups and it is 
necessary to achieve a balance of phenomenological description with 
insightful interpretation (Smith & Eatough 2007). To meet the 
objectives of the present study, it was necessary that the sample 
consisted of range of doctors to represent a range of views. Further, 
this study intended to be descriptive rather than interpretive of the 
meaning behind doctors' views and experiences of clinical judgement 
and decision making. 
The stages of thematic framework analysis are easy to follow and 
encourage the author to systematically and rigorously attend to the 
entire data set. However there is still room for a degree of flexibility 
when following these key stages (Braun & Clarke 2006). At the centre 
of the thematic framework method is the development of a coding 
frame i.e. a thematic framework. Its purpose is to classify and 
organise the data into themes and related categories (Ritchie & Lewis 
2003; Braun & Clarke 2006). The following six steps were taken to 
develop a reliable coding frame. Steps one to four were carried out 
manually using paper versions of transcripts, whilst steps five and six 
were managed by Nvivo software. 
4.3.7.1. Identification of meaningful units 
In order to gain an overview of the breadth and depth of the data all 
transcripts were read through once. This was a useful way to become 
familiar with the complete data set and the possible patterns. Five 
transcripts were selected to be analysed in more detail. Meaningful 
phrases or sentences were identified and used to divide the texts into 
units. These units represented the different thoughts and ideas of 
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participants. The example below illustrates how a paragraph from the 
original text was divided into separate meaningful units: 
Well that's the whole beauty and the problem with primary care and 
general practice, you have no idea what on earth is going to present. 
You could have a number of relatively minor illnesses. 
I mean you've got to remember that we're a very busy, really quite 
deprived area and so therefore say I'd be a duty doc today, I might have 
50 people I'll see in a day. 
And even on a quiet day if I'm doing a full day it would be a minimum 
of [sigh] 40 people, 35 to 40 people in one day. 
So I mean it can be anything from sort of simple coughj colds, to people 
coming with anxiety, depression, psychological illness, muscular 
skeletal problems. Or it could be sort of anything really, cardiovascular, 
respiratory ... 
... so it's a massive range, a massive range. (Int. 2) 
During this early stage of analysis, a selection of transcripts were 
used to identify meaningful units of data (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). Five 
transcripts were chosen (interviews 2, 5, 7, 10, 12) that represented 
views from doctors who differed according to clinical specialty and 
seniority level, so a range of texts were used. 
4.3.7.2. Generation of initial codes 
The next stage was to attribute meaning to each unit of data. The 
author reflected upon the units and decided what codes to assign to 
each unit. These codes represented a label that summarised the 
content of each unit according to the author's interpretation. For 
example, the following unit well that's the whole beauty and the 
problem with primary care and general practice, you have no idea what 
on earth is going to present was coded under 'context of specialty'. One 
code was assigned next to each unit of data until all five transcripts 
had been labelled. The author discussed the codes with supervisors in 
order to determine whether they represented accurate interpretations 
of the units of data. As a result of this discussion, it was necessary to 
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go back and divide the texts further into units of data and re-interpret 
some of the codes. This was good practice to increase the reliability of 
coding the data. These revised codes were then used to index the rest 
of the data set. 
4.3.7.3. Sorting of codes into initial themes 
A separate list of all the codes was made to simplify the sorting of 
codes into initial themes. The list of codes was carefully examined, 
duplicates were eliminated and related codes were grouped together. 
This was an iterative process where codes were re-grouped until a 
coherent set of groups of codes was established. Each group was then 
labelled with a title that represented the common link between the 
codes in each group. These were the initial themes indentified and the 
codes became the sub-categories under each theme. Twelve themes 
were identified with a number of associated categories that ranged 
from 9 to 47. Each theme and its related categories were numbered in 
the following way and this became the initial thematic framework: 
1. Demographics 
2. Role - academic 
3. Role - educator 
4. Role - clinician 
5. Stage of training 
6. Typical day 
7. Typical tasks 
8. Advantages of job 
9. Continuing professional development 
lO.Other 
To examine its suitability as a coding frame, the initial thematic 
framework was applied to a transcript that had not been used to 
develop the coding frame. 
4.3.7.4. Revision of initial codingframe 
It became apparent that the coding frame in its initial form was not 
suitable for categorising the transcripts. The process of applying it to 
a transcript was a difficult and cumbersome task. The initial 
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framework and example of a coded transcript were discussed with 
supervisors and it was agreed that there were too many themes and 
categories. This caused there to be a lot of overlap between categories 
which led to difficulty in deciding where to code some of the data. To 
rectify this, themes and categories were broadened so that more data 
could be coded using fewer codes. Four of the themes and many of the 
categories were eliminated by grouping them together under less 
specific labels. The first revision produced a much broader and 
simplified coding frame. It consisted of eight themes with a maximum 
of seven related categories under each theme. 
However, as more transcripts were analysed further revisions were 
made to the framework. A theme that described the demographics of 
participants, including their various roles and information about 
specialties, was removed as it did not contribute to important 
discussion. Instead, demographic information was presented in a 
summary table (see Appendix 8.11). It also made more sense to 
collapse two themes into one so that factors influencing decisions and 
factors influencing judgements were discussed under an over arching 
theme about factors that influence the clinical reasoning process in 
general. The names given to some themes were also revised in order to 
reflect the content more accurately. For example, making decisions 
became perceptions of making clinical decisions and learning to make 
decisions became role of learning. The final thematic framework 
consisted of six themes. Each theme was associated with between 5 
and 6 categories, (see Appendix 8.10) 
4.3.7.5. Application of revised coding frame 
The revised coding frame was then applied to all the transcripts in 
order to code the full data set. This stage required the author to make 
a judgement about which parts of the framework applied to each unit 
of data. Data was coded by labelling each unit of data with the 
relevant category number (1.2, 1.3, 1.4 ... ) in the margin of the 
transcript. A small proportion of the data was miscellaneous and 
coded under 'other' categories. Overall, coding the data with the 
revised thematic framework, as opposed to its initial format, was 
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much simpler and quicker. The themes and categories served as an 
appropriate coding system for all the transcripts and this was a sign 
of its validity (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). 
4.3.7.6. Managing data in Nvivo 
The final stage involved restructuring the data set so that each coded 
chunk of text was grouped under its associated category and theme. 
This was facilitated by using the qualitative data package, Nvivo. 
Using the tree node and free node functions, the thematic framework 
was recreated. Tree nodes represented themes and free nodes 
represented categories. Each coded piece of text was moved to the 
relevant free node. Eventually each free node (category) consisted of 
the full range of coded texts that would be used as examples to 
describe each category. 
4.4. Results 
A total of 15 doctors took part in this interview study; 8 males and 7 
females. Three doctors worked in primary care, 9 worked in medical 
and/ or surgical specialties and 3 were medical students. Six doctors 
were involved in academic research and 9 had teaching 
responsibilities. There were 7 senior doctors: consultants or GPs with 
more than five years of experience, 3 were middle grade doctors; 
specialist trainees, and 5 were junior doctors; either foundation year 
postgraduates or medical students. 
Overall, six themes were identified from the data: factors that 
influenced clinical judgements, factors that influenced clinical 
decisions, judgements and decision making methods, novice and 
expert clinical reasoning, professionalism and clinical reasoning, and 
acquiring clinical reasoning skills. Each theme included five or six 
related categories. In order to display the results succinctly, themes 
were organised under four headings to reflect the study'S objectives. 
These were (i) factors that influenced clinical reasoning; (ii) 
perceptions of ideal judgement and decision making; (iii) methods 
used to make judgements and decisions and (iv) development of 
clinical reasoning over time. 
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4.4.1. Factors that influenced doctors' clinical reasoning 
In this section, data from themes 1 and 2 are discussed. The data 
suggest that different factors influenced how doctors approach 
diagnostic judgements compared to treatment and management 
decisions. For this reason, they are summarised in separate sections 
below. Diagnosis was dependent on having the appropriate clinical 
information. The patient's appearance, time point at which they were 
seen by a doctor and physical examination, influenced whether an 
accurate and timely diagnosis was reached. Decisions about how to 
manage the patient were influenced by a wide range of factors, some 
of which included patient risk, preferences and pressure at the 
workplace. 
4.4. 1. 1. Factors that influenced diagnostic judgements 
Doctors said their diagnosis starts as soon as they see a patient and 
assess their physical appearance. One of the first judgements doctors 
made was do they look quite well, do they look unwell just generally? 
(Int.8). Doctors stated they were looking for signs of physical problems 
and poor hygiene, as illustrated below: 
So I just went to see her and saw her and I just thought, she doesn't 
look really very well, she was breathing quite quickly, had a look at her 
chest x-ray and she had quite a lot of fluid on her lungs. (Int. 15) 
and: 
as the patient comes in you're looking how are they're walking, are they 
still, are they in pain, are they limping, you know, what's their facial 
features like, do they look happy, unhappy, are they in pain. If it's 
somebody you don't know, you know, you will be making other 
assumptions, you will be looking at how they're dressed, you'll be 
looking at how kempt they are, are they shaved if they're male, you 
know, do they smell of alcohol, do they have body odour, do they have a 
cigarette smell around them. (Int. 2) 
However, doctors felt this judgement should be under constant 
review because a patient's appearance can be deceptive. For example: 
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you have to bring the bigger picture in as well because some people 
don't breathe quickly because they're on opiates and some people don't 
appear distressed because they're very stoical and things like that. 
(Int. 15) 
In addition, doctors spoke of a gradual appearance of clinical signs 
and symptoms in conditions that worsen over time. So the time point 
at which the patient was seen affected their ability to reach a timely 
diagnosis: 
So because symptoms ... and we obviously symptoms at an earlier 
stage, so the guy who I mentioned had a kidney infection, I saw him at 
sort of early stage, if I'd seen him a week later you would have said, this 
guy has a raging kidney infection, how did this stupid GP miss that? 
Well the stupid doctor maybe missed, if he did, because he saw it at an 
earlier stage and there was the clinical signs weren't fully developed. 
(lnt.3) 
A good physical examination was seen as facilitating the process of 
reaching an accurate diagnosis. A clear example was: 
And then I examined properly and it all fitted with this textbook pleural 
effusion, so she had some fluid on her lungs. (Int. 15) 
Whereas the absence of a physical examination hindered the 
diagnostic process, as illustrated in one interview: 
he was very difficult to examine and every time you got near him he got 
very upset, so it was very hard to work out whether his abdomen was 
actually tender or not. And this is a problem we have with young 
children. And I think in the end he turned out to be appendicitis and 
I'd kept worrying about him and kept going back because I just wasn't 
convinced that he was medical as he'd been managed that far. (Int.B) 
and: 
basically sort of looked at how he was, did a relatively sketchy 
neurological examination and sort of said, oh I'm sure things will be 
fine, you know. And then next day he'd actually got worse, he was 
admitted to hospital. (Int. 2) 
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4.4.1.2. Factors that influenced clinical decisions 
Decisions about how to manage a patient's condition were influenced 
by risk factors to the patient, individual preferences and pressure at 
the workplace. Doctors reported weighing up several different types of 
risk factors to reach a decision including a patient's age, co-morbid 
health problems and history: 
And you go along to see them and some cases they may be very sick old 
people where you would question the surgeon's decision to operate. 
And you have to take a lot of things into account; the patient's 
comorbidity, the risk ... it's basically a risk/benefit thing, weighing it 
up. (Int. 10) 
and: 
Add on the scenario that she's got a previous caesarean section and 
that makes the decision even more difficult. So where you're saying, 
well she should be in labour after she's ruptured her membranes, 24 
hours later she isn't, and she's got a BMI of 50-something. So you want 
her to have a vaginal delivery as much as possible. (Int.7) 
Doctors recognised that patients affected their management 
decisions. For example, patient's preferences and their way of life were 
considered to meet the needs of each individual patient: 
So she was happy, you know, she'd accepted the responsibility that if it 
was going to rupture it was going to rupture and that was fine and she 
didn't want surgery for it. (Int 16) 
and: 
What else is going on in the patient's life alters the decision-making 
process that you have. If that person is looking after somebody who is 
ill or they have co-dependents, again it alters your management plan 
and the decision that you make. (Int. 2) 
However, doctors talked about the tension between delivering care 
that is appropriate and in line with patients' wishes. There were 
occasions when patient preferences had little impact on the decisions 
doctors made, for example: 
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And in that case we were looking to sort of optimise his care and we felt 
that him being a protracted inpatient was not helping his overall 
treatment plan, and certainly not beneficial to the behaviours that he 
was displaying. So it was felt that he needed to have his care 
transferred from hospital into the community services, although he 
made very sort of clear his wish potentially to harm himself if we were 
to take that decision. (Int. 11) 
The type of doctor-patient relationship could also influence the 
management plan for patients. If a doctor was particularly fond of a 
patient there was more personal investment in the decision which 
influenced the delivery of care. This was illustrated in the texts below: 
On a personal level there are some patients that you really, really 
become attached to and you get to know really well, and you almost feel 
that for them you try even harder ... and there are other people that 
make decisions like whether he goes to intensive care and things like 
that, because he needed to go there in the end, so I found myself 
negotiating harder rather than just accepting decisions. (Int. 5) 
and: 
if you really like someone you're going to push for it, you're going to 
follow it up, you're going to go there yourself, present the patient's card 
to the radiologist and say look, I really need this done, can you get this 
done now. If you don't like someone or you've not spent as much time 
with them you may not think it's as important and you may not make 
that effort. (Int. 14) 
Doctors acknowledged that work pressures affected management 
decisions. Peer pressure was experienced as either implicit or explicit. 
Implicit peer pressure was experienced in terms of the expectations 
doctors have of each other: 
well what my colleagues think, and sometimes that's implicit and 
unsaid, so I think, what would other people here do, you know, and 
what would they think if they saw me admitting lots of people to 
hospital as well, or, what would they think if you know, they saw this 
boy with worsening cellulitis two days later and they thought, that fool 
should have, you know, admitted him. (Int. 3) 
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At other times peer pressure was a more direct experience such as 
a colleague insisting an action was carried out: 
Because she [nurseJ was hassling me I prescribed it, but then I was 
weighing it up after I prescribed it, do you understand what I mean? I 
should have done the weighing up first then prescribed, but my mind 
was really on making sure that I've done it. (Int. 5) 
A recurring view was that the time available affected decisions of 
how to manage patients. When time was constrained, doctors 
recognised they would sometimes select the quickest management 
plan in order to save enough time to deal with other patients: 
It sounds awful but it's the way things are - it would have been a 
hassle for me bouncing him into hospital because you know, several 
minutes on the telephone, writing a letter, explaining directions means 
that you fall behind in your surgery another 15 to 20 minutes, or at 
least sometimes you can. I did yesterday with a more complex case. 
Which then has a knock on effect on other patients, and your risk with 
other patients. (Int. 3) 
On other occasions, a lack of time was ignored if the patient was 
thought to be very ill: 
So for a woman I was dealing with yesterday who I thought might have 
a ... potentially have a blood clot in her lungs, it just took lots of time 
to do a careful examination of her and deal with the hospital and get 
her admitted. And you know, of course I can see there's a counter at 
the bottom of my screen which tells me how many patients are queuing 
for me, so I could see that totting up as time went on. But if something 
is urgent and important then you know, you just deal with it and take 
the consequences. (Int. 2) 
4.4.2. Perceptions of making ideal judgements and decisions 
Data from themes 4 and 5 are discussed in this section. There was no 
specific process that represented the 'gold standard' way to reach a 
judgement or decision, or one that should be used on every occasion. 
In theme 4, there was a sense that the quality of judgements and 
decisions should be judged on the steps taken to reach them rather 
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than the clinical outcome. Making good judgements and decisions 
was linked with maintaining professionalism at the workplace. Theme 
5 summarised how professionalism was maintained when making 
clinical judgements and decisions. There was a sense that making 
clinical judgements and decisions safely and in conjunction with the 
patient, was ideal. This is explained in more detail below. 
4.4.2.1. Safety netting 
A generally acknowledged ethos was that clinical judgements should 
be made in line with patient safety. This idea was a recurring theme 
across all interviews. Participants referred to their safety netting 
procedures that they used when thinking about a possible diagnosis. 
These were deliberate acts of precaution the doctor used to protect the 
patient. One method of safety netting was to give patients explicit 
instructions about what to do if their condition worsened: 
The other thing I did was ... well even when I was uncertain I put in 
what we call safety net, I said to him explicitly and I documented that, 
you know, if his pain got worse and you know, if it did turn out to be 
something like a kidney infection he was to come back and see 
someone else whilst I was away. (Int. 3) 
Or sometimes a patient would be referred for further investigation: 
So sometimes you just do have to refer even if you think the patient is 
exaggerating or something like that. (Int. 4) 
For making decisions about how to manage a patient's condition, 
another method was to start a treatment regime if the cause of the 
problem was uncertain. Doctors reasoned that it was better to give a 
potentially unnecessary treatment than leave a potentially fatal 
condition untreated. 
So lots of people are started on treatment for things that they haven't 
got because we can't distinguish but then you treat them for that 
because that's the most important thing to rule out. The other day 
someone had symptoms that suggested heart attack. I wasn't 
convinced and my consultant was though, but either way the right 
thing to do there is to treat them. Later on the test came back to show 
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they didn't have a heart attack but they've already had their treatment 
for it. (Int. 5) 
Adverse medical outcomes were recognised as inevitable in 
medicine. Doctors maintained confidence in their clinical judgments 
and decisions by adhering to an accepted procedure at work. For 
example, if a record of their reasoning was kept, appropriate further 
tests were ordered or a commonly used emergency procedure was 
implemented, then decisions were classed as right or good even if the 
ou tcome was bad. 
So in a way you can make a good decision and justify it, and you can 
justify in a note .... So I can make decisions and involve a lot of 
uncertainty, but quite comfortably, knowing that I've at least followed 
some sort of accepted procedure which has some sort of ... as well for 
me which has some sort of epistemological basis. (Int. 3) 
and: 
So it was a deterioration that you couldn't have foreseen but I'd already 
made the process into, I'd already arranged to have the appropriate 
blood tests, arranged to have the appropriate follow up, arranged to 
have the appropriate extra information gathering, it just so happened 
on that occasion, you know, things didn't tum out right. (Int. 2) 
and: 
but when you don't know the patient at all, know anything about them 
and you've done the ABC approach and they still die, then you've done 
everything you can possibly do. (Int. 5) 
4.4.2.2. Shared decision making 
Involving patients in decisions was mentioned but the nature of their 
involvement was important. Doctors would involve their patients in 
the decision making process as a way of encouraging compliance to 
their recommendations: 
I always try and involve a patient because if you can get them onto your 
side and see why you're making the decision then I think that always 
helps with their compliance and concordance. (Int. 4) 
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However, there were times when a shared approach to decision 
making was not ideal: 
I mean the patient has to be involved with that decision-making 
process. Now I say to be involved with it, but they'd be involved with 
some part of it. There are some bits where you have to have sort of 
control. (Int. 2) 
4.4.3. Methods used to reach cHnical judgements and decisions 
Data from theme 3 is discussed in this section. A number of methods 
emerged that participants believed they used to reach clinical 
judgements and decisions. It was not clear how doctors selected a 
particular method to use, but there did seem to be different methods 
used to reach a diagnosis (judgement) compared to a treatment plan 
(decision). To assess a patient's health or judge the cause of a 
condition, doctors relied upon their clinical intuition or an ability to 
recognise signs and symptoms. Treatment decisions were reached via 
a deliberate problem solving method or habit. 
4.4.3.1. Clinical intuition 
Clinical intuition was a difficult concept to articulate. It was described 
as a sixth sense, gut feeling or knowing something is not right. 
Participants trusted these intuitive feelings and allowed them to guide 
their clinical judgements about a diagnosis. Intuition was used to 
assess the condition of a patient's health: 
I might look from the end of the bed when the ... you know, somebody 
might be busy round the bed and I just look through the window and 
watch them for a minute, which by no means is any clinical 
examination, but yeah I might think, well that's fine, that's okay, they 
look okay. (Int. 8) 
Or if there was concern about a patient, it would encourage the 
doctor to search for further diagnostic information: 
So if I have a hunch that something isn't right then I need to look for 
something ... for what isn't right. (Int. 5) 
and: 
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And he was just vomiting a lot and I think we all know something was 
wrong but nobody really acted on it and I just remember thinking a lot, 
this isn't right, something's wrong, and asked lots of different people 
instead of just going to one Registrar. (Int. 15) 
Although, intuition was to be used with caution and was not to be 
over relied on: 
Although without any substantial evidence I won't make any, you 
know, real big decision on it, does that make sense? (Int. 5) 
4.4.3.2. Recognition of signs and symptoms 
There was a shared view that often clinical conditions are easily 
identifiable from a set of classic signs and symptoms. Many diagnostic 
judgements were based on an ability to recognise the typical 
characteristics of conditions: 
So people for example who have a two-week period of low mood, a lack 
of energy, a lack of enjoyment as well as other tick-box symptoms may 
fulfil the criteria for say a depressive episode. So we have criteria that 
we would use in our medical diagnosis model. (Int. 11) 
Furthermore, doctors with little clinical experience were expected 
to be able to diagnose common conditions using this recognition 
strategy: 
There is a pattern so you know, you'd expect even very junior staff to be 
able to recognise that set of signs and symptoms and the history and 
make a reasonable diagnosis and know what to do. So I think that's a 
form of basic pattern recognition. (Int. 8) 
However, most participants stressed that it was important to know 
that the same condition can present differently in different patients. 
Doctors needed to be able to recognise atypical as well as typical signs 
and symptoms of a condition, in order to make an accurate diagnosis. 
This knowledge was also used to drive the search for diagnostic 
information: 
It's always a danger that people can jump to conclusions just because 
it seems to fit a pattern. But then alongside that you have a ... nothing 
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ever fits the pattern exactly but it's how much it's deviating from what 
you're expecting, and that includes both the presentation and then the 
subsequent course. So I think it's always important to be looking at 
what doesn't quite fit and asking questions about that and saying, well 
what else could explain that. (Int. 8) 
4.4.3.3. Problem solving method 
At other times doctors would use a more deliberate method than 
intuition or recognition. This involved careful thought about 
challenging cases, usually around how to manage a patient rather 
than diagnose. To reach difficult decisions doctors would evaluate the 
pros and cons of a situation. An explicit example was: 
What's going on in my head is basically like what the surgeon said, it's 
sort of ... you go, this is an elective procedure, i.e. it's not an 
emergency. It's also cosmetic in that unlike say I don't know, varicose 
veins or a hernia repair, you may get pain from your varicose veins or 
pain from your hernia. The scoliosis isn't causing you any pain or 
anything like that and you don't die from scoliosis. You can die from a 
hernia if it gets trapped. So it's a cosmetic elective procedure and you're 
stood there weighing it all up, you're going, it's a cosmetic elective 
procedure in a child that's quite little, and you're not happy for 
whatever reason, you're not happy with the ventilation, it's not quite as 
it should be. And weighing it up against the fact that you've got all 
those people waiting, parents that have just left you in tears because 
they've just left their little girl in there. (Int. 10) 
Whilst an implicit example was: 
I think in most sort of decisions which there are ... there's not one right 
answer but probably several right answers, it's coming to a consensus 
and I think negotiating your way through that decision. (Int. 11) 
Prioritising tasks and completing them in order of importance, was 
also part of a problem solving approach. This was a strategy used 
when time was constrained: 
And if patients come with lots of problem you might decide not to tackle 
everything at once and put things off. Or you might sort of, instead of 
sort of doing everything in one go you might think, right okay which is 
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the most important, sort that one out and then they can come back 
and we1l sort the next step out and things like that. (Int. 4) 
4.4.3.4. Habit 
On other occasions a less deliberative method was use to decide how 
to treat a patient. Participants implied that they don't need to think 
hard about clinical decisions if there was a known, set treatment 
regime or they had developed a preferred method of treatment. These 
decisions became habituated. 
for that and a lot of other very kind of very common conditions there's a 
very basic and set treatment regime that everyone ... so everyone gets a 
salbutamol inhaler, which is used to help prevent asthma attacks and 
treat them when they happen. (Int. 14) 
So there's a very, very basic emergency decision that you have to deal 
with and it's almost like a reflex that doesn't involve your higher 
centres at all, it's like a spinal reflex, a knee jerk response. You just do 
the airway, breathing, circulation. (Int. 10) 
and: 
I have a favourite way of anaesthetising people for that is actually with 
something called a spinal, like an epidural. (Int. 10) 
4.4.4. Development of cUnical reasoning competency over time 
Theme 4 and 6 included data about the improvement of doctors' 
clinical reasoning over time. Senior doctors displayed more flexible 
thinking and better ability to identify the most important pieces of 
clinical information, than those with less experience. There was a 
consensus that clinical reasoning improved through practice at the 
workplace, but that enough knowledge about disease presentation 
and physiology should be gained first. Doctors with teaching duties 
believed they had developed an increased awareness about their own 
clinical reasoning through teaching. None of the participants had 
received any formal teaching about how to make clinical judgements 
and decisions. 
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4.4.4.1. From novice to expert 
There was recognition that novice and expert doctors make clinical 
decisions about treatment in different ways. Novices explicitly relied 
on guidelines and protocols at the workplace, as exemplified below: 
if you have got a specific diagnosis there's quite often Trust guidelines 
and NICE guidelines that you can look at and quite often things like the 
various colleges like the Royal College of Obs and Gynae 1 has like their 
own set of guidelines for specific gynaecological and obstetric cases. So 
there's quite a lot of places that you can look in to get sort of advice for 
sort of how you would go about treating patients. So it's useful to use 
that. (Int. 12) 
and: 
It probably depends on what the kind of protocol is. Yeah, it depends if 
you're in that kind of environment where it's very ... where there are 
lots of guidelines about your work. (Int. 13) 
While consultants displayed more flexible thinking and were able 
to judge when it was appropriate to deviate from a standard 
procedure: 
She was at risk of having a sudden emergency and despite her having a 
general outlook that would mean that we would normally not be very 
aggressive, I thought we should be aggressive and try and resuscitate 
her if we could. (Int. 9) 
When gathering clinical information to make a judgement about 
diagnosis, experienced doctors were able to do this in a focused and 
succinct manner. They were more able to distinguish and obtain 
essential from non-essential clinical information. 
Even taking the history from the patients, it seems to take them 
forever, and I suppose we've just got it down to a, you know, what we 
think we need to know, hopefully what we do need to know. And they 
don't seem to be able to get to the nitty-gritty of it. It's sort of like 
they're still scattergun approach of like asking all the questions before 
they get to the relevant bit, (Int. 10) 
I That is, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists. 
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Junior doctors expected to be able to develop this skill over time: 
I know it's getting better but I can't sort of read a set of notes and pick 
out what's important, and I know that's all about becoming an expert 
and things like that. (Int. 15) 
4.4.4.2. Theoretical knowledge 
Most people agreed that a sufficient amount of biomedical knowledge 
was a necessary foundation for making clinical judgements and 
decisions: 
I think first principles are always part of your armamentaria, you know, 
you're going back to first principles and thinking how would this 
disease produce that. So you have to know how the body works and the 
processes underlying the workings of the human body. (Int. 8) 
Medical students shared the opinion that the signs and symptoms 
of diseases and other conditions is sufficiently taught in medical 
schools, but that formal teaching of how to manage these conditions 
was sparse. This left them feeling more prepared for making clinical 
judgements (diagnoses) than decisions around managing conditions. 
A lot of the teaching is focused in the first couple of years on 
recognising symptoms and coming up with possible differential 
diagnosis. While there's actually not a huge amount of teaching on 
management and management planning for the patient, you're 
supposed to kind of pick that up on the wards. (Int. 12) 
and: 
so looking more towards management and how you're going to institute 
your management I think is overlooked in medical school. (lnt.IS) 
Whereas others believed that biomedical knowledge played a 
limited role in developing their clinical reasoning: 
I don't think any amount of book reading or swatting up or theoretical 
knowledge is going to compensate for that. You need a theoretical basis 
obviously for your treatments and your management, but I think 
ultimately it's about taking decisions and taking responsibility for your 
actions that's important. (Int. 11) 
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4.4.4.3. Practical experience 
There was a sense that learning to make effective clinical judgements 
and decisions could only be learned from experience. 
I personally don't think there's been a lot from my training, I think it's 
just acquisition of experience. I really can't put it down to anything 
more than that. (Int. 9) 
and: 
I think that the best way to learn really is to practice and to be put in 
situations in which you are impelled to make decisions, under 
supervision of course initially. (Int. 11) 
Colleagues were an important source of guidance on how to make 
appropriate decisions in practice: Also, it was important to learn from 
the times when poor judgements and decisions were made so that 
these would not be repeated: 
And you learn to recognise from observing behaviour as to what is 
acceptable and recognise that where you would do the same thing it is 
acceptable, or where you wouldn't do the same thing maybe you ought 
to be doing it. (Int. 7) 
and: 
Well it's just true I think, it's human, it's how we're made to function is 
that if something goes wrong you really remember it. Well a bit like the 
case that I discussed earlier. Little things like giving ... I'd prescribe a 
drug and then somebody would say, have you checked their renal 
function and you go to their renal function and their renal function is 
completely off and you're like, oh my god - and things like that. 
(Int. 15) 
4.4.4.4. Leaming from teaching 
Doctors that had teaching duties felt that they had become more 
aware of how they reasoned about their judgements and decisions. It 
was implied that this was beneficial for teaching purposes but 
whether it improved their judgements and decisions in practice was 
not discussed: 
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Yes, definitely, teaching changes you, yeah. It makes you sort of 
question your own decisions. Yeah, because you're well, I may be asked 
at any minute why I've said that, so I just think about the answer. 
(Int. 10) 
but the interesting thing is, is that whereas before I would have to 
justify to myself what I did, very often when you're teaching you're 
justifying to students what you do, and that does make you explicitly 
think about the decision-making process in a way that you don't 
always do as a practitioner. (Int. 2) 
and: 
Sometimes it's hard to follow your own thought processes so far as to 
how you do things. But I guess the reasons you do something are the 
same it's just that you have to be able to sort of put that into words to 
explain it to someone else. Whereas normally you don't tend to think 
about those words I guess. (Int. 4) 
4.5. Discussion 
Participants' views and experiences of making clinical judgements and 
decisions were classified into six broad themes and several sub-
categories. The data suggested that doctors' diagnostic judgements 
are influenced by different factors compared to treatment and 
management decisions. Further, doctors reported using different 
methods to make a diagnosis compared to patient management 
decisions. There was no single optimal method to reach a clinical 
judgement or decision, but the sample emphasised that the quality of 
their judgements and decisions should be evaluated based on their 
reasoning processes rather than medical outcomes. There was a 
consensus that clinical reasoning is developed at the workplace and 
improves with clinical experience. No one had received any formal 
teaching about how to make good clinical judgements and decisions, 
however those who had teaching responsibilities believed that this 
role had increased their awareness about their own clinical reasoning. 
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4.5.1. Factors that influenced doctors' reasoning about clinical 
cases 
Many factors have been shown to influence doctors' judgements and 
decisions but a distinction has been made in the literature between 
medical and non-medical factors. Most research has focused on 
understanding the impact of non-medical factors on doctors thinking 
as they are seen as sources of bias (McKinlay, Potter, and Feldman 
1996). These include factors that are not associated with probabilities 
of disease such as the patient's personality, the doctors speciality or 
level of experience (McKinlay et al. 1996). Studies have reported that 
workplace pressures affect doctors' thinking (Lockey & Hardem 2001; 
Grant & Dowell 2002; Farnan et al. 2008) and the preferential 
treatment of some patients over others is well documented (Brotman, 
Stern, and Herzog 1984; Mathers, Jones, and Hannay 1995; Hall, 
Milburn, Roter, and Daltroy 1998; Hall, Horgan, Stein, and Roter 
2002; Bellon & Fernandez-Asensio 2002; Haggerty, Tu diver , Brown, 
Herbert, Ciampi, and Guibert 2005; Krebs, Garrett, and Konrad 
2006). In the present study, there was evidence that doctors' 
judgements about diagnosis were influenced by similar non-medical 
factors that were not relevant to discovering the cause of a condition 
or determining how to treat it. These included a patient's physical 
appearance, a doctor's relationship with the patient and pressures at 
the workplace. 
4.5.2. Perceptions of an ideal or 'gold standard' way of making 
effective clinical judgements and decisions 
Most participants demonstrated they had some perception of ideal 
judgements and decisions. They were keen to emphasise that it was 
more important to evaluate the quality of their judgements and 
decisions based on steps they had taken to reach them, rather than 
the consequences of those choices. This finding is in line with a 
debate in the literature about whether decision clinical quality should 
be based on outcomes or reasoning processes (Bekker 2010). The 
uncertain nature of medicine means poor judgements and decisions 
can result in good medical outcomes by chance and good judgements 
132 
CHAPTER 4 
and decisions can result in adverse medical outcomes. For this 
reason, an increasing number of decision making researchers stress 
that the reasoning process is a better marker of decision quality than 
the medical outcome (Frisch & Clemen 1994; Sox 1999; Yates et al. 
2003; Baron 2008; Schwartz & Bergus 2008; Bekker 2010). For 
participants in this study, a good process included three aspects; (i) 
patient safety must be at the forefront of doctors' thinking, (ii) their 
actions and reasoning should be explicitly recorded and justified 
before others if necessary and (iii) decisions about treatment should 
be made with patients when appropriate. Participants struggled to 
articulate anything more specific than the above because it was more 
important that their practice was satisfactory rather than perfect. A 
good clinical reasoning process has been defined by others in a 
similarly broad manner. Schwartz & Berguss' (2008) definition 
included four aspects, one of which was also that it should be 
justifiable before others. Sox (1999) stated that the process should 
end with shared decision making. In this study, participants agreed 
that it was ideal for patients to be involved with clinical decisions. 
However, there were a range of views about what patient involvement 
meant. 
4.5.3. Strategies and methods to reach clinical judgements and 
decisions 
There were several types of methods identified that were used to make 
a diagnosis and/or to make a decision to manage a patient. This was 
a reflection of the complexity of clinical reasoning and the repertoire of 
multiple cognitive processes used by doctors. It was unclear how 
doctors selected which method was most appropriate to arrive at a 
diagnosis or decision. For instance, some management decisions were 
based on a doctor's preference or an ingrained habit. At other times, 
doctors would deliberate about the pros and cons of multiple options 
before making a choice. According to the Cognitive Continuum Theory 
(Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson 1987) the decision maker 
uses different styles of reasoning depending on the nature of the 
decision task. A distinction is made between a well structured and an 
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ill structured decision task. This theory proposes that well structured 
decision tasks are complex and require time and effort to resolve. This 
decision context primes a person to use a conscious systematic 
processing method. Whereas an ill structured task is less complex 
and can be solved quickly, such tasks are said to invoke heuristic 
processing where the decision is reached without much conscious 
awareness. On the surface, this may be a suitable explanation for the 
present findings, but it is unclear as evidence exists that contradicts 
the cognitive continuum theory (Kulatunga-Moruzi, Brooks, and 
Norman 2004; Pretz 2008; Ark et al. 2007). 
4.5.4. Perceptions about the development of clinical reasoning 
competency 
Participants unanimously held a traditional view of expertise, that 
clinical reasoning improved over time with more clinical experience 
(Ericsson 2007). It was learned through imitation of colleagues, 
repeated practice with real patients and knowledge of accepted 
procedures at the workplace. In other words, doctors learned how to 
make clinical judgements and decisions through the hidden medical 
curriculum rather than the formal curriculum. Participants also felt 
biomedical knowledge was necessary, but to what extent was unclear. 
In the literature, there are differing opinions about the precise role 
biomedical knowledge plays in clinical reasoning (Woods 2007). In 
this study junior doctors were more mechanical in their thinking and 
rule bound in their practice, compared to senior doctors. Similar 
findings were reported about other junior doctors and nurses (Benner 
1982; Jensen et al. 1990; Shanteau 1992; Greenhalgh 2002). 
Similarities between junior and senior doctors were noticed as well. 
Like senior doctors, junior doctors and medical students referred to 
their use of pattern recognition as the default method of reaching a 
diagnosis. This suggested that novices had developed enough clinical 
experience to recognise, at least some conditions, based on their 
collection of signs and symptoms. Evidence shows that encountering 
similar conditions repeatedly is a critical component in the 
development of expert diagnostic reasoning (Norman, Rosenthal, 
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Brooks, Allen, and Muzzin 1989; Brooks et al. 1991; Hatala, Norman, 
and Brooks 2003). Some authors have concluded that the recognition 
of patterns is how routine diagnosis is made by all doctors (Elstein & 
Schwartz 2002; Norman 2009). Another similarity between 
participants was that most, including senior doctors, did not believe 
that expertise was an end state. Senior doctors did not perceive 
themselves to be expert decision makers nor did junior doctors believe 
they would become expert decision makers. Rather, they felt it was 
important for them to recognise their limitations and remain as 
continual learners. This view resembled one type of expert identity 
that has been identified, known as the adaptive expert (Mylopoulos & 
Woods 2009). 
4.5.5. ImpUcations of findings to medical education and practice 
This study has highlighted several implications for medical education 
and practice. The doctors drew upon a large range of cues when 
thinking about the cause of a condition or how to treat a patient. 
Some of these cues were helpful - such as when it related to disease 
probability - other cues were potentially misleading - such as the 
strangeness of a patient's personality. Only a few doctors 
demonstrated they were aware of how some factors could lead them to 
make biased choices. It would be difficult to teach doctors about the 
cues that should definitely be considered and those that should 
definitely be ignored. A patient's appearance was described as an 
important source of information about their health, but this could 
also be a distraction if it led to a biased choice. Instead, doctors 
should be made aware that they selectively process information, that 
is, they do not consider all of the available information. The 
information that they do consider is not always relevant to making an 
accurate diagnosis and/ or selecting the best treatment option. 
There was a consensus that a good judgement or decision was 
reasoned well. This definition presents practical problems for 
measuring a good reasoning process as there is no common 
understanding of good and bad thinking (Bekker 2010). In the 
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systematic review study, it was found that few studies measured the 
process of clinical reasoning. Of those that did, good reasoning about 
clinical problems were indicated by avoiding biased judgements when 
making diagnoses (Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999; Abraham et 
al. 2004) or following a normative guideline of good prescribing skills 
(DeVries et al. 1995; Hassan et al. 2000; Akici et al. 2003). Others 
have offered explicit criteria of good reasoning (Pauker & Pauker 
1999). 
It is established that doctors draw on a repertoire of different 
methods when thinking about clinical problems. What is not 
established is whether doctors can be helped to identify the optimum 
mode of thinking for a particular decision problem. It has been 
suggested that doctors should be aware that they use more than one 
style of reasoning. Further evidence suggests greater diagnostic 
success was associated with explicit instruction to use a combined 
reasoning approach of both non -analytic and analytic strategies, 
compared to when no instruction was given (Ark et al. 2006; Ark et al. 
2007; Eva et al. 2007). It is now being recognised that different types 
of diagnostic strategies should not be thought of as mutually 
exclusive and that doctors should not limit themselves to one mode of 
thinking (Eva et al. 2007). Most participants were receptive to 
receiving formal training about decision making, but stressed that it 
must not be so theoretical that they could not recognise the relevance 
to their work. Some preferred it to be integrated into clinical practice 
as a work-based learning activity. It was interesting that having 
teaching responsibilities was perceived to be a benefit to doctors' 
clinical reasoning. Whether it actually helps them make better 
judgements and decisions than doctors who do not teach others, is a 
topic for future research. 
4.5.6. Critique of study 
The study'S strengths include the ngorous methods used and in-
depth data generated to further understanding of clinical judgement 
and decision making. The sampling frame ensured that a range of 
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doctors' views about their experiences of making judgements and 
decisions, were represented. Steps were taken to develop a suitable 
interview schedule in accordance with good practice, to encourage 
participants to speak freely, in depth, and without bias (Robson 2002; 
Ritchie & Lewis 2003). The data and themes generated are thought to 
be robust as the materials and procedure were piloted, and the coding 
frame was developed according to an established qualitative 
methodology (Ritchie & Lewis 2003). That the present findings are in 
line with similarities identified in other literature further supports the 
validity of the data. 
The study may be subject to the limitations associated with 
qualitative methods. Findings from the study may not be applicable 
beyond the study sample for two main reasons. First, this was not an 
observational study. This means the data reflects doctors' perceptions 
of how they make judgements and decisions and not necessarily how 
they are actually made in practice. Second, even though effort was 
made to interview doctors from a range of specialties and levels of 
experience, it is unclear whether these views and experiences about 
making clinical judgements and decisions, are common to all doctors. 
There is also a chance that the themes generated were influenced by 
the author's prior knowledge about the topic area. However, effort was 
made to code the data according to the words and meanings of the 
participants. This provides some confidence that the themes are an 
accurate reflection of participants' views and experiences about 
clinical decision making. 
4.6. Summary 
This study provided deeper insight into the complexity of how doctors 
experience making clinical judgements and decisions. The sample had 
limited awareness about the processes doctors employ to solve clinical 
problems and there was no process described as ideal. There was 
some awareness that a diverse array of cues influenced their thought 
processes, but little explicit awareness about the occurrence of biased 
thinking. A general competency in clinical reasoning was believed to 
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principally develop through years of repeated clinical experience, but 
all except one participant supported the introduction of formal 
training to improve clinical reasoning into medical education. 
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Evaluating the feasibility of an 
online decision literacy 
intervention: a quasi-experimental 
study 
This chapter describes a quasi-experimental study to evaluate the 
feasibility of delivering an online intervention to enhance doctors' 
decision literacy. Participants were shown a short tutorial and worked 
through a series of tasks. The tutorial provided basic information 
about how people use a heuristic and/or systematic method to make 
judgements and decisions. Clinical problem solving exercises and 
multiple choice questions were used to evaluate the intervention 
based on the following outcomes; knowledge of decision sciences 
concepts, relevance of the tutorial material and clinical judgement. 
S.l. Background 
From the synthesis of evidence in Chapter 2 the following aspects 
seemed suggestive of an effective clinical reasoning course for doctors: 
an explicit theoretical basis, appropriate assessment methods, useful 
feedback and integration into medical education. An understanding of 
how people in general and doctors specifically, make judgements and 
decisions is required, as discussed in Section 1.5. Knowledge about 
the delivery of medical education is also necessary to appropriately 
design and evaluate an intervention. These issues are discussed 
further below. 
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The findings of the systematic review and questionnaire studies 
implied that educators focus on training doctors to apply normative 
decision theory to clinical problems. This included teaching how to 
calculate disease probabilities using Bayes theorem (e.g. 
(Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage 2002; Grant et al. 2006) and how to apply 
decision analysis to find the optimal treatment choices (e.g. Lee et al. 
2007). There has been little focus on enhancing doctors' 
understanding of their own reasoning processes, in spite of the 
encouraging findings (Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995; 
Round 1999; Abraham et al. 2004). This type of intervention could be 
informed by the decision sciences, including content about 
information processing (Section 1.5.1) dual processing models of 
thinking (Section 1.5.4) and the heuristics and bias literature (Section 
1.6). 
In terms of training, the information processing approach and dual 
processmg models provide a useful theoretical basis for 
understanding how to intervene in doctors' clinical reasoning (Dowie 
& Elstein 1988; Croskerry 2009b). They explain how people make lay 
and professional judgements and decisions as well as how they can be 
improved. There is a hypothesis that if doctors are educated about 
their use of heuristics, they may be able to avoid the influence of bias 
(Arnoult & Anderson 1988; Croskerry 2000; Croskerry 2003). From 
the systematic review, there is evidence that raising doctors' 
awareness of heuristics and bias can improve aspects of their clinical 
reasoning on hypothetical scenarios (Wolf et al. 1988; Gruppen et al. 
1994; Round 1999; Hershberger et al. 1995; Abraham et al. 2004). A 
potentially encouraging finding was reported by Bornstein et al. 
(1999). They found that doctors were not influenced by a sunk-cost 
effect in medical situations, but were in non-medical situations. 
Specifically, their treatment decisions were not biased by the amount 
of time and money already invested in treating a patient, but these 
factors did bias their non-medical decisions (Bornstein et al. 1999). 
However there is little evidence to suggest that gaining knowledge 
about heuristics and bias would improve actual judgements and 
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decisions, in practice. In the non-clinical context, awareness training 
about heuristics was not enough to improve their judgements in 
practice (Fischhoff 1975; Welsh et al. 2007). 
As well as theory, the design and evaluation of an educational 
intervention should be informed by current trends in medical 
education. There has been a shift from traditional lecture based 
teaching to problem based, student self-directed learning (Gwee 
2003). Web-based learning, has become accepted within the medical 
education community and is widely used as a supplement to 
traditional teaching (Ruiz et al. 2006). In the previous systematic 
review study, 14 studies delivered their intervention electronically and 
six of these were web based tutorials using clinical vignettes (Warner 
et al. 1974; Murray et al. 1977; Lincoln et al. 1991; Kumta et al. 
2003; Servais et al. 2006; Hedrick & Young 2008). Five of these web 
based interventions reported that doctors performed better in the 
training groups compared to the control groups. Further, a review of 
76 studies from the medical and dental literature found that web 
based learning was as good as, but not better than traditional 
teaching (Chumley-Jones, Dobbie, and Alford 2002). Web based 
learning can be used to encourage doctors to take greater 
responsibility for their own learning and engage with continuing 
professional development activities. To encourage problem based and 
active learning, assessment methods should target not only 
knowledge components such as recall tests but methods that 
demonstrate what trainees will do when faced with real clinical 
problems (Miller 1990). 
An important educational strategy is the integration of teaching 
throughout medical education. It is necessary to consider where and 
how clinical reasoning training could be included in medical 
education, as it is likely to be a key factor in the delivery of an 
effective educational programme (Harden 2000). The systematic 
review and questionnaire studies found that most courses were not 
integrated into medical curricula. Those that had been integrated 
were no more effective than the one-off studies, suggesting effective 
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integration is a complex issue that requires careful planning. General 
guidance has been offered on how to integrate educational 
programmes in medicine (Harden 2000) but little is known about 
where to place training in clinical reasoning into medical education. 
Frameworks have been designed to guide the evaluation of 
educational training programmes. According to Kirkpatrick's model 
and Miller's framework of clinical assessment, training should be 
evaluated according to a hierarchical sequence of four levels (Miller 
1990; Kirkpatrick 1998). Kirkpatrick suggests that an intervention 
should at least assess participants' reaction to the training, followed 
by their learning. At the higher complex levels, training should be 
assessed in terms of behavioural changes and results in the 
workplace (Kirkpatrick 1998). Miller (1990) describes four stages of 
competencies a doctor should demonstrate in clinical assessment. At 
the lowest level a doctor is expected to have gained knowledge, 
followed by knowing how to use that knowledge. Assessment at the 
higher levels becomes more difficult, when doctors should actually 
demonstrate they can correctly use the knowledge gained, followed by 
applying it appropriately in clinical practice (Miller 1990). 
5.2. Aims and objectives 
There is no study that evaluates an educational intervention to 
explicitly teach doctors about the processes they use to make 
judgements and decisions. This study aimed to enhance doctors' 
awareness of how they make personal and clinical judgements. In 
other words, the intervention aimed to enhance doctors' decision 
literacy. It was informed by the decision sciences and the medical 
education literature. The study also drew upon findings from the 
previous empirical studies in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. It explored whether 
it was useful to teach doctors about information processing and 
factors that influence their judgements and choices. This insight may 
help doctors reflect on their clinical judgements and decisions. 
However, it may not be enough to change practice. The study sought 
to answer the following research questions: 
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Does an intervention about basic decision science improve doctors' 
knowledge of how they make judgements and decisions? 
Can the intervention be delivered in a way that is relevant to 
doctors? 
Does the intervention improve doctors' clinical judgements about 
diagnosis? 
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Context 
The intervention was designed online in the format of web-based 
learning for the following reasons. First, doctors are familiar with 
participating in online courses, assessments and completing 
e-portfolios to monitor their professional progress. Second, it was a 
convenient and accessible way for doctors, who had busy schedules, 
to participate in the study. The only requirement was access to a 
computer with Internet access. Third, participants could work 
through the study at their own pace without the presence of a 
researcher. This was expected to reduce the likelihood of biased 
responses that occur from researcher effects (Robson 2002). Fourth, it 
linked well with doctors' requirement of continuing their professional 
development (CPD). Doctors are also accustomed with a case-based 
learning format using clinical vignettes and multiple choice questions 
(MCQs) to assess their learning. For this reason, clinical vignettes and 
MCQs were used to evaluate the online intervention. 
5.3.2. Ethical approval 
The study received ethical approval in 2010 from the University's 
Medicine and Dentistry Educational Research Ethics Committee 
(EdREC) (Appendix 8.12). 
5.3.3. Design 
The study used a quasi-experimental pre-test/post-test design. 
Experiments are the most appropriate design to answer questions 
about the effectiveness of interventions (Gribbons & Herman 1997). 
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The ideal type of experiment is the randomised control trial (RCT) also 
known as a true experiment (Coolican 1999; Robson 2002). Its key 
features are a control group and random allocation of participants to 
each group. In comparison to other study designs, the true 
experiment enables a researcher to maintain more control over 
extraneous variables that may lead to a misinterpretation of results. 
The advantage of a high level of control is that any difference found 
between control and experimental group can be reasonably attributed 
to the manipulation of the experiment (Kantowitz, Roediger, and 
Elmes 2005). However it is not always feasible or appropriate to carry 
out a true experiment, especially in education contexts. A suitable 
alternative is a quasi-experimental design (Cook & Campbell 1979). A 
quasi -experimen tal design does not require random allocation of 
participants. In the present study the participants were only 
contacted once and it was anticipated that the sample size would be 
too small for a full randomised controlled trial. A quasi-experimental 
design is also well suited for applied research where some flexibility is 
required in the design (Robson 2002). For this study, a quasi-
experimental design was seen as a compromise between flexibility 
whilst still maintaining an experimental approach. Questionnaire 
methods were used to evaluate the impact of the intervention. 
Questionnaires offered a simple way of collecting a large amount of 
standardised data. They can also be completed online which was a 
necessity in this study. 
A pre-test/post-test design was used with the same group of 
people. The advantage of this design is that it eliminates the potential 
for individual differences to confound the results (Coolican 1999). 
When there are multiple groups of different people, individual 
differences in participants may be unevenly distributed. A biased 
interpretation of results is possible if differences in results are found. 
The disadvantage of a quasi-experimental pre-test post test design is 
that there is less control over extraneous variables than in true 
experiments. This means that it is not possible to attribute with 
certainty any change in results to the intervention, rather it can only 
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be concluded that the variables are related (Kantowitz et al. 2005). For 
instance, there is a possibility that results may improve after the 
intervention due to completing the same task twice, through practice 
effects (Robson 2002). Nevertheless, the quasi-experiment allows at 
least some knowledge to be gained about the effectiveness of an 
intervention when a true experiment is not feasible (Cook & Campbell 
1979). 
5.3.4. Sample 
Medical doctors who were either postgraduate students or staff 
members at the University of Leeds were invited to take part in the 
study. To encourage participation, the study was aimed at doctors 
who were also students. As the context of the study was based on 
doctors' continuing professional development, it was assumed 
postgraduates had an interest in continuing medical education. 
Further, they had experience of making real clinical judgements and 
decisions. Undergraduate medical students were not invited to take 
part as they did not have sufficient clinical experience to complete the 
tasks. The sample size estimate was based on commonly used rules of 
thumb used in statistics. Some authors suggest that to compare 
differences between groups, there should be a minimum of 7 people in 
each group in order to maintain sufficient power in the study 
(Wilson VanVoorhis & Morgan 2007). Others suggest 5 participants 
per variable are sufficient when estimating a minimum sample size 
(Tabachnick & Fidell 1996). In this study there were two independent 
variables that were manipulated: (i) web based tutorial and (ii) type of 
clinical vignette. There were three dependent variables: (i) knowledge 
of decision sciences concepts, (ii) relevance of the tutorial context, and 
(iii) clinical judgement. Based on the rule above of five participants for 
six variables in total, it was calculated that the study sample should 
be a minimum of 25 participants. 
5.3.5. Materials 
5.3.5.1. Study information and consent 
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An information sheet that described details about the study was 
designed to recruit participants (Appendix 8.13). Information sheets 
were distributed electronically to potential participants and hard 
copies were handed out during teaching sessions by the author. The 
content of the information included an introduction of the author, 
description of those invited to participate, purpose of the study, web 
link of the study and what the study involved, information about a 
prize draw, what happens to the data and contact details of the 
author. When volunteers accessed the web link they were presented 
with a summary of the information again as an introduction to the 
study. Before beginning the tasks volunteers were required to confirm 
they had understood the information and give their consent to 
participate. 
5.3.5.2. Overview a/the intervention 
The online intervention consisted of three main aspects. First, there 
were problem solving exercises based on clinical vignettes. These were 
used to assess doctors' judgements about diagnosis in a way that was 
familiar and relevant to their continual professional development. 
Secondly, there was a tutorial to improve doctors' understanding 
about how they make personal and clinical judgements and decisions. 
Information about basic decision science was provided using real 
examples of lay judgements and examples that were relevant to their 
clinical practice. Third, there was an evaluation of participants' 
knowledge of decision concepts and the perceived relevance of the 
tutorial material. 
The intervention was implemented using the Bristol Online Survey 
(BOS) application. This service allows questionnaires to be developed 
and deployed online. There were three reasons for why this 
application offered the most practical method to develop the 
experiment online. First, the University of Leeds has an annual 
subscription to BOS which enables staff and students to obtain a 
password protected account free of charge. This meant there was a 
good support network within the University if any problems arose 
with the use of BaS. Second, the data are stored on a secure server at 
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the University of Bristol and, thirdly, results can be exported into 
SPSS. It was not possible to design the tutorial using the BOS 
application, so this was designed as a series of presentation slides 
using Microsoft PowerPoint 2003. This PowerPoint presentation was 
uploaded onto the author's personal web space at the University of 
Leeds, and the URL link was embedded into the BOS application. A 
disadvantage was that the tutorial was less integrated into the 
experiment than the other tasks. Alternative online applications were 
considered such as SurveyMonkey and Questionmark, but these did 
not meet the needs of the study design nor were they supported by 
the University of Leeds. 
5.3.5.3. Designing the tutorial 
The purpose of the tutorial was to enhance doctors' understanding of 
how they make judgements and decisions in non -clinical and clinical 
contexts. The content of the tutorial was based on evidence and 
theories from the decision sciences. The tutorial consisted of fourteen 
PowerPoint slides (Appendix 8.14). It began with introducing the 
purpose of the tutorial and why it was relevant to doctors. Learning 
objectives were given so that participants were aware of the knowledge 
they should have gained on completion of the tutorial. The concept of 
information processing and limited capacity to process information 
was explained. It then moved onto the main content of the tutorial 
regarding a heuristic and systematic method of processing 
information. In order to facilitate participants' understanding of the 
details about heuristic and systematic processing methods, numerous 
examples from a non-clinical and clinical context were given. This 
illustrated to participants how they use these methods to make 
judgements and decisions in their personal lives, as well as in their 
clinical practice. Images were also included that depicted examples of 
the use of these two methods to reinforce understanding and add 
interest to the tutorial. A table was provided that compared the main 
features of a heuristic and systematic method so participants could 
see the differences. The tutorial ended with a take home message and 
a summary of the key concepts that had been described previously. 
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5.3.5.4. Outcomes 
There were three outcomes that were measured to evaluate the 
intervention: 
knowledge of decision sciences concepts; 
relevance of the tutorial; 
clinical judgement about diagnosis. 
In accordance with Kirkpatrick's model, the outcome perceived 
relevance was a measure of participants' reaction (Kirkpatrick 1998). 
In accordance with Miller's framework, the outcome knowledge of 
decision making concepts measured participants' knowledge gain 
from the tutorial (Miller 1990). Clinical judgement measured whether 
participants could demonstrate correct use of the knowledge gained. 
5.3.5.5. Measuring knowledge of decision sciences concepts 
A questionnaire was developed to measure participants' knowledge of 
decision making concepts using a questionnaire format (Appendix 
8.15). This measure included a series of 10 multiple choice questions 
about the decision making concepts presented and was administered 
after the tutorial. Participants were asked to identify the name of the 
concept described in each statement. They had to select one of the 
following responses each time: systematic strategy, information 
processing, smart heuristics, heuristic and systematic strategy, 
limited capacity, or heuristic strategy. Responses were in the format of 
multiple choices as doctors are usually familiar with this as a method 
of assessment. Also, the ability to recognise the correct answer was a 
valid indicator that the tutorial content was understood. Concepts 
from the decision sciences presented in the tutorial were complicated 
and perhaps new information for most people. It would have been 
unrealistic to expect participants to memorise all of the terms 
introduced in a five minute tutorial. Therefore they were not asked to 
freely recall any of the tutorial information. Participants were given 
the opportunity to show they had understood the tutorial content 
through recognising the correct description of each key concept. 
5.3.5.6. Measuring relevance of tutorial 
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A questionnaire was developed to measure the extent to which 
participants found the tutorial content useful and applicable to their 
clinical work. It consisted of 13 statements that participants were 
asked to rate their level of agreement with (Appendix 8.16). This 
measure was also administered after the tutorial. The following items 
on the questionnaire assessed participants' overall perception of the 
benefit tutorial; 
The tutorial was interesting. 
I do not feel I have benefitted from the tutorial. 
The tutorial taught me nothing new. 
I think some formal teaching on how people make decisions should be 
included in medical training. 
The following items assessed whether participants understood the 
relevance of the tutorial information to their own clinical practice; 
It helped me to think about my own decision making. 
I have a better understanding of how people make decisions. 
I understood the relevance of the tutorial to me as a doctor. 
I have a better understanding of how others can affect my judgements 
and choices. 
I have a better understanding of how my personal beliefs and 
experiences can affect my judgements and choices. 
Further, participants were asked questions around how the 
information may actually affect their clinical practice with the 
following: 
I can identify examples of when people use heuristic and systematic 
strategies to make personal decisions. 
I can identify examples of when doctors use heuristic and systematic 
strategies to make clinical decisions. 
I feel more cautious about making clinical decisions. 
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I feel more confused about making clinical decisions. 
5.3.5. 7. Measuring clinical judgement 
To measure the impact on clinical judgement, a set of four problem 
solving tasks were developed using a questionnaire method (Appendix 
8.17). The problem solving tasks consisted of two components, clinical 
vignettes and a series of associated multiple choice questions for 
participants to answer. This measure was administered before and 
after the tutorial to evaluate whether there was any change in 
participants' clinical judgements about their diagnosis. The details of 
how the components of this measure were developed are discussed 
below. 
5.3.5.8. Developing clinical vignettes 
Since the inception of problem based learning, clinical vignettes have 
been a commonly used teaching tool for doctors. They are relevant, 
practical examples of real situations that occur in the clinical context. 
There is evidence that vignettes are a valid way of measuring doctors' 
ability to diagnose and treat specific medical conditions (Peabody, 
Luck, Glassman, Dresselhaus, and Lee 2000; Peabody et al. 2004). 
Clinical vignettes were also used in many of the interventions 
reviewed in Chapter 2. They were used for a variety of purposes such 
as to illustrate cognitive biases in clinical reasoning or to practice 
making good prescribing decisions (DeVries et al. 1995; Round 1999). 
Others used them to train doctors in improving their clinical 
diagnostic judgements (Wolf et al. 1988; Wigton et al. 1990; Friedman 
et al. 1999). 
The content of the clinical vignettes were informed by anecdotal 
evidence in a recent bestselling book titled How Doctors Think 
(Groopman 2007) as well as actual scenarios taken from the interview 
study (Chapter 4). Four vignettes were developed that were based on 
actual scenarios. Two vignettes were based on scenarios taken from 
the book How Doctors Think (Groopman 2007). Groopman is a senior 
doctor and academic who has published over 150 articles in peer 
reviewed journals. He is also involved in 'popular' medical writing for 
various newspapers such as The New Yorker, the New York Times and 
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the Washington Post. The book How Doctors Think was particularly 
relevant to this thesis as Groopman has studied the heuristics and 
bias literature extensively. He uses anecdotes from doctors and 
patients to illustrate the times when doctors made good and poor 
judgements and explores the reasoning processes used. 
Vignettes 1 and 2 were developed from clinical scenarios narrated 
by two medical students during the interview study, reported in 
Chapter 4. These were taken from the transcripts of interviews 12 and 
13. Vignettes 3 and 4 were based on two scenarios narrated in 
Groopman (2007). They described real situations when two 
experienced doctors failed to diagnose their patients in an accurate 
and timely manner, which almost led to fatal consequences. The 
clinical vignettes were as follows: 
Scenario 1: A 19 year old man comes to the Accident and Emergency 
department (A&E) late at night complaining he is struggling to breathe. 
He is a student and this has been his first week at university. You take 
his history and find out he had mild asthma as a child, but feels he has 
grown out of it with age. You examine him and he sounds wheezy and 
is taking quick short breaths. He states he has no chest pain and has 
had no recent illness. (Int. 13) 
Scenario 2: A mother brings her 1 year old baby into the GP surgery. 
She explains her baby has developed a fever and bad cough yesterday 
which has worsened during the night. As the baby cries it starts 
coughing and you notice it sounds like a bark. You take the baby's 
temperature and it is slightly raised. The breathing is noisy, but the 
baby does not appear to be struggling for breath. There is no rash on 
the body and throat and ears look normal. (Interview 12) 
Scenario 3: A young man is brought into Accident and Emergency in 
the early hours of one morning. The police had found him slumped on 
the steps of a public library. He is unshaven, his clothes are dirty and 
is not fully conscious. He is unwilling to arouse himself. He seems 
confused and cannot respond with any clarity to the nurse's questions. 
(Groopman, 2007) 
Scenario 4: A 41 year old man comes into Accident and Emergency 
complaining of severe chest pain. He explains he was hiking in the 
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woods when a pain in his chest stopped him in his tracks. He works as 
a forest ranger so due to his active lifestyle has a lean figure and is very 
fit. Over the past few days he has experienced growing discomfort in his 
chest, even when resting. As a forest ranger he is used to muscle aches 
but thinks this is different. He has no history of heart problems. 
(Groopman, 2007) 
All of the vignettes were based on real situations that had taken 
place between a doctor and patient. It was preferred that the 
scenarios were authentic rather than fictitious in order to find out 
how doctors might judge these situations in the clinical setting. The 
study was aimed at doctors working in any specialty so it was 
important that the scenarios did not represent presentations that 
were specialty specific. The scenarios were selected because they were 
based on general medicine presentations. It was anticipated that 
participants would be familiar with presentations that resembled an 
asthma attack, croup, diabetes and angina. This was to ensure that 
all participants would at least be familiar with the presentations so 
they could respond to questions in a considered rather than random 
manner. If the vignettes described conditions that were particularly 
rare or specific to one specialty, then some participants would be 
unfairly disadvantaged if they were unaware of that presentation. If 
this was the case, people may guess answers to questions without 
much thought, potentially introducing bias into the results. 
The vignettes were written in a way to reveal only a limited amount 
of information about the patient's condition. This was to assess the 
initial judgements participants made about each scenario. The 
ambiguity of the vignettes was manipulated for the purpose of 
distinguishing whether the tutorial had an overall positive rather than 
negative effect. It was important to establish whether the intervention 
had a detrimental effect on the correct judgements people made before 
the tutorial. This was not a desired outcome and would mean the 
intervention would be ineffective and inappropriate to include in 
medical education. Scenarios 3 and 4 were more ambiguous than one 
and two. To achieve this, an understanding of how doctors make 
diagnostic judgements was necessary. Evidence suggests that 
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diagnosis is usually a direct and automatic process based on pattern 
recognition (Kulikowski 1970; Patel & Groen 1986; Norman 2005). 
That is, doctors are able to recognise the signs and symptoms of many 
medical conditions, without much conscious thought. In scenarios 1 
and 2, it was expected that the correct diagnosis would be easily 
recognised by most participants. The signs and symptoms given were 
typically characteristic of a patient that had an asthma attack in 
scenario 1, and a baby that had croup in scenario 2. Whereas in 
scenarios 3 and 4, it was expected that the correct diagnoses would 
be less recognisable to participants. The signs and symptoms 
represented atypical presentations of a patient with diabetes in 
scenario 3 and angina in scenario 4. Further, the signs and symptoms 
given also resembled those of other conditions i.e. the presentations 
were ambiguous. Specifically, in scenario 3 it was expected that some 
participants would misjudge a young, semi-conscious man to be 
drunk rather than correctly diagnose him as diabetic. Information 
such as his unkempt appearance and being found slumped on the 
steps of a public library, were expected to bias their judgement 
towards an incorrect diagnosis. In scenario 4, it was expected that 
some participants would misjudge the cause of chest pain in a young 
forest ranger to be muscle strain rather than angina. Information 
such as his active lifestyle and seemingly high level of fitness, were 
expected to bias their judgement towards an incorrect diagnosis. 
These assumptions were based on the actual misjudgements that 
doctors made in practice as narrated in Groopman (2007). 
5.3.5.9. Developing multiple choice questions 
After each clinical vignette, participants were asked to respond to the 
same set of four multiple choice questions. They were asked the 
following questions about their diagnostic hypotheses for each 
scenario. 
1. Given these findings only, what diagnosis would you make? 
2. How certain are you that this is the correct diagnosis? 
3. Would you actively wish to exclude or diagnose 
another condition? If so, which condition(s)? 
153 
DOCTORS' CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
4. Rate how much influence the following aspects of the scenario had 
on your chosen diagnosis? 
The purpose of questions 1 and 2 was to understand participants' 
frrst impressions of the scenarios and also whether their choice of 
diagnosis changed after the tutorial compared to before. The purpose 
of questions 3 and 4 was to understand how participants reasoned 
about the diagnosis they had chosen. 
5.3.6. Evaluating quality of materials 
It was necessary to evaluate the quality of the materials. Steps were 
taken to assess the validity of the measures and the suitability of the 
online format of the intervention. This included discussions with 
supervisors and a review of the materials by a group of experts. The 
final stage was a pilot test of the materials and study procedure by a 
group of doctors that did not participate in the main study. Further 
details of these stages are discussed below. 
The items that measured perceived relevance were counter-
balanced. Some were positively worded such as 'I have a better 
understanding of how people make judgements and decisions', and 
others were negatively worded such as 'I do not feel I have benefitted 
from the tutorial'. This was to encourage participants to think about 
their responses rather than answer in an automatic manner. People 
have a tendency to agree with items when asked to rate their level of 
agreement, known as acquiescence bias. Counterbalancing the way 
the items are worded or scored is a way of reducing the effect of this 
bias (Robson 2002). 
To ensure that clinical judgements were accurately operationalised 
by the problem solving tasks, they were reviewed by supervisors and 
three experienced GPs that worked at the Leeds Institute of Health 
Sciences. GPs were appropriate to consult because the clinical 
scenarios were based on presentations that would be seen in general 
medicine. They were asked to provide feedback about the 
appropriateness of the types of clinical presentations i.e. were they 
familiar to doctors irrespective of their specialty and seniority level; 
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was the length of the scenario suitable; and was the language 
comprehensible? All agreed that the scenarios were authentic and the 
presentations would be familiar to all types of doctors. This provided 
some confirmation of face Validity. 
Their feedback was also sought on the wording of multiple choice 
questions and the different response options. A few ambiguities were 
identified and amended. It was suggested the first question regarding 
diagnosis, should be changed from What do you think is the most 
likely diagnosis? to Given these findings only, what diagnosis would 
you make? The former was judged to be potentially misleading and 
may have biased participant responses. An example given was that in 
scenario 4, alcohol excess would arguably be the most likely cause 
because it is statistically a more frequent presentation in A&E than a 
patient on the verge of a diabetic coma. To avoid this bias, the 
question was re-worded in more neutral terms. Another question was 
changed from Would you want to obtain further investigations for 
another condition? If so which condition(s)? to Would you actively wish 
to exclude or diagnose another condition? If so, which condition(s)? 
This change was made because not all of the other possible conditions 
listed required actual investigations, which prompted clarification in 
the wording of the question. The relevant changes were made and 
sent back to the group of experts for further consideration. The 
amended version was judged by the experts to be a suitable test of 
doctors' judgement when giving diagnoses. This provided evidence 
that the scenarios and multiple choice questions were an accurate 
representation of real clinical judgements made in the clinical context 
i.e. expert opinion suggested the construct validity of the 
questionnaire. Further, the difference in ambiguity of the scenarios 
was judged to be an appropriate way of distinguishing any change in 
judgements after the tutorial, again a sign of construct validity. 
The final step in establishing validity in the intervention was to 
pilot test the materials and study procedure. Using the BOS 
application, the pilot experiment was designed. A group of doctors 
that worked in the Leeds Institute of Health Sciences were invited to 
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participate. These were not the same people who helped design the 
clinical vignettes. Five doctors participated in the pilot experiment. 
They were asked to provide feedback on the length of time it took to 
complete the study, ease of comprehension of instructions and 
completion of tasks and any problems that occurred. The feedback 
received was mostly positive. Participants reported the study was 
interesting and insightful. It took people between 15 and 20 minutes 
to complete the study and this was reasonable given the number of 
tasks to complete. The instructions were described as clear and 
overall the experiment was easy to complete. The results were 
examined and participants answered in a similar manner to each 
other before and after the intervention, suggesting there was some 
reliability in the clinical vignettes. Patterns emerged that were 
anticipated. Participants did select the correct diagnosis before and 
after on the unambiguous scenarios and were fairly certain both 
times. This suggests there was some reliability in scenarios 1 and 2 
and that the intervention was not associated with a detrimental effect 
on their correct judgements. It was expected that some people would 
make biased judgements about the ambiguous scenarios and this 
pattern also emerged. 
5.3.7. Procedure 
Six course tutors were approached by the author for permission to 
advertise the study amongst their students. Those that agreed sent an 
e-mail to their students to advertise the study on behalf of the author. 
The study information sheet was distributed amongst students of the 
following courses: Postgraduate Certificate in Health Research, 
Masters in Psychiatry, Masters in Public Health, Masters in Public 
Health for International Students, Masters in Child Health and 
Masters in Clinical Education. Additionally, an e-mail was sent to 
staff members of the Faculty of Medicine and Health addressed to 
those who were also medical doctors. 
The study was completed in four parts. Participants accessed the 
web link that had been provided by the author in order to access the 
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study online. Part one required that people read the welcome page 
that reiterated information about the study. They were told the study 
was expected to last approximately 20 minutes. Participants were 
required to confrrm that they had understood the information and 
that they agreed to take part in the study. They were given 
information about a prize draw and were instructed to provide their 
email address so they could be contacted if they had won a prize. The 
first task began with the clinical problem solving exercises. 
Participants were required to work through each scenario and all of 
the associated questions, described in the materials section. This task 
was expected to take 5 minutes to complete. 
In part two of the study, participants were shown the tutorial. They 
were instructed to click on the web link to access the tutorial and 
then close it once they had read the information presented. It was 
recommended that participants spend at least 5 minutes reading the 
information given in the tutorial, to get the most benefit. In part three 
of the study, participants were asked to complete the same clinical 
problem solving exercises that were given to them before the tutorial. 
This was to determine whether students thought differently about the 
same scenarios after the tutorial compared to before. Participants 
were told that they could choose the same responses as they did 
previously, change some of them, or change all of them. The final part 
of the study required participants to complete an evaluation 
questionnaire. This included multiple choice questions to assess their 
understanding of the tutorial content and a section that asked them 
to rate how useful they found the tutorial. This task was also expected 
to take approximately 5 minutes. After this was completed, 
participants were informed that they had reached the end of the study 
and that their answers had been submitted. 
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5.4. Analysis 
Results were analysed using SPSS for windows version 18.0. All 
participants completed the study fully, there was no missing data. 
Results were described in terms of descriptive and inferential 
statistics. 
5.4.1. Analysis of knowledge and relevance 
Knowledge of decision sciences concepts and perceived clinical 
relevance were measured on the second questionnaire, after the 
tutorial. Participants were measured via multiple choice questions 
about their knowledge of decision making concepts. The total number 
of correct responses out of 10 was entered into SPSS for each 
participant. As the data was continuous in nature, the mean number 
of correct responses was calculated along with the standard deviation. 
Frequencies were also calculated to show how many participants 
scored a particular total number on the multiple choice test, for 
example how many people scored 5, 6, 7 etc. Participants also rated 
their level of agreement with a series of statements. This indicated 
their views about the clinical relevance of the tutorial information. 
This task obtained ordinal data. The frequency of people that agreed, 
disagreed or were neutral about each statement, were calculated. 
5.4.2. Analysis of clinical judgement 
Participants were asked questions about their diagnostic judgements 
on four clinical vignettes. There were four questions to answer for 
each vignette, therefore 16 questions in total. Participants'responses 
for each question were coded as numeric variables in SPSS and 
crosstabs were computed to describe the results. Crosstabs were 
particularly useful as they display frequency data in a contingency 
table to express the association between two variables (Bryman & 
Cramer 2008). This was an accessible way of displaying the responses 
participants chose for each question on each scenario before and after 
the tutorial. Not only did crosstabs provide information about how 
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many people selected a particular response option, but also details of 
the changes in people's responses after the tutorial. 
In order to determine if there were any significant differences in the 
way participants responded to questions before and after the 
intervention, statistical analyses were conducted. The data were 
categorical and ordinal in nature. Categorical variables were 
associated with questions that asked people to select a diagnosis and 
other conditions they may wish to exclude or diagnose. The response 
options to these questions were in the form of categories that had no 
intrinsic order to them (Bryman & Cramer 2008), for example asthma 
attack, panic attack, pneumonia and heart attack. In order to 
determine whether responses before and after the intervention differed 
on these categorical variables, the McNemar's chi-square test was 
conducted. The McNemar chi-squared test is a non-parametric test 
used to analyse categorical data (Bryman & Cramer 2008). It is also 
used when the same individuals have been measured twice on the 
same variables, as was the case in this study. 
Ordinal variables were associated with questions that asked 
participants to rate the certainty level they had towards their chosen 
diagnosis and the influence each piece of scenario information had on 
their diagnosis. The response options to these questions were in the 
form of categories that could be rank ordered, but in which the 
differences between categories were not equal (Bryman & Cramer 
2008). For instance, not at all certain, somewhat certain, fairly certain 
and absolutely certain. The Wilcoxon signed rank test was conducted 
to determine whether responses before and after the intervention 
differed on these ordinal variables variables. The Wilcoxon test is an 
alternative non-parametric test to the repeated measures t-test. For a 
t-test to be used appropriately, the data should be (i) continuous i.e. 
numbers can be compared as multiples because differences between 
numbers are identical and (ii) have a normal distribution. This study 
did not meet those conditions. The Wilcoxon test was more 
appropriate as it is designed to calculate differences when data is 
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ordered in ranks and does not make assumptions about the 
distribution of the data (Bryman & Cramer 2008). 
5.5. Results 
The study was complete by 48 doctors who were either staff members 
or postgraduate students at the University of Leeds. Half of the 
sample provided demographic data about themselves. There were 14 
females and 10 males between the ages of 29 and 50. The sample of 
doctors varied in level of seniority and clinical specialty. Most 
participants worked at registrar level, and ranged from those who 
were newly qualified to having seven years registrar experience. Only 
a few people were consultants. Clinical specialty varied widely from 
Psychiatry, Surgery, Oncology, Cardiology, Paediatrics, Rheumatology, 
Renal Medicine, General Practice and a few were in academic 
positions. The results were summarised under three main headings 
that reflected the outcomes measured. These were knowledge of 
decision making concepts, clinical relevance of the tutorial and impact 
on clinical judgements. 
5.5.1. Knowledge of decisioD makiDg cODcepts 
Most participants did well on the multiple choice test. All participants 
achieved at least 50% correct answers, and 79% scored 8 or above. 
The mean score was 8.33 (standard deviation = 1.34). One third of the 
sample scored 9 and this was the most frequent score. The lowest 
score was 5 and the highest was 10. 
5.5.2. RelevaDce of tutorial 
Over half of the sample found the tutorial interesting and felt that 
that they had benefitted from it and were taught something new 
(Table 27). The majority agreed that some formal teaching on how 
people make judgements and decisions should be included in medical 
training. In terms of understanding the content of the tutorial, just 
over half agreed that it helped them to think about their own clinical 
judgements and decisions and over 70% of people understood the 
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relevance of the tutorial to doctors. However, only a small minority of 
people agreed that they had gained better understanding of how 
people make judgements and decisions. Most people were ambivalent 
about this and approximately one third disagreed that they had 
gained better understanding about how people make judgements and 
decisions. Overall people seemed unclear about the factors that can 
affect their judgements and choices. 
Statement Disagree Neutral Agree 
The tutorial was interesting 19% 23% 58% 
It helped me to think about my own judgement and 
19% 27% 54% decision making 
I have a better understanding of how people make 
38% 56% 6% judgements and decisions 
I understood the relevance of the tutorial to me as a 14% 13% 73% doctor 
I can identify examples of when people use heuristic 
and systematic strategies to make personal 2% 17% 82% 
judgements and decisions 
I can identify examples of when doctors use 
heuristic and systematic strategies to make clinical 2% 17% 82% 
judgements and decisions 
I have a better understanding of how others can 17% 38% 46% 
affect my judgements and choices 
I have a better understanding of how my personal 
beliefs and experiences can affect my judgements 19% 35% 46% 
and choices 
I feel more cautious about making clinical 
42% 44% 15% judgements and decisions 
I feel more confused about making clinical 
73% 20.8% 6% judgements and decisions 
I do not feel I have benefitted from the tutorial 54% 23% 23% 
The tutorial taught me nothing new 57% 27% 17% 
I think some formal teaching on how people make 
judgements and decisions should be included in 12% 31% 57% 
medical training 
Table 27: Views about the relevance of the tutorial. 
Over half of the sample stated they did not have a better 
understanding of how others, their personal beliefs and experiences 
can affect their judgements and choices. In terms of understanding 
the application of the tutorial content, almost the entire sample 
believed they could identify examples of heuristic and systematic 
strategies to make personal and clinical judgements and decisions. 
The majority of people did not feel more confused about making 
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clinical judgements and decisions in practice after the tutorial nor did 
they feel more cautious, although over one third of the sample was 
ambivalent about feeling cautious (Table 27 ). 
5.5.3. Clinical Judgement 
Clinical judgements were measured in terms of the accuracy of 
diagnosis, certainty of diagnosis and how doctors reasoned about 
their judgement. In the following sections, the results of the McNemar 
tests have been reported where possible. There were occasions when 
the test did not compute any values. The McNemar test is calculated 
using the values in the diagonal of a contingency table. For the 
McNemar test to be possible, the data should be arranged in a 
symmetrical contingency table, such as a 2x2 or 3x3 table etc. 
(Agresti 1990). In this study, some of the cross-tabulations were not 
arranged symmetrically, therefore the test was not conducted. In 
these cases, the results of the cross-tabulations were described. 
Appendix 8.18 shows examples of cross-tabulations and results of 
statistical tests as SPSS output. 
5.5.3.1. Diagnostic accuracy 
Table 28 shows the proportions of correct diagnoses before and after 
the tutorial, in response to each clinical vignette. The majority of the 
sample correctly diagnosed asthma and croup before and after the 
tutorial. 
Scenario type Proportion of sample correct Proportion of sample correct before tutorial after tutorial 
Asthma scenario 83% 90% 
Croup scenario 98% 96% 
Diabetes scenario 0 2% 
Angina 65% 75% 
Table 28: Accuracy of diagnosis before and after tutorial. 
Nobody correctly diagnosed diabetes except one person after the 
tutorial. Almost the entire sample misdiagnosed the patient before 
and after the intervention. The majority of people thought the patient 
had consumed alcohol excessively before and after the tutorial, 73% 
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and 75% respectively. The rest of the sample thought that the patient 
had sustained a head injury. Angina was correctly diagnosed by more 
people after than before the tutorial. Ten people made the same 
misdiagnosis after the intervention as they did before i.e. they did not 
change their previous incorrect responses. Of those that did change 
their responses after the intervention, six of them were changed to the 
correct diagnosis and one was changed from the correct to an 
incorrect diagnosis. There were no significant differences between the 
diagnostic judgements people made before compared to after the 
intervention (X2 = 4.33, df = 2, P = 0.12). 
5.5.3.2. Diagnostic certainty 
Overall, the majority of people remained at the same level of certainty 
abou t their diagnoses before and after the tutorial on all scenarios 
(Table 29). However, the proportions of people that became more 
certain of their diagnoses after the tutorial was higher than those that 
became less certain (Table 29). The majority of people were fairly 
certain that their diagnosis on the asthma and croup scenario was 
correct, at both times. 
Scenario type Decreased certainty Stayed same Increased certainty 
Asthma scenario 8% 73% 19% 
Croup scenario 15% 67% 19% 
Diabetes scenario 10% 75% 15% 
Angina scenario 13% 65% 23% 
Table 29: Change in certainty of diagnosis after tutorial. 
There were no significant differences in people's certainty about their 
diagnosis on the asthma and croup scenario before and after the 
interventions (z = -1.615, P = 0.11; z = -0.688, p = 0.49. The sample 
was least certain about their diagnosis on the diabetes scenario. Over 
50% of the sample was not at all certain about their chosen diagnosis 
before and after the intervention. There were no significant differences 
in people's certainty about their diagnosis on this scenario, before and 
after the interventions (z = -0.577, P = 0.56). People's certainty was 
most varied on the angina scenario, but overall most were uncertain 
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about their diagnosis. Furthermore, before the tutorial the majority of 
the sample, 44%, said they were not at all certain about their 
diagnosis. Whereas after the tutorial a majority of 40% had slightly 
increased their certainty to somewhat certain. The result of the 
Wilcoxon test indicated that there was no significant differences in 
people's certainty about their diagnosis on the angina scenario, before 
and after the tutorial (z = -0.894, P = 0.37). 
Scenario type Correct + Correct + Incorrect + Incorrect + 
certain uncertain certain uncertain 
Asthma scenario 
Before 40% Before 42% Before 13% Before 2% 
After 58% After 33% After 4% After 4% 
Croup scenario Before 67% Before 31% Before 0% Before 2% After 71% After 25% After 0% After 2% 
Diabetes Before 0% Before 0% Before 6% Before 94% 
scenario After 0% After 2% After 6% After 92% 
Angina scenario Before 19% Before 46% Before 4% Before 29% After 23% After 52% After 2% After 19% 
Table 30: Comparing accuracy with certainty of diagnosis. 
It was useful to know whether some people become more certain 
about a correct diagnosis after the tutorial, or more certain about a 
wrong diagnosis. Further analysis was conducted to determine how 
the accuracy and participants' certainty of diagnosis interacted (Table 
30). Overall, the proportion of people who misdiagnosed in each 
scenario and did not recognise their error, was small i.e. incorrect and 
certain. Most people were correct about their diagnosis on the asthma 
and croup scenarios and were confident that they had diagnosed 
correctly. Further, the proportion of people who diagnosed asthma 
and croup correctly, and were certain of their diagnosis, increased 
after the tutorial. On the diabetes scenario almost the entire sample 
chose an incorrect diagnosis, but they were not confident that they 
had diagnosed correctly before or after the tutorial. Whereas on the 
angina scenario, most people chose the correct diagnosis but were 
uncertain that their judgement was correct. Further, the number of 
people that chose the correct diagnosis but remained uncertain, 
increased after the tutorial. 
164 
CHAPTER 5 
5.5.3.3. Excluding or diagnosing other conditions before and after 
intervention 
For all scenarios, most people wanted to consider multiple conditions 
alongside their chosen diagnosis, before and after the tutorial. 
Further, the proportions of people that wished to consider multiple 
conditions increased after the tutorial, in response to all scenarios. 
The majority was largest on the diabetes scenario, where 83% before 
and 85% after the tutorial wanted to consider other conditions 
alongside their diagnosis. On the asthma scenario, the second 
commonest response was to consider panic attack 17% selected this 
option before the tutorial and 19% selected it after. Whereas on the 
croup scenario, 21 % of the sample preferred not to consider any of the 
stated options alongside their diagnosis. The proportion of people that 
chose this option decreased from 21 % to 10% after the tutorial. 
5.5.3.4. Rating the influence of each aspect ofinfonnation 
On the asthma scenario, participants were asked to rate how 
influential the following aspects of information were on their chosen 
diagnosis; (i) it was the patient's first week at university, (ii) a history 
of asthma, (iii) signs of wheezing and shortness of breath and (iv) 
absence of chest pain and illness. There was a consensus that signs 
of wheezing and shortness of breath was the most influential aspect of 
information on participants' chosen diagnosis. There was no 
consensus about the aspect of information considered to be the least 
influential. Most people stated that the other three aspects of 
information had some influence on their diagnosis. A history of 
asthma was considered to have some influence by 54% of the sample, 
but this decreased to 35% after the tutorial. That it was the patient's 
first week at university had some influence on 35% of the sample 
before and 38% after the intervention. The absence of chest pain and 
illness had some influence on 33% of the sample and this increased to 
50% after the tutorial. There were no significant differences in 
participants' responses about each aspect of information, before 
compared to after the intervention. The results of the Wilcoxon tests 
for each aspect of information were as follows; it was the patient's first 
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week at university (z = -0.128, P = 0.90), a history of asthma (z = 
-0.202, p = 0.84), signs of wheezing and shortness of breath (z = 
-0.144, P = 0.89) and absence of chest pain and illness (z = -0.1528~ 
P = 0.13). 
On the croup scenario, participants were asked to rate how 
influential the following aspects of information were on their chosen 
diagnosis: (i) age of patient, (ii) fever, (iii) barking cough, and (iv) 
absence of other symptoms. There was a consensus that a barking 
cough influenced their diagnosis the most, however there was little 
agreement on the least influential aspect of information. Before the 
tutorial, 79% of the sample considered a barking cough as the most 
influential on their diagnosis but this decreased to 71% after the 
intervention. The remainder of the sample considered a barking cough 
had little influence on their diagnosis. High importance was also 
attributed to the age of the patient. Before the intervention, 88% of 
the sample stated that the age of the child had some or most 
influence on their diagnosis. After the tutorial, these two options were 
chosen by 79% of the sample indicating age was an important factor. 
Presence of fever was not considered to be as influential. Less than 
30% stated that fever was the most influential on their diagnosis on 
both occasions. The absence of other symptoms elicited the most 
varied responses. On both occasions, approximately two thirds of the 
sample stated that the absence of other symptoms had some or most 
influence on their diagnosis. The remaining third thought it had a 
minimal effect on their diagnosis. The results of the Wilcoxon tests on 
each aspect of information were as follows; age of patient (z = -1.615, 
P = 0.11), fever (z = -1.069, P = 0.29), barking cough (z = -1.414, P = 
0.16), absence of other symptoms (z = -1.604, P = 0.11). 
On the diabetes scenario, participants were asked to rate how 
influential the following aspects of information were on their chosen 
diagnosis; (i) patient found slumped on library steps, (ii) his unkempt 
appearance, (iii) not fully conscious, (iv) confused state. The general 
trend was that participants considered all four aspects of information 
were influential in their chosen diagnoses. There was no aspect of 
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information that was rated as the least influential, but there was a 
clear consensus that the semi-consciousness of the patient influenced 
choice of diagnosis the most. Before the tutorial, 77% of the sample 
rated the patient not being fully conscious had some or most 
influence on their diagnosis. This increased to 85% after the 
intervention. Forty-two percent of the sample changed their responses 
after the tutorial. That the patient was not fully conscious gained 
more importance for 35% of the sample after the tutorial. For this 
aspect of information, the Wilcoxon test indicated participants' ratings 
differed significantly after the tutorial compared to before (z = -3.145, 
p = 0.02). The confused state of the patient was also considered 
important and a similar pattern emerged to the above results Before 
the tutorial, 73% stated that the patient's confused state had some or 
most influence on their diagnosis, and this increased to 77% after the 
tutorial. Again, 42% of the sample also changed their responses after 
the tutorial. For the majority, a confused state influenced the 
diagnosis more after the tutorial. The Wilcoxon test indicated that 
participants' ratings for this aspect of information also differed 
significantly after the tutorial compared to before (-2.488, p = 0.13). 
The unkempt appearance of the patient also influenced participants' 
diagnoses. Around two thirds of the sample rated this to have had 
some influence or most influence on their chosen diagnosis. Those 
who rated it as the most influential aspect of information increased 
from 31 % to 38% after the tutorial. However, there were no significant 
differences in these ratings after the tutorial compared to before (z = 
-0.054, P = 0.96). That the patient was found slumped on the library 
steps was less influential than other aspects of information. Before 
the tutorial, 63% of the sample stated it had some or most influence 
on their diagnosis, but only 38% chose these options after the 
tutorial. There were no significant differences in these ratings after the 
tutorial compared to before (z = -0.386, P = 0.70). 
On the angina scenario, participants were asked to rate how 
influential the following aspects of information were on their chosen 
diagnosis: (i) age of patient, (ii) his active lifestyle and physical fitness, 
167 
DOCTORS' CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
(iii) chest pain even at rest, (iv) no history of heart problems. There 
was no clear consensus regarding the aspect of information 
considered to be the least influential on participants' diagnoses .. 
However, just over 50% of the sample believed that the patient's lack 
of history with heart problems was not influential on their diagnoses. 
This was the case before and after the tutorial. The Wilcoxon test 
revealed there were no significant differences in judgements about 
this aspect of information, before compared to after the tutorial (z = 
-1.189, P = 0.235). There was a clear consensus on the most 
influential aspect of information. Around 87% of the sample thought 
that chest pain even at rest influenced their diagnosis before and after 
the tutorial. Furthermore the number of people that rated it as the 
most influential aspect of information increased from 58% to 77% 
after the tutorial. There was a significant difference in ratings about 
chest pain at rest, before compared to after the tutorial (z = -2.50, P = 
0.01). The age of the patient was also quite influential on most 
peoples' diagnosis. On both occasions, over 68% rated that it had 
some or most influence on their diagnosis. However there were no 
significant differences between responses before compared to after the 
tutorial (z = -0.44, P = 0.66). There was a similar pattern of responses 
towards the active lifestyle and physical fitness of the patient. This 
information was also influential for over 60% of the sample before and 
after the tutorial. On this occasion the Wilcoxon test revealed a near 
significant difference before compared to after the tutorial (z = -0.554, 
P = 0.58). 
5.6. DiscussioD 
This study reports a quasi-experiment that evaluated the feasibility of 
delivering an online tutorial to enhance doctors' decision literacy. All 
of the participants scored well on the knowledge test, indicating they 
did not have problems understanding the tutorial material. Despite 
this, most people felt unsure as to whether the tutorial had given 
them better knowledge about making judgements and decisions. In 
particular, they were unclear about the factors that can affect their 
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judgements and choices. The sample did think the tutorial 
information was relevant to them as doctors and were receptive to the 
inclusion of this type of training into medical education. The 
intervention was not enough to significantly improve clinical 
judgements, although overall most participants' judgements were 
accurate and sensible on three out of four scenarios. There was 
evidence of biased thinking about the diabetes scenario. Everyone 
judged the patient to be drunk and was influenced by information 
that was the least relevant to the diagnosis. Most people were 
confident about the accuracy of their diagnosis on the asthma and 
croup scenarios, but not on the diabetes and angina scenario. There 
was evidence that the majority were considering a range of conditions 
alongside their chosen diagnoses. The following discussion explains 
the findings in more detail, and is organised in such a way to answer 
the study's research questions. 
5.6.1. Does an intervention about basic decision science improve 
doctors' knowledge of how they make judgements and decisions? 
An online tutorial about basic decision science was enough to impart 
knowledge to doctors about how they make judgements and decisions. 
The results of the knowledge test showed that the majority of 
participants understood the concepts that were introduced in the 
tutorial well. This was an encouraging find, given that it was unlikely 
the sample would have had previous knowledge about information 
processmg. However, it is important to acknowledge that previous 
knowledge about the decision sciences concepts was not actually 
assessed. Therefore, it is possible that previous knowledge may 
account for participants' high scores on this knowledge test. Further, 
the format of the knowledge test was limited in that each question 
was associated with the same 6 response options that appeared in the 
same order (see Appendix 8.15). The disadvantage of this format is 
that participants may have been able to guess which response was 
most likely correct based on the previous answers they had chosen. 
Therefore, bias was potentially introduced this way and the findings 
should be interpreted with these limitations in mind. It is still likely 
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that a brief online tutorial about basic decision science was enough to 
impart knowledge to improve doctors' decision literacy. 
This finding would be in line with those interventions reviewed in 
Chapter 2 that reported participants had gained better knowledge 
about how doctors employ heuristics and how they can lead to biased 
judgements (Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999). 
The findings from this study and previous studies indicate that it is 
possible to translate information from the decision sciences in a 
meaningful way to doctors. 
As well as an objective test of knowledge through MCQs, 
knowledge gained was measured subjectively by asking participants 
their views towards the tutorial. Almost everyone felt they had been 
taught new information and agreed they could identify examples of 
decisions that had been made using a heuristic and systematic 
strategy. These views provided some confrrmation of the high scores 
on the MCQ test. A similar finding was reported by Abraham (2004). 
Feedback from participants indicated that the intervention had 
increased their knowledge and understanding about critical thinking 
skills. However in this study, the sample did not feel they had 
developed better understanding of how people make judgements and 
decisions. Perhaps this was due to the wording of the item. If the word 
'better' had been eliminated participants may have agreed more with a 
statement like 'I have developed an understanding of how people 
make decisions'. Another possible reason was that there was no 
feedback given to participants about their performance on any of the 
tasks. Feedback has been shown to be an important aspect of 
successful learning (King 1999; Chowdhury & Kalu 2004; Race 2005). 
Participants did not know their scores on the knowledge test, but if 
they had known then they may have responded to this item 
differently. They also felt unclear about the impact that others, 
personal beliefs and experiences had on their judgements and 
choices. It is likely that more detailed information and more examples 
were required that explained how these factors can influence their 
judgements and decisions than what was presented in the tutorial. 
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5.6.2. Can the intervention be delivered in a way that is relevant 
to doctors? 
The majority of the sample recognised the relevance the intervention 
had on their work as doctors. They found the topic interesting and the 
intervention helped them think about their own judgements and 
decision making. Further, over half of the sample agreed that doctors 
should receive some formal training to improve their decision literacy 
as part of their training. There is evidence that people respond 
favourably to web based instruction (Chumley-Jones et al. 2002; 
Atreja, Mehta, Jain, Harris, Ishwaran, Avital and Fishleder 2008). In 
one review of web based instruction in continuing medical education, 
the majority of studies reported that participants had positive 
attitudes towards the interventions (Wutoh, Boren and Balas 2004). 
Further, they were as effective in imparting knowledge as traditional 
formats in continuing medical education (Wutoh et al. 2004). The 
present study also found that the online intervention was effective at 
imparting knowledge about decision sciences concepts to doctors. 
However, participants' reaction to web based training in these above 
studies was evaluated in terms of enthusiasm, satisfaction with 
learning experience and not relevance of the learning material towards 
the applied context. Relevance of the material was evaluated in a 
similar study reviewed in Chapter 2 (Servais et al. 2006). This 
intervention delivered a web based intervention with problem solving 
scenarios to improve surgical decision making. The vast majority of 
participants believed that the online intervention was an effective 
mode of teaching clinical decision making and they would use similar 
teaching modules in future if they were accessible over the Internet 
(Servais et al. 2006). These positive evaluations indicate participants 
did find the material and delivery mode relevant to their clinical work. 
That participants in the present study did find the intervention 
relevant to their work as doctors, was encouraging. Relevance of the 
learning material is an important factor in determining whether 
people are motivated to learn and apply their learning (Noe & Schmitt 
1986). 
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Learning is thought to be optimised when principles are stated 
explicitly and plenty of relevant examples are given to clarify the 
principles. Evidence has found that when participants were given a. 
concept to learn, they did not make use of it unless relevant examples 
were presented as well (Anderson 1987; Ross 1987; Ross & Kennedy 
1990). In this study, it was anticipated that the decision making 
concepts were likely to be new information to the sample. The author 
ensured that concepts were explained using multiple examples from 
the non-clinical and clinical context. It is likely that the examples 
presented in the tutorial helped participants understand the relevance 
the decision sciences has on informing their clinical practice. People 
are usually educated about heuristics from the perspective that they 
can lead to poor judgements and decisions. Most studies focus on 
providing examples to people of heuristics that have failed (Fischhoff 
1975; Wolf et al. 1988; Hershberger et al. 1995). The limitation with 
this approach is that people may not gain the understanding that 
people routinely use heuristics because they mostly lead to accurate 
judgements and good decisions. This study sought to give participants 
a more complete understanding of heuristic processing by (i) 
presenting examples of times when heuristics can lead to good as well 
as poor judgements and (ii) presenting information about systematic 
processing and comparing it with heuristic processing. Shepperd & 
Koch (2005) have recommended that any attempts to educate people 
about the use of heuristics should not neglect providing examples of 
heuristics that lead to good judgements. They found that if they gave 
students examples of the representative heuristic (see Section 1.6) 
leading to only poor judgements, it hampered their understanding of 
the heuristic. This group showed even less understanding than those 
who were not given any examples to explain the heuristic. Students 
that were shown examples of the heuristic leading to good and poor 
judgements, showed the best understanding (Shepperd & Koch 2005). 
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5.6.3. Does the intervention improve doctors' cUnical 
judgements? 
The intervention was not enough to improve doctors' clinical 
judgements about diagnosis. Overall the vast majority of people made 
the same judgements on the problem solving tasks before and after 
the tutorial. However, these were mostly accurate judgements from 
the start. The majority of people correctly diagnosed asthma, croup 
and angina before and after the tutorial. A positive find was that the 
majority of people correctly diagnosed angina in the forest ranger with 
chest pain before and after the tutorial. It was expected that fewer 
people would get this diagnosis correct at least before the tutorial, as 
it described an atypical presentation of angina in a seemingly young, 
fit and healthy man. It is likely that participants had been taught to 
always consider angina if a patient complains of chest pain even at 
rest. They may have used a method of ruling out the worst case 
scenario (Croskerry 2002) which in this case was angina. While the 
intervention was not associated with an overall positive effect, it was 
encouraging that it was not associated with a negative effect on 
doctors' judgements. Participants did not change their correct 
diagnoses to incorrect diagnoses after the tutorial. This indicates that 
learning basic information about the decision sciences did not have a 
detrimental impact on clinical judgements. Further, hardly anyone 
reported feeling more confused about making clinical judgements and 
decisions in practice. None of the studies reviewed in Chapter 2 
evaluated whether their intervention had a negative impact on clinical 
judgements and/or decisions. 
There was evidence of biased reasoning on the diabetes scenario. 
All except one doctor inaccurately judged the diabetes patient to be 
drunk, before and after the tutorial. This was not just an incorrect 
diagnosis, but it suggested that participants' reasoning about the 
situation had been influenced by the misleading aspects of the 
scenario. For example, information such as an unkempt appearance 
and the patient found slumped on the steps of a public library biased 
their judgement about the cause of the patient's condition. That 
everybody thought the patient had consumed too much alcohol, 
173 
DOCTORS' CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
suggests doctors were influenced by a prototypical typical appearance 
of a drunken man. This is evidence that participants had over relied 
on the confirmation heuristic when thinking about this clinical 
scenario. That is, their judgements were based on how representative 
the clinical information was about a drunken man (Tversky & 
Kahneman 1974; Croskerry 2000). The information presented in the 
tutorial did not help doctors think differently about this particular 
scenario, for example that the cause of the patient's symptoms could 
be an atypical presentation of an illness. 
As the intervention did not improve clinical judgements, these 
findings do not support the view that doctors can avoid the influence 
of bias through education about heuristics (Arnoult & Anderson 1988; 
Croskerry 2000; Croskerry 2003). The systematic review in Chapter 2 
found a few interventions that educated doctors about heuristics and 
bias were associated with better diagnostic judgements (Wolf et al. 
1988; Gruppen et al. 1994; Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999; 
Abraham et al. 2004). There may be a few reasons for why the same 
was not found of the present study. Overall, most people made good 
clinical judgements in response to all but one of the problem solving 
tasks, before the tutorial. Changes in responses that were better than 
previous answers were so few that they did not result in significant 
differences. There was only room for significant improvement in 
response to how they solved the diabetes scenario. Further, the 
study's sample size was fairly small (N = 48). A small sample size is 
one factor that compromises the power of a statistical test i.e. the 
probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is indeed false 
(Cohen 1988). This means that the statistical power in this study 
may not have been sufficient to detect a true effect of the intervention. 
It may be that this type of intervention genuinely has no effect on 
doctors' clinical judgements. That is, teaching doctors about basic 
decision science is not an effective way of enhancing clinical 
judgements. However, this is unlikely as the intervention was based 
on good rationale; the systematic review found that decision literacy 
interventions were effective i.e. those that taught students and 
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doctors about critical thinking or the reasoning processes they use to 
solve clinical problems (Cebul et al. 1984; Wolf et al. 1988; 
Hershberger et al. 1995; Round 1999; Beullens et al. 2006). Further, 
the study took on board the suggestions of other authors that doctors 
should be educated about their use of heuristics from an approach 
that emphasises they are routinely used because they are helpful 
(Croskerry 2002; Croskerry 2003; Eva & Norman 2005; Shepperd & 
Koch 2005). It is more likely that the intervention was delivered in a 
format that was not suitable to impact on doctors' clinical 
judgements. The online tutorial was perhaps too brief a delivery mode 
for educating doctors about decision making concepts and 
information processing. It may have been more suitable to have 
delivered this information in a series of lectures or tutorials by an 
expert in the decision sciences. Doctors may have gained more benefit 
from having contact with a teacher and their peers in order to discuss 
the information about decision making and receive feedback on their 
performance on problem solving tasks. This mode of delivery is 
thought to facilitate deep learning (Spencer & Jordan 1999) and there 
is reason to believe that this format would have been more likely to 
improve clinical judgements. All of the interventions that delivered 
some education in critical thinking or information processing and 
were associated with an improvement in clinical judgements, delivered 
their teaching in a lecture or tutorial format (Cebul et al. 1984; Wolf et 
al. 1988; Round 1999; Abraham et al. 2004; Beullens et al. 2006). 
5.6.4. Implications of findings to medical education and practice 
Medical educators should consider introducing some formal teaching 
about the decision sciences for trainees. It is likely that doctors will be 
receptive to it if they understand the relevance it has on their clinical 
practice. It is possible to translate information from the decision 
sciences in a meaningful way to doctors. In this study people gained 
knowledge about information processing. This means that doctors can 
be taught to understand how the generic principles of judgement and 
decision making are relevant to their clinical practice. It is unlikely 
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that online education about the decision sciences will be enough on 
its own to improve clinical judgements and/or decisions in practice. 
Interactive forms of teaching are necessary to enhance deeper. 
learning so participants can recognise when they need to think 
differently about a clinical problem. Web based training is a 
satisfactory mode of learning when it supplements traditional forms of 
teaching. For instance, doctors reportedly find it useful and enjoyable 
to practise solving clinical problems using online scenarios, that are 
often more graphically rich than paper based scenarios (Servais et al. 
2006; Hedrick & Young 2008). 
Doctors displayed biased thinking and this was not corrected after 
they had been given information about heuristics and the errors they 
can lead to i.e. they did not transfer their learning from the tutorial to 
solve this problem. It is reasonable to assume that participants would 
have made similar judgements in practice as all of the clinical 
vignettes were based on real clinical situations. This highlights a 
training need for doctors that they become more reflective about their 
reasoning processes and aware of the factors that influence their 
judgements and decisions. In partiCUlar there was evidence that 
participants over relied on the confirmation heuristic. As this is one of 
the most commonly used rules of thumb by all individuals, medical 
educators should be cautious to place equal emphasis on teaching 
trainees to recognise patterns of atypical as well as typical signs and 
symptoms of medical conditions (Croskerry 2002). 
Little is known about how clinical reasoning interventions impact 
on clinical practice. Interventions that seek to raise doctors' 
awareness about judgement and decision making processes have been 
criticised on the basis that learning will not be transferred to the 
clinical context to improve practice (Gick & Hollyoak 1983; Norman et 
al. 1995; Nendaz & Bordage 2002; Schuwirth 2002; Norman 2005; 
Eva & Norman 2005; Norman & Eva 2010). At this stage, it is more 
important to establish that clinical reasoning interventions do not 
have a detrimental effect on real world clinical judgements and 
decisions. This may happen if doctors became confused about how 
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they make decisions. In this study, the intervention did not harm the 
correct judgements doctors made. Most interventions reviewed in 
Chapter 2 did not evaluate this aspect and further research is needed 
in this area. 
5.6.5. Critique of study 
The strengths of this study include a successful translation of basic 
information from the decision sciences in a way that was relevant and 
interesting to doctors. It avoided limitations of other studies that risk 
creating the false impression of a fundamental problem with the way 
doctors use heuristics to make judgements and decisions, and the 
need to avoid using heuristics. This study presented the use of 
heuristics in its broader context as one mode of processing 
information. It emphasised the importance of these mechanisms that 
simplify information processing and the effective results they produce 
most of the time. A systematic method was presented as an 
alternative way that doctors can use to solve clinical problems when 
heuristics are inappropriate. It was encouraging that participants 
reported that the tutorial information helped them to reflect on their 
own decision making and that this knowledge did not confuse them 
about how they should make judgements and decisions in practice. 
From a review of the evidence (Chapter 2) it was unclear as to 
which component parts of interventions are associated with the 
enhancement of doctors' decision making skills. However, a summary 
of good practice for designing educational interventions was provided 
(page 72). The strengths of this study include explicit use of theory to 
inform the design of the intervention. Further, as this theory came 
from the decision sciences participants were given information about 
generic aspects of decision making that affect all individuals as well 
as specific information about their clinical judgements and decisions. 
Most interventions reviewed in Chapter 2 were not informed by theory 
and those that were focused on specific aspects of doctors' clinical 
reasoning. The types of measures were designed specifically for the 
present study in order to ensure they suitable matched the aims and 
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objectives. This was noted as a limitation of a few of the interventions 
reviewed in Chapter 2, where an established measure had been used 
that was not well suited to the study aims and objectives. Further" 
the advice of Miller (1999) was adhered to by not only including a 
measure of knowledge, but the application of knowledge to establish 
how doctor's actual clinical judgements may be in practice. 
Some limitations should be considered. The sample size was small 
and only included qualified doctors who were postgraduate students 
at the University of Leeds. The findings do not necessarily reflect the 
views and clinical judgements of medical students or doctors who are 
not engaged in postgraduate studies. The intervention needs to be 
evaluated with a variety of different samples and in large numbers to 
gain a better understanding of whether an online intervention about 
basic decision science is feasible. However, the sample did at least 
consist of doctors from different levels of experience who worked in 
different clinical specialties. Delivering the intervention online meant 
that participants did not have an opportunity to discuss or ask 
questions about the problem solving tasks or tutorial material with 
the author or their peers. Further, the software used to design the 
study did not allow feedback to be given to participants on their 
performance after they had completed the study. This was not ideal as 
the provision of constructive feedback is an important aspect of 
successful learning (King 1999; Race 2005). Perhaps if they had been 
given feedback on aspects they answered well and areas for 
improvement then the intervention may have had more impact on 
their clinical judgements, particularly with regard to the diabetes 
scenario. It is not known whether participants will retain the 
knowledge they gained from the tutorial and/or go onto apply it in 
practice. This could be addressed in future work in order to 
understand if the intervention is associated with any long term 
benefit. 
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5.7. Summary 
To summarise, this study evaluated the feasibility of delivering brief 
online teaching about basic decision sciences concepts to doctors, in 
order to improve their decision literacy. It is possible to impart 
knowledge about the decision sciences in a way that is meaningful 
and relevant to doctors. They were receptive to learning about the 
science behind their judgement and decision making. The online 
intervention was not enough to impact on their clinical judgements. It 
is anticipated that clinical judgements can be improved if the decision 
science information is delivered by an expert over a longer duration in 
an interactive teaching format. 
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Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to (i) develop a theory-based 
intervention to facilitate doctors' clinical judgements and decisions 
and (ii) evaluate the feasibility to integrate it within medical 
education. The objectives were to: 
identify the evidence of interventions designed to enhance doctors' 
clinical reasoning; 
evaluate the effectiveness of those interventions; 
describe how interventions have been incorporated into medical 
curricula; 
explore doctors' VIews and expenences about making clinical 
judgements and decisions effectively; 
make recommendations for the design and implementation of 
fu ture clinical reasoning training for doctors. 
The aims and objectives were fulfilled by carrying out four 
empirical studies reported in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. Evidence of 
training courses to enhance doctors' clinical judgements and 
decisions was synthesised in the systematic review and questionnaire 
studies (Chapters 2 and 3). The main findings were that few formal 
courses have been designed to train doctors in clinical reasoning. Of 
the courses identified, most of them had not been included into 
medical curricula. This indicates improving doctors' clinical reasoning 
through formal training has not gained importance in medical 
education. There was little agreement between medical educators 
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about how to improve doctors' clinical judgements. However, training 
to improve the outcome of decisions remained a more common 
approach than training to improve the decision process. 
Doctors were interviewed about their perceptions of making clinical 
judgements and decisions effectively (Chapter 4). The sample had 
limited awareness about their own reasoning processes and did not 
feel there was an ideal way to make effective clinical judgements or 
decisions. There was some awareness that a diverse array of cues 
influenced their thought processes but little awareness about the 
occurrence of biased thinking. It was found that doctors in the sample 
believed that clinical reasoning improved primarily through years of 
repeated experience in practice. 
The findings from the systematic review, questionnaire and 
interview studies informed the development of an online decision 
literacy intervention (Chapter 5). A short tutorial was delivered that 
introduced the basic science behind doctors' judgement and decision 
making. The intervention was enough to impart knowledge to doctors 
about their reasoning processes, and was received well by 
participants. It did not impact on their clinical judgements, but this 
was likely to be due to methodological limitations rather than an 
ineffective intervention. It is anticipated that the inclusion of the 
decision sciences in medical curricula will be feasible and beneficial to 
doctors. 
This chapter discusses the contributions of this thesis to the 
clinical reasoning literature, medical education and training as well as 
directions for future research. It ends with a critique of the thesis. 
6.1. Implications of findings to the clinical reasoning 
literature 
A distinction between judgements and decisions is clear and more 
accurate from a decision sciences perspective. In this thesis, an 
attempt was made at distinguishing clinical judgements from clinical 
decisions. However, it was difficult to apply this same distinction to 
the clinical reasoning context because it is not clear at which point 
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clinical judgements become decisions and vice versa. This thesis 
imposed a separation between forming an opinion about a diagnosis 
(judgement) and making a choice about how to manage a patient. 
(decision). There are a few advantages of separating clinical 
judgements from clinical decisions in this way. First, the aims and 
objectives of studies become clearer. The current use of 
interchangeable terminology makes it difficult to understand what 
research problem medical educators are trying to address. For 
example, whether the aim is to improve the accuracy of a diagnosis or 
problem solving ability. This unclear use of terms was reflected in 
Chapters 2 and 3 which found there was little consensus between 
educators on how to effectively enhance doctors' clinical reasoning. To 
rectify this, authors should set out a clear rationale for what they 
mean by clinical judgement, clinical decision, problem solving or 
clinical reasoning etc. 
Second, a distinction between clinical judgements and clinical 
decisions was useful in highlighting where gaps exist in our 
knowledge about improving doctors' clinical reasoning. It was clear 
that the vast majority of research focused on one aspect of clinical 
reasoning, understanding the processes doctors employ to make a 
diagnosis and factors that affect diagnosis (Elstein 1972; Barrows 
1982; Groen & Patel 1985; Croskerry 2002; Norman 2005). 
Consequently, most training courses in clinical reasoning were aimed 
at improving doctors' diagnostic accuracy via the application of Bayes 
theorem and decision analysis to clinical problems (Elstein 1981; 
Elstein 1985). There has been little change in the approach that 
medical educators take to improve doctors' clinical reasoning. That is, 
the application of statistical decision theories is still preferred as a 
means of educating doctors. Little is known about how doctors choose 
particular courses of action to manage a patient's condition and the 
factors that influence those choices (Norman 2005). For this to be 
rectified, medical educators should be made aware that research on 
doctors' clinical reasoning IS almost entirely focused on 
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understanding clinical diagnosis and that this is only one aspect of 
clinical reasoning. 
The emphasis on improving diagnosis may be due to the feasibility 
of conducting research. The accuracy of a diagnosis is an easily 
measured outcome in experimental studies; it is either correct or 
incorrect. Alternatively, it may reflect a commonly held view that a 
good decision is one that leads to a good outcome, such as the correct 
diagnosis (Frisch 1994; Sox 1999; Baron 2008; Bekker 2010). An 
important find from this thesis was that decision literacy 
interventions, although few in number, were effective. These involved 
explicit use of decision theory to enhance doctors' awareness of their 
reasoning processes and critical thinking skills (Wolf 1988; 
Hershberger 1995; Round 1999; Abraham 2004). These findings 
suggest that improving doctors reasoning about clinical problems 
offers a promising alternative way to enhance the quality of clinical 
judgements and decisions. The findings also shed light on ways that 
doctors can be helped to make well-reasoned choices. The view that a 
good decision is one that is reasoned well, has received little attention 
in the clinical reasoning literature (Croskerry 2000; Croskerry 2002). 
This thesis suggests that training doctors to understand their own 
reasoning processes can potentially improve their judgements and 
decisions in clinical practice (Chapter 2). When interviewed, doctors 
reported that they preferred the quality of their judgements and 
decisions are evaluated by the steps they had taken to reach them 
(Chapter 4). Furthermore, doctors were receptive to learning about 
the basic science behind their decision processes (Chapter 5). Overall, 
these findings substantiate the view that training doctors to reason 
well is a worthwhile goal. 
6.2. Implications of findings to medical education and 
training 
The findings from this thesis can be used to improve the design 
and delivery of future courses that seek to educate doctors about their 
clinical reasoning. The following sections make suggestions about how 
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fu ture training in clinical reasoning could be delivered in terms of 
content and format, who it should be aimed at and where to include it 
in the medical curricula. 
Medical educators have continued to hold the opinion that doctors 
should learn how to apply statistical decision theories to solve clinical 
problems (Croskerry 2005). The majority of courses reviewed sought 
to teach doctors how to apply Bayes Theorem to their clinical 
diagnosis and/or decision analysis to their treatment choices. In 
practice, it is reasonable to expect that doctors will not always 
implement decision making techniques such as Bayes theorem, 
decision trees or clinical guidelines. For instance, evidence 
demonstrates it is difficult to get doctors to implement best practice 
guidelines (Greco 1993; Cabana 1999; Rello 2002). Teaching doctors 
to become decision literate could prove to be a more practical way of 
enhancing the quality of clinical judgements and decisions. This 
involves helping doctors develop an insight and ability to critically 
evaluate their own reasoning processes. 
One of the reasons that a decision literacy approach to training 
may be effective is because it integrates the generic aspects of human 
judgement and decision making with the applied clinical context. 
Referring back to the good practice guidance (see page 72) a good 
course in clinical reasoning would have an explicit theoretical basis. 
The decision sciences are a useful theoretical basis that provides 
knowledge of generic decision making principles that are applicable to 
all people. When this information is combined with health and illness 
examples of judgements and decisions, the evidence and theories from 
the decisions sciences becomes relevant to the clinical context. This 
combination means that doctors can learn about the similarities 
between how all individuals generally and doctors specifically make 
judgements and decisions, and the factors that influence their 
reasoning. Findings from the quasi-experiment (Chapter 5) in this 
thesis demonstrated that the information processing framework was a 
useful way of teaching doctors to understand the basic science that 
underlies their personal and clinical decisions. Doctors gained a basic 
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understanding of how the generic principles of decision making apply 
to their clinical practice. This knowledge could help doctors gain an 
ability to monitor their own thinking, and thereby become more 
reflective practitioners (Kassirer 1991; Croskerry 2000; Graber 2003; 
Graber 2005; GMC 2009; Graber 2009). 
The content of such courses may include understanding how 
people use a variety of cognitive shortcuts (heuristics) and the effects 
they can have on clinical judgements and decisions (Wolf 1988; 
Hershberger 1995; Round 1999; Beullens 2006). A comprehensive list 
of the different types of heuristics that doctors use has been 
developed that could be used as a teaching resource (Croskerry 2002; 
Croskerry 2003). It is important to provide examples of when 
heuristics are used effectively and when they may lead to an incorrect 
and/or poor decision. This may help doctors develop an insight into 
how errors occur in their reasoning and potentially how they may be 
avoided in future. 
Further to the good practice guidance summarised on page 72, it is 
important that the outcome measures are clarified and that 
assessment methods are appropriate. A more accurate use of tenus 
will clarify the outcomes that are being measured, e.g. whether a 
judgement or decision is being measured. Future interventions should 
also employ assessment methods targeting not only knowledge 
components such as recall tests but methods that demonstrate what 
trainees will do when faced with real clinical problems (Miller 1990). 
There should also be some attempt at assessing the long-term impact 
of training and transfer of learning to clinical practice. In terms of how 
to deliver teaching about the decision sciences, an interactive series of 
tutorials are expected to be more suitable than online teaching. An 
interactive set of tutorials would allow for timely, constructive 
feedback about participants learning. The limitations of the online 
tutorial reported in Chapter 5 were that information could only be 
conveyed briefly and there was no face to face interaction between the 
educator and learners. This mode of delivery may have inhibited the 
effectiveness of the intervention. 
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A final aspect of good practice in clinical reasoning training is to 
plan carefully where it could be integrated into medical curriculum. 
From this thesis, educators raised two main issues for consideration:. 
(i) whether it should be taught as part of a module on a broader topic 
or as a module itself and (ii) whether it should be introduced before or 
after clinical experience is gained. Many of the educators sUIVeyed 
believed there was a close link between communication skills and 
improving clinical reasoning. Consequently, they reported that clinical 
reasoning training should be integrated within modules that primarily 
teach doctors better communication skills. Given that an ability to 
reach good clinical judgements and decisions is a crucial aspect of a 
doctor's clinical practice, training in clinical reasoning deseIVes a 
more prominent position in medical education. This could be in the 
form of a series of modules devoted entirely to clinical reasoning that 
are integrated throughout the curriculum. 
The majority of educators believed that the ideal time to deliver 
this training was at postgraduate level when doctors have gained 
sufficient clinical experience. Otherwise, an alternative option was to 
introduce it earlier during the later years of undergraduate training to 
coincide with the clinical attachment phases. A different view exists 
within the clinical reasoning literature that states it is not necessary 
to wait for medical students to develop sufficient experience of making 
decisions in practice and that basic principles can be introduced in 
the first year at undergraduate level (Croskerry 2000; Croskerry 2005; 
Croskerry 2009; Kassirer 2010). A few studies have supported this 
view by demonstrating that medical students without any clinical 
experience can benefit from formal training in clinical reasoning 
(Margolis 1982; Vollebregt 2005). It is likely that a basic introduction 
to the decision sciences could be introduced effectively early on in 
undergraduate medical training. This material would then need to be 
revisited later on when students have gained some clinical experience 
and can apply real clinical scenarios to the theory. Ideally, this 
material would be spiraled throughout undergraduate curricula in 
order to reinforce learning (Harden 2000). 
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6.3. Further research and future directions 
The thesis has highlighted several areas of further research 
necessary in this subject area. Further research is needed to 
understand why training in clinical reasoning has made little impact 
in medical education. Some of the possible reasons were highlighted 
in this thesis, and include a firm belief that clinical reasoning skills 
are acquired solely at the workplace, not the classroom. Others are 
concerned that, despite its potential value, the curriculum is already 
saturated with subjects of a higher priority. Future research may 
want to understand the perceived barriers to clinical reasoning 
training better so they can be addressed if perceptions are to change. 
There is considerable variation in the way decision making related 
terms and concepts are used amongst researchers. This compromises 
the quality of the clinical reasoning literature and people's 
understanding of how to effectively train doctors to make better 
judgements and decisions. An agreeable and workable language needs 
to be established to achieve a common understanding of what is 
meant by a good judgement or good decision. Studies describing 
future decision making courses should be explicit about whether the 
aim is to improve reasoning processes or the medical outcome. 
Medical educators should understand this important difference in 
approach and the implications it has on clinical practice. Achieving 
consistency in the use of these terms will lead to clearer aims, clearer 
operationalisation of variables and meaningful communication among 
educators about decision making training. 
Understanding how doctors make treatment choices and other 
decisions about managing patients, has been neglected. This should 
be addressed in order to complement what is known about diagnosis. 
It is reasonable to expect that doctors employ expert methods that are 
different to those used to reach a diagnosis. For instance, pattern 
recognition is one type of method used to make a diagnosis but has 
little relevance to making a treatment choice. The interview study 
reported in Chapter 4 suggested that diagnosing a patient is reached 
by different processes and influenced by different factors compared to 
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making treatment choices. To understand how to improve doctors' 
treatment and other patient management choices, researchers should 
seek to clarify the processes doctors use and the factors that influence. 
treatment choices. Researchers should also look to the shared 
decision making literature and integrate any useful information into 
the clinical reasoning literature that informs the training of doctors in 
this area. 
Finally, the evaluation of further training courses needs to 
eventually target the impact of training at the workplace. Further 
research needs to resolve the following main issues: (i) whether 
doctors apply their learning from a training course to the clinical 
context and (ii) what impact is there on clinical judgements and 
decisions in practice. The majority of educators focused on whether 
their courses had a positive effect on judgements and decisions. The 
possibility that training may worsen doctors' judgements and 
decisions has been overlooked. Further, it is not known whether any 
of the courses reviewed had a long term impact on clinical judgements 
and decisions. These are important aspects that must be accounted 
for before efforts can be made to implement any training in medical 
curricula. Studies that use a longitudinal design would be appropriate 
to address these issues. 
6.4. Critique or thesis 
The strengths of the thesis include a thorough exploration about how 
to effectively train doctors in clinical reasoning to make better 
judgements and decisions. It resulted in the development of a feasible 
online educational intervention that was based on theory and 
evidence. The evidence was collated over a series of empirical studies 
using a range of rigorous research methods. It has made a significant 
contribution to furthering understanding about effective and 
ineffective ways of training doctors in clinical reasoning and the 
processes that doctors use. This thesis has also demonstrated that 
doctors can be trained to understand how the generic principles of 
judgement and decision making can inform their clinical practice. 
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The thesis has some limitations. There is no guarantee that the 
evidence base reviewed in Chapters 2 and 3 represents every course 
in clinical reasoning. It is possible that the systematic review missed a 
relevant study that was not published in the English language. 
Further, a few medical educators may have chosen not to participate 
in the questionnaire study and therefore the details of these course 
remain unknown. Sample sizes were relatively small in the 
questionnaire, interview and quasi-experimental studies and a non-
probability sampling method was used to recruit participants. 
Therefore it is not possible to claim these findings are applicable to 
other populations of doctors (Robson 2002). The online delivery mode 
of the decision literacy intervention limited the amount of information 
that could reasonably be conveyed. Participants may have benefitted 
more from the intervention if it were delivered in a format that 
facilitated interaction between others. 
6.5. Summary 
There is increasing evidence to support the value of introducing 
formal clinical reasoning training into medical education. This 
evidence suggests that there are aspects of good clinical judgement 
and decision making competency that are not learned through 
repeated clinical practice alone. In particular this thesis highlights 
that training to improve doctors understanding about how people 
think has the potential to impact on clinical reasoning. Doctors in 
training should be made aware that making well reasoned judgements 
and choices is one of their most important skills. Medical educators 
should develop effective training methods to improve doctors' critical 
thinking and reasoning processes. 
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8. Appendices 
8.1. Systematic review search strategy 
8.1.1. OVID 
Searched Medline, Embase and PsycInfo separately so relevant 
articles were not missed. 
Searched from 1950 to May 2010. 
Three topic headings developed and recorded as many different 
similar words. 
Topic 1 - terms related to Topic 2 - terms related to Topic 3 - terms related to 
'intervention to facilitate' 'doctors' 'clinical decision making' 
Intervention Doctors Decision making 
Teach Physician Clinical decision making 
Train Clinician Clinician decision making 
Educate Medic Physician decision making 
Instruct Medical Student Medical decision making 
Guide Medical practitioner 
Learn Trainee Clinical judgement 
Clerkship Postgraduate Clinician judgement 
Internship Undergraduate Physician judgement 
Medical judgement 
Facilitate Consultant 
Aid Registrar Clinical reasoning 
Enhance House officer Medical reasoning 
Help Specialist Critical thinking 
Assist General practitioner Problem solving 
Develop Intern 
Promote Resident 
Evaluate 
Using the 'map term to subject heading' function, inserted 
following subheadings: 
Topic 1: physicians/or hospitalists / or physicians, family / 
or physicians, women/ 
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Topic 2: Students, Medical 
Topic 3: Consultants 
Topic 4: medical education 
Key words searches carried out. Un ticked 'map term to subject 
heading'. 
Used truncation * for similar words like train* to find trainer, 
training etc. 
Used '?' symbol for multiple ways of spelling a word e.g. judg?ment 
When all of key word searches done, ticked all boxes and 'or' to 
combine all data sets. 
This resulted in 3 main data sets. 
Combined the 3 data sets into 1 final large data set to look through 
using 'and' function. 
Articles limited to English language only. 
Spot checked first few pages to check the suitability of search 
terms. 
8.1.2. Other databases 
Search features in other databases not as advanced as OVID, key 
words typed in like an equation in the following databases; 
Cochrane library (from earliest date to My 2010) 
Web of Science (from 1898-May 2010) 
Cambridge Scientific Abstracts (1900-May 2010) 
ERIC (from 1966-May 2010) 
Key words inserted into each database as follows; 
intervention* or teach* or train* or educate* or guide* or clerkship 
or internship or facilitat* or aid* or enhanc*or develop* or evaluat* 
or medical education 
and 
doctor* or physician* or clinician* or medic* or trainee* or 
postgraduate* or undergraduate* or general practitioner* or GP* or 
intern* or resident* 
and 
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decision making* or judg?ment* or clinical reasoning or medical 
reasoning or critical thinking or problem solving 
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8.2. Data extraction form 
Study ID ___ _ 
Details of study 
Author(s) ________ _ 
Title ______________________________________________ __ 
Reference ________________________________________________ _ 
Country of origin _______ _ 
D Full paper D Abstract/ summary only 
Aim of study 
Fill in with au thors words 
Discussion of 'good' metacognitive skills (i.e. what makes good 
decision making) 
o Yes D No 
210 
Details 
Theory used 
D 
D 
D 
None 
Medical Education 
Economics 
APPENDCIES 
D 
D 
Psychology 
D Mathematics 
Other 
Details ________________________ _ 
Design 
Fill in with authors words 
Sampling method 
D Convenience / opportunistic D Purposive 
D Random D Volunteer 
D All class/year D Not stated 
D Other (state) 
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Sample size 
Numbers participated 
D Total 
D Control group 
D 
D 
Numbers participated to completion 
D Intervention group D 
Intervention group 
Attrition (participants lost) 
Control group 
Other details. _______________________ _ 
Other sample characteristics 
select all that apply 
D Medical undergraduates Stage a/training (state) ____ _ 
D Doctors D Other professionals 
Position/ speciality 
~tat~ ____ --____ ------------------
Other details 
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Intervention 
Type 
o Metacognition (teaching how people think) 
o Expert heuristic (decision aids- teaching PBL, 
guidelines, decision analysis) 
o Other 
Further details 
Setting 
o 
o 
o 
University 
Hospital 
Not stated 
Integration of intervention 
o 
o 
D 
D Integrated into medical course 
Primary care 
Laboratory 
Other (state) 
D Integrated into behavioural sciences course 
D Isolated/one off 
D Unclear 
Participants'task 
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Measures 
Patient management - specific 
D 
D 
Diagnosis 
History taking 
Metacognitive skills - general 
D 
D 
D 
Decision making 
Judgement 
Critical thinking 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Treatment plan/ prescribing 
D Skills acquisition 
Reasoning 
Problem solving 
Other (details) 
Validity and reliabllity of measures 
Measurement type (e.g. Description (e.g. diagnostic Valid/established? 
questionnaire, process thinking inventory) 
tracing, observation) 
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Timing of measurement (select all that apply) 
D 
D 
Before intervention only D 
After intervention only D 
Further comments 
Results 
During intervention 
Before and after intervention 
Effective training? (As stated by authors) 
D Yes D Significant 
0 Non -significant 
D Mix of significant / 
non-significant 
0 Unclear 
0 N/A 
0 No 
Summary of conclusions 
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Assessing quality of study 
Yes = 2 Unclear = 1 No = 0 Nj A = Omit from total score 
Theory Yes Unclear No N/A 
Referred to in introduction and discussion 
Operationlised 
Evaluated 
Scientific rigour Yes Unclear No N/A 
Clear aims 
Aims are meaningful/justified 
Appropriate sample used 
Appropriate comparator (similar groups) 
Mostly validated/established measures 
Measures used at appropriate times 
Coherence of study Yes Unclear No N/A 
Appropriate method for aims 
Appropriate measures 
Meaningful results 
Conclusion is consistent with results 
Generalisability Yes Unclear No N/A 
Sample is representative of study population 
(i.e. represents who they claim intervention is 
aimed at) 
limitations acknowledged 
Further details 
Total quality score 
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S.3. Ethical approval for questionnaire study 
From: 
To: 
Cc: 
Darren Shickle 
Vikram Jha 
Hilary Bekker; Leila Mehdizadeh; 
Deborah Murdoch-Eaton 
Date: 24 September 2009 15:25:11 
RE: Ethics Subject: 
Dear Vikram, 
Normally I would say that this would fine and would treat it as though 
Deborah has taken chair's action on behalf of EdREC to say that 
ethics review was not required. However, given that this is for Leila's 
PhD, we would need to make sure that an examiner doesn't cause 
problems down the line. Thus if Leila would like extra reassurance, we 
could do a formal review if she wanted to complete the ethics 
application form. Alternatively I have re-read the protocol and 
questionnaire that you sent me, and I do not see anything ethically 
problematic. In particular, I have considered the following: 
The introduction to the questionnaire explains the purpose and 
together with the act of completion and return infers informed 
consent. 
The questionnaire is anonymous, although if returned bye-mail, 
could allow the questionnaire to be identified, but I assume that no 
identifying information will be transferred to the questionnaire. 
I am also assuming that members of the distribution list will have 
given implied consent to receive questionnaires in this way ie it 
happens on a regular basis. 
The subject of the questionnaire is not sensitive. 
On this basis I am happy to take chair's action on behalf of the 
Medicine and Health Faculty Research Ethics Committee to approve 
Leila's research. She should retain this e-mail as proof of this 
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decision, although of course she can still submit an ethics application 
if she wants additional evidence. 
Regards 
Darren 
Professor Darren Shickle 
Head of the Academic Unit of Public Health 
Institute of Health Sciences 
University of Leeds 
Room G.30 
Charles Thackrah Building 
lO 1 Clarendon Road 
Leeds LS2 9W 
Telephone: +44 1133437213 
Fax: +44 1133436997 
E-mail: d.shickle@leeds.ac.uk 
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8.4. Cover letter from supervisor for questionnaire 
study 
From: 
Sent: 
To: 
Subject: 
Dear All 
Evidence Based Shared Decision Making 
[mailto:SHARED-L@LIST.MSU.EDU] On Behalf Of 
Hilary Bekker 
Tuesday, October 27, 2009 12:49 PM 
SHARED-L@LIST.MSU.EDU 
for teachers of medical decision making 
Re: a very short questionnaire. 
One of my PhD students, Leila Mehdizadeh, is carrying out a survey 
to find out what type of training doctors / medical students are 
receiving about medical decision making. The survey is building on 
Arthur Elstein's survey from 20 years ago. 
If you have taught or are teaching doctors about some aspect of 
medical decision making, Leila would be grateful if you would 
complete the attached survey. If you know of a colleague who is 
involved, please forward the email to them. 
Please respond directly to Leila's at psc31m@leeds.ac.uk; Or Leila 
Mehdizadeh, room G.02, Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, Charles 
Thackrah Building, University of Leeds, 101 Clarendon Road, Leeds 
LS2 9W, United Kingdom 
Thank you in anticipation of your help 
Hilary 
Dr Hilary L Bekker 
Chartered Health Psychologist 
Senior Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences 
Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, Faculty of Medicine and Health, University of Leeds 
Charles Thackrah Building - Room 1.10, 101 Clarendon Road, Leeds LS2 9 W 
Tel: +44 (0) 1133432726 
Email: h.l.bekker({/I(.(.ds.ac . uk 
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/lihs/psychiauy/staff/bekker.htm 
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8.5. Medical decision making questionnaire 
TEACHING DOCTORS ABOUT MEDICAL DECISION MAKING: A 
BRIEF SURVEY 
Please complete this survey if you have taught doctors about an 
aspect of medical decision making; either courses designed for doctors 
to help improve their decision making skills and/or those of their 
patients. As no gold standard has been suggested to guide educators' 
medical decision making programmes, I am asking for your 
experiences and views about the necessary component parts for a 
medical decision making course. 
The survey is part of my PhD investigating courses designed to 
teach doctors about medical decision making. I am supervised by Dr 
Hilary Bekker (Leeds Institute of Health Sciences) and Drs Vikram 
Jha and Naomi Quinton (Leeds Institute of Medical Education). Thank 
you for your help, Leila Mehdizadeh (psc31m@leeds.ac.uk). 
1. For which organisations do you (or have) deliver a medical decision 
making course? (tick all that apply) 
Organisation Please list their affiliation (Leeds Uni, hospital trust, RCOG, FIMDM, etc) 
University 
Medical Professional Body 
Conferences 
Public Health Facility 
Private Health Facility 
Other (please state) 
2. How have you delivered the medical decision making course(s)? (tick 
all that apply) 
A half-day specialist session A short 1-2 day specialist course 1 
Part of a module on a broader topic As a module on decision making 1 
Other (please state) 
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3. What is the focus of your medical decision making coursers)? (tick all 
that apply) 
Helping doctors to make better clinical Helping doctors to develop some 
decisions general awareness of decision making 
(meta cognition) 
Helping doctors to make better team Helping doctors' skills in patient-centred 
decisions care or shared decision making 
Informing doctors about social sciences 
Other (please state) 
4. What theoretical perspectives do you draw on during your teaching 
of the coursers)? (tick all that apply) 
Classical! normative/ rational decision Descriptive information processing 
theories theories 
Expert models of clinical decision Heuristics and biases/ framing 
making/naturalistic theories 
Self regulation theories Social cognition models 
None 
Other (please state) 
5. What applications do you refer to during your teaching of the 
coursers)? (tick all that apply): 
Decision analysis Other algorithms 
Conjoint analysis Smart heuristics 
Patient decision aids Utility elicitation methods 
Risk presentation Bayes' Theorem 
Other (please list) 
6. Is the effectiveness of the decision making part of the coursers) 
explicitly evaluated? (tick one response) 
I Yes I No 
7. What do you think should be included in a medical decision making 
course? (tick all that apply) 
Clinical reasoning strategies (e.g. Heuristics and overcoming bias 
hypothetico-deductive method, pattern 
recognition) 
Risk Perception Probabilities (e.g. likelihood ratios, 
pre/post test probabilities of disease) 
Diagnostic test accuracy (sensitivity, Decision analysis 
specificity) 
Cost-effectiveness analysis Clinical practice gUidelines 
Decision aids 
Other (please list) 
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8. What method is most useful for teaching medical decision making? 
(tick all that apply) 
Paper based clinical scenarios Computerised clinical scenarios 
High-fidelity simulation (manikins) Standardised patients/actors 
Real patient care experience (e.g. clinics, Erroneous clinical examples 
ward rounds) 
Anecdotes of doctors 
Other (please list) 
9. How much do you agree with the following statements about how 
and when to teach medical decision making? (tick one response for 
each statement) 
Not Possibly Very 
relevant relevant relevant 
Integrated with social sciences courses in 
undergraduate training 
Integrated into communication skills courses in 
undergraduate training 
Integrated with clinical attachment in undergraduate 
training 
An optional specialist topic in undergraduate 
training 
Integrated into professional training post first 
degree 
An optional component in continuing professional 
development portfolios 
A work based learning activity 
10. How much do you agree with the following statements about their 
assessment and impact? (tick one response for each statement) 
Not Possibly Very 
relevant relevant relevant 
Doctors' decision making should be assessed in the 
workforce 
Formal decision making training will increase 
patient safety 
It is unlikely formal decision making training will 
gain wide support in medical education 
11. What advice do you have about medical decision making training 
for other educators? 
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Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. 
Please return the completed questionnaire to the box at the 
conference reception desk or post by the 2nd November to; Leila 
Mehdizadeh room G.02 Leeds Institute of Health Sciences, 
Charles Thackrah Building, University of Leeds, 101 Clarendon 
Road, Leeds LS2 9LJ, United Kingdom 
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8.6. NBS ethical approval for interview study 
,.'l:kj 
National Research Ethics Service 
1 April 2009 
Ms Leila Mehdizadeh 
PhD Research Student 
Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
RoomG.02 
Charles Thackrah Building 
101 Clarendon Road 
LS29U 
Dear Ms Mehdizadeh 
Leeds (East) Research Ethics Committee 
Room 5.2, Clnical Sciences Building 
St J8I1le8'S University Hospital 
Beckett Street 
Leeds 
LS97TF 
Telephone: 0113 2065652 
Facsknle:01132066772 
Full title of study: Clinicians' Views on Effective Clinical Decision Making: 
REC reference number: 
An Interview Study 
09lH1306111 
Thank you for your letter of 25 March 2009, responding to the Committee's request for 
furtt1er information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair. 
Connrmation of ethical opinion 
On behalf of the Committee. I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research on the basis desaibed in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation as revised. subject to the conditions specified below. 
Ethical review of research sit •• 
The Committee has designated this study as exempt from site-specific assessment (SSA). 
The favourable opinion for the study applies to all sites involved in the research. There is no 
requirement for other Local Research Ethics Committees to be infOrmed or SSA to be 
carried out at each site. 
CondHions of the favounlble opinion 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of 
the study, 
Management permissjon or apPrOval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to 
the start of the study at the site concerned. 
Management permission at NHS sites iR&D approvar') should be obtained from the 
relevant care organisation(s) in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System or at hHp:/Iwww.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
This It_arch Ethia Comm~ i~ an 1Idvis«y <ommittee TO Yorkshir~ and Ihe HIMTIMI Strategic ~"th Authority 
TIw! NatioNI ~arr;h Ethics SefYir:~ (NRES) -.prnents tM NItES DifPCtorarrr within 
~ NatiOnal ".t;'", Safety A9t'ncy and IIftt1arr:h Ethics ComnllttHS in fngl.nd 
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Approved documents 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
Document Vsmion Date 
Interview Schedules/Topic Guides 2 06 February 2009 
Compensation Arrangements 02 October 2008 
letter from Sponsor 06 February 2009 
Protocol 1 06 February 2009 
Investigator CV 06 February 2009 
Application 06 February 2009 
CV for Dr Bekker 
Response to Request for Further Information 25 March 2009 
Participant Consent Form 2.0 23 March 2009 
Participant Information Sheet 4.0 23 March 2009 
Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
After ethical review 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National Research 
Ethics Website> After Review 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure. If you wish to make your views 
known please use the feedback form available on the website. 
The attached document "After ethical review -guidance for researchersR gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, induding: 
• Notifying substantial amendments 
• Progress and safety reports 
• Notifying the end of the study 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics. which is updated in the light of 
changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to Improve our 
service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegrouD@nres.npsa,nhs.uk. 
109/H1308/11 Please quota this number on all correspondence 
This R_arch Ethi(\ Committfe i, an advisory committee to Yorkshire and 'The Humber Strategic Health Authority 
The National ReIf!arch Ethks St1rvicf! (NRES) ,.epr~ents the NRES DI~ctofatf! within 
thl! National Patient Safety Agency and ResNFCh Ethics Committees in Englancl. 
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With the Committee's best wishes for the success of this project 
Yours sincerely 
/lvy \ -•.... '~") 
( Dr John Holmes 
Chair 
Email: ann.tunley@leedsth.nhs.uk 
Enclosures: "After ethical review - guidance for researchers" 
Copy to: Ms Rachel De Souza, University of Leeds 
R&D Department, Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust 
This Rl!Search Ethics Committee is an Idvisory committee to Yorkshire ilnd The Humber Strategic Health Authority 
The National Re5f/arch Ethics S.rvice (NRES) represents the NRES OifPCtOrate within 
the National Pilfient Safety Agency ilnd ResNrch Erhio Committees in Engt.nd. 
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The Leeds Teaching Hospitals fi!l:fl 
NilS Trust 
01/06/2009 
Ms Leila Mehdizadeh 
Research 8r Development 
Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust 
34 Hyde Terrace 
Leeds 
LS29LN 
Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
Room G.02 Charles Thackrah Building 
101 Clarendon Road 
Tel: 0113 392 2878 
Fax: 0113 392 6397 
Leeds 
LS29LJ 
r&dCleedsth.nhs.uk 
www.leedsteachinghospitals.com 
Dear Ms Leila Mehdizadeh 
Re: lTHT R&D Approval of: Clinicians Views on Effective Clinical Decision 
Making: An Interview Study 
l THT R&D Number: Ul0918927 
MREC: 09/H1306/11 
I confirm that this study has R&D approval and the study may proceed at The Leeds 
Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust (L THT). This organisational level approval is given 
based on the information provided in the documents listed below. 
In undertaking this research you must comply with the requirements of the Research 
Governance Framework for Health and Social Care which is mandatory for all NHS 
employees. This document may be accessed on the R&D website 
http://www.leedsth.nhs.uklsites/research and development! 
R&D approval is given on the understanding that you comply with the reqUirements 
of the Framework as listed in the attached sheet "Conditions of Approval". 
If you have any queries about this approval please do not hesitate to contact the 
R&D Department on telephone 0113 39~. 2878. 
Indemnity Arrangements 
The Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust participates in the NHS risk pooling 
scheme administered by the NHS Litigation Authority 'Clinical Negligence Scheme 
for NHS Trusts' for: (i) medical professional and/or medical malpractice liability; and 
(ii) general liability. NHS Indemnity for negligent harm is extended to researchers 
with an employment contract (substantive or honorary) with the Trust. The Trust 
only accepts liability for research activity that has been managerially approved by the 
R&D Department. 
Chilirman Martin Buckley Chipf Executive M~ggle Boylp 
The Lf!I'!h Tf'iIChing Hlnpitllls incorporating: Chapel Allerton Hospital Leed~ Dental Institute Seacroft Hospital 
5t James's LlniIlPl'ilty Hospital The General Infirmary at Leeds Wharfedalp Hospital 
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The Trust therefore accepts liability for the above research project and extends 
indemnity for negligent harm to cover you as principal investigator and the 
researchers listed on the Site Specific Information form. Should there be any 
changes to the research team please ensure that you inform the R&D Department 
and that s/he obtains an employment contract with the Trust if required. 
Yours sincerely 
Approved documents 
The documents reviewed and approved are listed as follows 
Document Version Date of document 
NHS R&D Form 2.0 
SSIForm 2.0 21/04/09 
Protocol 1.0 06102109 
REC Letter confirming favourable opinion 01/04/09 
Evidence of Insurance 02/10/08 
Sponsor Letter 06102109 
Patient information sheet (LREC Approved) 4.0 23103109 
Consent form (LREC Approved) 2.0 23/03/09 
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NHS Bradford and Airedale 
'.·/Iki 
Bradford and Airedale 
Research management and governance support team 
Clinical Quality 
Level 2 
Douglas Mill, Bowling Old Lane 
Bradford 805 7 JR 
OurRef:/IRMG/ApprovallapprovaUetter _ version_3 
Monday, 8th June 2009 
Ms Lelia Mehdizadeh 
23 Kingswear Garth 
Whitkirit 
Leeds 
LS158lS 
Re: Clinicians Views on Effective Clinical Decision making: An 
Interview Study 
Thank you for your recent submission to NHS Bradford and Airedale research 
management and governance support team. 
Following consideration of your submission I am pleased to confirm that research 
management and governance approval has been granted by NHS Bradford and 
Airedale for the above research to take place as described in your completed 
application and accompanying documentation. 
Conditione of approval 
You should be aware that approval is granted subject to the conditions specified 
below: 
• Throughout the course of the study, all research activity should comply with 
relevant, current governance and regulatory requirements Including (but not 
limited to) 
o The Research Governance Framework for Health and Social Care, ~ 
Ed (2005) 
o The Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations (2004) and 
subsequent amendments 
o The Mental Capacity Act (2005) 
o The Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) (Amendment) Regulations 
(2006) 
o The Medical Devices Regulations (2002) (Statutory Instrument 
20021618) 
o The Human Tissue Act (2004) 
o The Data Protection Act (1998) 
Q:lClinical Qual~ & Govemance\Cllnical 
aualty\Re5flllrch\Research_UanagemenCGovemance_May_2OO&\Approveis\09_ 10\Appr0vall_a1_Apr_Jul_09\001 
_ 19_06_09_0000_Mehdizadeh.doc 
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,.'llk1 
Bradford and Airedale 
• Consent for NHS Bradford and Airedale to audit your project, which Is Implicit 
in your acceptance of approval. 
• Where any amendments. substantial or non substantial are made throughout 
the course of the study these should be notified to NHS Bradford and Airedale 
on the relevant form (available from htto:llmyresearchproject.org) 
• A copy of the final study report should be forwarded to NHS Bradford and 
Airedale on the relevant form (available from htto:llmvresearchproject.org) no 
later than 3 months following study completion 
• Should any serious adverse event(s) occur throughout the course of the study 
these should be notified to NHS Bradford and Airedale using the contact 
details set out above 
Should you require any clarification regarding any of the points raised above, or have 
any further queries in retation to approvals and post approval study management 
process then please do not hesitate to contact me on 01274 237397. 
Finally. may I take this opportunity to wish you well with your study and look forward 
to hearing about your progress in due course. 
Us Claire Seymour 
Head of Quality Development 
NHS Bradford and Airedale NHS Bradford and Airedale 
Encs. 
cc: 
Ms Anna Frearson NHSLeeds 
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8.7. Study information sheet 
DOCTORS' VIEWS ABOUT MAKING CLINICAL DECISIONS 
EFFECTIVELY: AN INTERVIEW STUDY 
Introduction 
Making clinical decisions well is a key aspect of doctor's everyday 
practice. Little is known about how doctors learn to make clinical 
decisions well. This study asks doctors for their views and perceptions 
about what enhances clinical decision making. The study is being 
carried out by Leila Mehdizadeh, a doctoral student at the University 
of Leeds supervised jointly between the Leeds Institutes of Health 
Sciences (LIHS) and Medical Education (LIME). 
Why am I beiDg contacted? 
Doctors working at the Leeds Teaching Hospitals or Leeds Primary 
Care Trust are being invited to take part in the study. This study is an 
interview study, requiring a sample of about 20 doctors. We would 
like this sample to include doctors at different stages in their careers 
from different specialties to make sure a range of views and 
experiences about clinical decision making are represented in the 
interviews. 
What does the study involve? 
If you agree to take part, Leila will arrange to meet with you to talk 
about your views and experiences of making decisions. Leila is happy 
to meet with you at your workplace; the interview lasts about 30 
minutes. The interviews will be digitally recorded to ensure your views 
are accurately represented. There are no right and wrong answers to 
the questions Leila will ask you. It is your views and experiences that 
are important. 
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What happens to the interview data? 
A third party will transcribe the digital recordings, making sure the 
resulting transcript is anonymised, i.e. your name will be replaced by 
a study identification number. Leila will use the anonymised paper 
and electronic versions of these transcripts when analysing their 
content. The content of your interview will be analysed together with 
those from other study participants. Anonymised quotes from these 
combined analyses will be used in the study results and disseminated 
via her thesis, pUblication and conference presentations. 
Confidentiality and anonymity 
Your identity will be anonymised so that no one can recognise you 
from the interview. The data from the interviews are confidential. The 
study materials will be stored in a locked flling cabinet in Leila's office 
in LIHS. Any electronic versions of the data will be erased when Leila 
completes her doctoral studies. The person transcribing the 
recordings will erase any versions of the recordings and transcripts on 
their computers after the interview is transcribed. 
Is participation voluntary? 
Yes, it is entirely your choice whether you participate or not. If you 
participate in the study, you can choose not to talk about an issue 
raised during the interview or you can withdraw from the study at any 
time without giving a reason. 
What happens next? 
If you would like more details about this study and/or are interested 
in participating then please contact Leila Mehdizadeh either via her 
email (psc31rn@leeds.ac.uk). mobile phone (07765 911305) or 
address (Leeds Institute of Health Sciences; Charles Thackrah 
Building - room G.02; University of Leeds; 101 Clarendon Road; Leeds 
LS29W). 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
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Dr Hilary Bekker Senior Lecturer in Behavioural Sciences; LIHS 
Dr Vikram Jha Consultant Obstetrician and Senior Lecturer in 
Medical Education; LIME 
Dr Naomi Quinton Lecturer in medical Education; LIME 
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8.8. Consent form 
Title of Project: Doctors' views about making clinical decisions 
effectively: an interview study 
Name of Researcher: Leila Mehdizadeh 
Please initial box 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
dated 23/03/09 (version 4.0) for the above study. I have had the 
opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. D 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I can terminate 
the interview and/or withdraw from the study at any time without 
giving a reason, without my work or legal rights being affected. D 
3. I permit the researcher to audio-record the interview and use 
anonymised extracts of data when reporting the study. D 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. D 
Nameofparticipant ________________________________________ _ 
Date __________________________________________________ ___ 
Signature ________________________________________________ __ 
Name of person taking consent. _______________________________ _ 
Date _____________________________________________________ _ 
Signature 
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8.9. Interview schedule 
Preliminary 
On a typical day what problems do your patients present with? In 
which situations do you feel you are making decisions about their 
care? 
Main body; Examples from clinical practice 
What do you find challenging when managing patients? 
Can you think of an example of a patient who had a bad outcome 
but you felt comfortable with your clinical judgment. 
Can you think of an example of a patient who had a good outcome 
but you felt uncomfortable with an aspect of your clinical 
judgment. 
What did you learn from that? 
Are there any examples of when you would have made a decision 
differently? 
Are there examples of valuable learning experiences from 
colleagues that helped improve your clinical judgement? 
Examples from formal teaching 
Are there examples that stand out from your formal teaching that 
helped improve your clinical judgement (lecture, article, book) 
(How do you think doctors learn to be competent decision 
makers)? 
Is there anything at the place of work you think affects your 
decision making? 
(situation, experience, personal values, something about the 
patient, working in a team vs alone, NHS budget) 
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8.10. Coding frame of themes and categories 
Theme 1: Theme 2: Theme 3: Theme 4: ThemeS: Theme 6: Factors Factors Making Novice to Professional Developing influencing influencing decisions expert practice decision judgements decisions making skills 
2.1 Patient non-
clinical factors 5.1 Relationships 6.1 Clinical (d-p at work (doctor-
experience 1.1 Patient's relationship,pers patient, SDM, 
appearance/beh onality, 3.1 Intuition 4.1 Doctor is colleagues (practise skills on 
aviour behaviour, prefer expert priorities,disagre manikins and 
ences, events, ement,detachme real patients,on 
beliefs,emotions, nt) job). 
relatives) 
1.2 Information 2.2 Patient 3.2 Problem 5.2 Quality of 6.2 Colleagues 
care (conseious (amount, source clinical factors solving 
4.2 Ideal vs effort,satisfactio (observing, role, 
of (condition (systematic 
reality n,equal models,anecdote information/opin type,lifestyle,hist thinking, filtering 
standard,compas s,diseussion,feed ions of others) ory,co-morb) information) 
sion) back,supervision) 
6.3 Acquiring 
2.3 Doctor 5.3 Bad theoretical 
factors outcomes knowledge 
1.3 Condition 
(prefs,limitations 3.3 Pattern 
4.3 Seeking help (inevitable, (formal 
,personality,emo recognition mistakes, teaching,applied 
tion,experience) rectifying assessments,see 
mistake) narios,online,per 
sanal study) 
4.4 Experience of 5.4 Safe practice 
being doctor (safety netting, 1.4 cautious 
Consequences 
2.4 Workplace (supervision,diffi practices e.g. 6.4 Professional factors cufty, thinking (risk,importance, (time,daY,colieag 3.4 Habit style, change in asking norms (accepted 
urgency, ethical 
ues,logistics,peer cu Iture over colleagues, clear procedures, 
implications,peer pressure) time, peer instructions to ABC,guidelines) 
pressure) pressure,uncertai patients, 
n) multiple 
treatments) 
5.5 Reflective 
3.5 Information practice 
gathering 4.5 Transition (awareness of 
2.5 Other (patient records, phase decision process, 6.5 Mistakes ( or 
1.5 Other (complexity, memory, (reflections of good/bad emotional 
multiple factors) questioning, seniors, difficufty outcomes, experiences) 
observations, doctors' 
examination, for novices) limitations, 
investigations). justifying 
reasoni~ 
3.6 Strategies 
(prioritising, forw 
ard 
4.6 Other 5.6 Other 6.6 Other planning,negotia 
ting,guidelines,co 
IIeagues) 
3.7 Other 
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8.11. Demographic information of interview sample 
Participant Current Academic Gender clinical Seniority level Educator role 
number 
specialty role 
2 Male 
General Experienced 23 No Yes Practice years 
3 Male 
General Experienced Yes Yes Practice 18 years 
Female General Middle grade 4 Yes Yes 4 practice years 
5 Male Oncology FY2 Yes Yes 
6 Male Paediatric Junior registrar No No 
surgery (STl) 
7 Female 
Obstetrics and 
Gynaecology Senior registrar No Yes 
8 Male 
Paediatric 
medicine Consultant No Yes 
9 Male 
Renal 
medicine Consultant Yes Yes 
10 Female Anaesthetics Consultant Yes Yes 
Male 
Adult Consultant 11 Psychiatry Yes Yes 
stn year 
12 Female N/A Undergraduate No No 
student 
stn year 
13 Female N/A Undergraduate No No 
student 
4tn year 
14 Male N/A Undergraduate No No 
student 
15 Female 
Acute general 
FYl No No 
medicine 
16 Female 
Vascular Junior registrar 
No No 
surgery (STl) 
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8.12. EdREC ethical approval for quasi-experiment 
Faculty of Medicine and Health 
~0IfIce 
Rocm 10. I 10. I eve! 10 
Wr.<J"", BlJlldl",,! 
Clore-'om W<JY 
LCt.'Cls LS2 9N L 11 
; iGcner~ FnqlJlriP.<;j +44 (0) 113343411)1 
F -44 (0) 113 343 4,]1 UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS 
Ms Leila Mehdizadeh 
Leeds Institute of health Sciences 
Room G.02, Charles Thackrah Building 
University of Leeds 
101 Clarendon Road 
LEEDS LS2 9LJ 
29th June 2010 
Dear Leila 
Re: EDREC/091016 
TItle: EnhancIng Medical Students' Aw.ren ... of Deer-Ion M.klng: A Pilot 
Experimental Study 
I am pleased to inform you that the amendment for the above research application has been 
reviewed by the EdREC committee and following receipt of evidence of permissions 
requested, I can confirm a favourable ethical opinion. 
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any further amendments to the original 
research as submitted at date of this approval prior to implementation. 
I wish you every success with the project. 
Yours sincerely 
Professor Deborah Murdoch-Eaton 
Chair, EdREC 
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8.13. Study information sheet 
INFORMATION SHEET 
Study title: Enhancing doctors' awareness of decision making: a pilot 
experimental study 
Researchers: Leila Mehdizadeh, Hilary Bekker, Vikram Jha, Naomi 
Quinton 
1. What is the purpose of this study? 
Making clinical decisions well is a key aspect of doctor's everyday 
practice. Despite this, there is limited research evidence on how to 
help doctors acquire good clinical decision making skills. There is 
also little formal decision making training 10 the current 
undergraduate curriculum. The purpose of this study is to determine 
whether a short online tutorial is enough to 1) enhance doctors' 
awareness of people's decision making and 2) improve their decision 
making skills. 
This experimental online study is being carried out by Leila 
Mehdizadeh, a PhD student at the University of Leeds supervised 
jointly between the Leeds Institutes of Health Sciences (LIHS) and 
Medical Education (LIME). 
Students who are taking postgraduate courses within the School of 
Medicine and are also qualified medical doctors are being invited to 
take part in the study. 
2. Do I have to take part? 
It is entirely your choice whether you participate or not. If you 
participate, you can choose to withdraw from the study at any time 
without giving a reason. If you do not participate, then this has no 
impact on your studies. 
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3. How do I complete the study? 
The study is completed online, as long as you have access to a 
computer with internet then you can participate from a location of 
your choice. You will be asked to complete a series of short tasks at 
your own pace, but the study is not expected to take longer than 15 
minutes in total. Instructions will appear on screen to guide you 
throughout the study. The study includes 1) a decision making 
questionnaire based on four clinical scenarios 2) a short tutorial on 
how people make decisions and 3) an evaluation questionnaire. 
4. Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes, the data you provide will remain confidential and strictly for 
research purposes only. Participants' data will be stored in 
anonymous files on password protected computers that only Leila has 
access to. Your identity will remain anonymous at all times. 
5. What's in it for me? 
All participants will be entered in to a prize draw with the chance to 
win a leisure voucher. Leisure vouchers can be used in a large range 
of shops, restaurants, gyms and attractions (e.g. HMV, Waterstones, 
Pizza Hut, Alton Towers, Madame Tussauds, London Eye). After the 
study's closing date has passed, three people will be selected at 
random to each win a voucher. First prize will be a voucher of £20, 
second prize £10 and third prize £5. 
As a doctor you will have to make many clinical decisions so you 
need to be confident that you make decisions in the best way possible. 
This study should help you develop an awareness of i) the importance 
of decision making as a key clinical skill and ii) how doctors make 
decisions in practice. Other anticipated benefits are that you reflect 
more on your own decision making and learn to make better decisions 
in practice. You might also find the tasks and tutorial interesting. 
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6. Results of the study? 
The data will be discussed with Leila's supervisors but at no point will 
your identity be divulged. The study results will be disseminated via 
her PhD thesis, conference presentations and publication. 
7. Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the University's Medicine and 
Dentistry Educational Research Ethics Committee (EdREC). 
8. Consent 
Participants are required to complete the 'informed consent' section 
shown after this information in order to proceed with the study. This 
is to confirm that you understand what the study involves and that 
you can withdraw at any point. 
9. Contact details for further information: 
If you would like more details about this study then please contact 
Leila Mehdizadeh either via her email (psc31m@leeds.ac.uk). or 
address (Leeds Institute of Health Sciences; Charles Thackrah 
Building - room G.02; University of Leeds; 101 Clarendon Road; Leeds 
LS29W). 
10. Closing date of study 
The study is open for participation until 30th June 2010. After this 
date the study will close and thereafter the winners of the prize draw 
will be contacted 
INFORMED CONSENT (completed online) 
Before you can begin the study, you are required to complete the 
following section that confirms you agree to take part. You cannot 
proceed without completing aU of the information below. 
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Title or Project: Enhancing doctors' awareness of decision making: B: 
pilot experimental study 
Principle Researcher: Leila Mehdizadeh 
Please select 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet. D 
2. I confirm that I have had the opportunity to ask questions. D 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time without giving a reason. D 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. D 
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8 . 14 . Tutorial PowerPoint slides 
Slide 1 
Slide 2 
Introduction 
• The following presentation is a short tutorial that 
introduces you to the way people make decisions. 
• We are not usually aware of how we make decisions. 
• That is, we are not conscious of the steps we take to 
reach a decision. 
• As a doctor, making decisions is a large part of your job. 
• Understanding the processes we use to reach decisions 
should help improve your clinical judgements. 
• To get the most out of the tutorial, give yourself at least 5 
minutes to work through the slides. 
1~ e . 
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How Do We Make 
Decisions? 
Slide 3 
Slide 4 
Slide 5 
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Aim & Learning Objectives 
Aim: To enhance your awareness of how people make 
decisions. 
Learning objectives: 
• To understand that people generally make decisions in 
the same way as each other; 
• To understand how decisions are made using a heuristic 
and/or systematic strategy; 
• To understand the advantages and disadvantages of the 
heuristic and systematic strategy when making 
decisions; 
• To be able to identify whether decisions have been 
made using a heuristic strategy or systematic strategy. 
• Everyone tends to make decisions in the same way. 
• Just as the human heart, kidneys, or lungs function in 
the same way from person to person, so does the brain. 
• The brain has a given infrastructure that makes sense of 
information "out there". 
• Actively making sense of information is known as 
Information Processing. 
• Most of the time we are not aware of how we process 
information because it happens SUb-consciously. 
• We make our decisions based on the information we 
have processed and not on the full information that is 
available "out there". 
Selecting Information 
• We are always solving 
problems and ma ing 
decisions. 
But there is so much complex 
information 'out there' that we 
do not process all of ~ when 
making a decision. 
• The brain has a IimHed 
capacity to process information 
consciously . 
The bra in has ways of 
reducing what information we 
attend 10, either based on our 
(1N(l experiences or external 
cues. 
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Slide 6 
Slide 7 
Slide 8 
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Two Methods of Decision Making 
o heuristic 8 systematic 
We all use two strategies to reach a decision; 
o Heuristic strategy: Decisions are based on a subset of 
information using mental shortcuts. 
6 Systematic strategy: Decisions are based on all the 
known options and weighing up the advantages and 
disadvantages of their consequences. 
Heuristic Strategy: 
Taking Shortcuts 
Heuristics are simple rules of 
thumb that help us take shortcuts 
when we want to make 
judgements or decisions. 
For example, if you were asked if 
a baby was a boy or girl and it was 
dressed in pink, you would be 
likely to say "girl". 
Or when choosing a new camera 
you might buy the one 
recommended to you by a trusted 
friend rather than spend time 
searching for the latest model or 
best value for money. 
We make most of our decisions 
using heuristic methods. 
Heuristic strategies are quick and 
enables us to make decisions 
without much (if any) conscious 
effort. 
TM ___ .. _ 
oI, ~,,&.W M-..'onb 
_ ... _"""''''''".... 
• qgct .. ""'*on"'''~ 
Heuristics and Clinical Decisions 
Doctors and patients use a type of 
experl heuristic to understand 
infonnation and make decisions. 
You wi experience lots of cfnicat 
scenanos that enable you to make 
quick and correct decISIOns. 
For example, you win be taught to 
at.Nays consider pre-eclampsia 
when a pregnant woman feels 
breathless and other 'worst case 
scenanos'. 
Or, you will foUow the advice of a 
more expenenced coIeague if you 
are unsure of which type of 
treatment to give a pabent. 
These are known as 
smart heuristics because they 
usuany lead to correct deciSions III • '.,.In 'TlO r>{ .Gl~EJj-lll 
an econormcal way. .$I«lt!T CJJT (l 1Q(, ~Il»t)" 
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Disadvantage of Shortcuts 
·Heuns!ics will often help you make good 
dil1lcal decisions. 
·But using heunstics means you don't 
analyse details of information, so you are 
more likely to make a mistake. 
{lur judgements can be biased by the 
external and Internal cues we use to focus 
our aHenbon. 
'Intemal cues are factors such as our 
beliefs, prejudices, experiences and 
habits. 
·For example, diagnostic decisions can 
be influenced by a doctor's beliefs 
about a pabent e.g. 'she's a 
hyPOChondriac there is nothing wrong 
with her' or past experiences tell us that 
'young and fit peOple don't have heart 
·Examples of external cues of a slluation are attacks'. Doctors also develop habrts 
bme pressure, time of day or the person that such as a set of preferred drugs they 
gives infO!TTlation. always prescribe to patients. 
'A doctor is more willing to ad on a • These external and internal cues 
colleague's opinion ff there is no time to find innuence the shortcuts we use to make 
out the correct answer for himsenlhersen. Judgements. 
Or. a treatment decision can be more 
influenced by the free gffts from a sales • The disadvantage is that we use 
representative Instead of an evaluation of shortcuts without questioning their 
the eVidence. ,--__ ~ippropriateness wihich can lead to 
nw.".mtlwngNlItt:wf 
.. dtxtori tN/llNtt 
dtctIJCtI.~by" 
dN9~lwa .. 
ThII. ,.tMbnlwtlyfo 
...... cMald«IMon/ 
==: i correct judgements and decisions. 
Systematic Strategy: The Longer 
Way Round 
Systematic strategies requ~e 
conscious aHention to the details of the 
options. 
It is a thorough evaluation of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the 
consequences of each option. 
SystematiC processing is sometimes 
used to reach decisions that have 
important consequences for us, 
It is unlikely we would use a systematic 
strategy for what to eat for dinner 
tonight, you would more likely use a 
heuristic such as "whatever is there' , 
But, wihen choosing a university course 
we might consider the reputation of the 
university, course quality, location, 
living expenses, recreational activities 
etc and choose the one that best 
meets our preferences and priorities, 
A systematic method of making 
decisions feels chanenging 10 us as it 
requires conscious thought and is time 
consuming. 
Thinking Systematically About 
Clinical Decisions 
• Doctors will think systematically about most novel dinical 
decisions, 
• For example, a doctor may weigh up the risks and benefits of 
performing or not performtng high risk surgery on a particular 
patient. 
• Or if a patient is not responding to a treatment in the way they 
should, a doctor may revisit the details and think of altemative 
diagnoses, 
• The disadvantage of this method is the conscious effort 
required to think carefully about the information before 
deciding what to do. 
• The advantage of systematic processing is there is less 
chance of making a wrong decision. 
• Decisions made systematically are more stable i.e, they are 
less likely to change or be influenced by others. 
• Also, we usually do not regret decisions we have made 
systematically because we can justify how we reached them. 
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Comparing Heuristic and Systematic 
Method of Decision Making 
Heuristic Systematic 
Conscious effort is minimal Conscious effort is required 
No attention to details of Attention to details of all 
choice options 
Quick process TKIle consuming 
Feels easy Feels challenging 
Errors are likely Errors are unlikely 
Decisions not easily justified Decisions easily justified to 
to others others 
Unstable judgements More stable judgements 
(easily swayed by others (not easily swayed by 
opinions) others opinions) 
Take Home Message! 
• You will use heuristic strategies when making clinical 
decisions. These mental shortcuts are essential and will lead 
to satisfactory decisions most of the time. 
• Nevertheless they are shortcuts so be aware that they can 
sometimes lead to unsatisfactory and/or incorrect clinical 
decisions. 
• Sometimes tt is better to take a systematic approach and 
think things through methodical~. It requires more effort to 
reach a decision this way, but tt IS more reliable, you are less 
likely to regret your decision and you are more likely to justify 
~ to others when tt is made systematically. 
Summary 
• Actively making sense of information is called information 
processing. 
• People process information selectively because the brain has 
a limited capacity for conscious attention. 
• There are two methods of information processing that people 
use to make decisions. 
• Heuristic processing strategy is the use of mental shortcuts to 
make decisions quickly and without much effort. 
• Smart heuristics are shortcuts based on experience that lead 
us to satisfactory decisions in an economical way. 
• Systematic processing strategy requires consideration of all 
the known options and weighing up the advantages and 
disadvantages of their consequences. 
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8.15. Knowledge measure using multiple choice 
questions 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to evaluate your knowledge and 
understanding of the information presented in the tutorial 'How do we 
make Decisions?' There are three parts to the questionnaire, please 
complete all of them. 
PART 1 
Below are 10 multiple choice questions. Please answer each question 
by placing a tick next to one option only. 
1. Which of the following terms refers to actively select one 
making sense of information? option 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristic 
Systematic strategy 
2. Which of the following terms explains why we select one 
do not process all of the information "out there" option 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristic 
Systematic strategy 
3. Which of the following terms refers to the 
select one 
method we use to make decisions based on a 
option 
subset of information using mental shortcuts? 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strat~y 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristic 
Systematic strategy 
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4. Which of the following terms refers to the 
select one 
mental shortcuts that lead us to correct decisions 
option in an economical way? 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
5. Which of the following terms refers to the 
method we use to reach decisions based on all select one 
known options and weighing up the advantages option 
and disadvantages of their consequences? 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
6. Which of the following can sometimes lead us select one 
to unsatisfactory and/or incorrect decisions? option 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
7. Which of the following refers to the 
select one 
mechanism that leads us to stable judgements 
option (i.e. not easily swayed by others) 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
8. Which of the following are you most likely to 
select one 
use when deciding which film to go see at the 
option 
cinema? 
Information processing 
limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
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9. Which of the following are you most likely to select one 
use when deciding to purchase a house? option 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
10. Which of the following terms refer to how select one 
experts make their professional decisions? option 
Information processing 
Limited capacity 
Heuristic and systematic strategy 
Heuristic strategy 
Smart heuristics 
Systematic strategy 
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8.16. Measure of clinical relevance 
This final section is an evaluation of your thoughts and opinions 
towards the tutorial you saw on how we make decisions. Please read 
the following statements. For each statement place a tick in one box 
only. 
Neither 
Statements Acree agree nor Disagree 
disagree 
I found the tutorial interesting 
It has helped me to think about my own decision making 
I have a basic understanding of how people make 
decisions 
I understand the relevance of the tutorial to me as a 
doctor 
I can identify examples of when people use heuristic and 
systematic strategies to make personal decisions 
I can identify examples of when doctors use heuristics 
and systematic strategies to make clinical decisions 
I understand how others can affect my judgements and 
choices 
I understand how my beliefs and experiences can affect 
my judgements and choices 
I feel more cautious about making clinical decisions 
I feel more confused about making clinical decisions 
I do not feel I have benefitted from the tutorial 
I think some formal teaching on how people make 
decisions should be included in medical training 
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8.17. Clinical judgement measure using problem 
solving tasks 
Below are four short medical scenarios. Read each one and answer 
the accompanying questions about your diagnosis. Please try and 
answer them all, do not miss any questions out. 
SCENARIO 1 
A 19 year old man comes to A&E late at night complaining he is 
struggling to breathe. He is a student and this has been his first 
week at university. You take his history and find out he had mild 
asthma as a child, but feels he has grown out of it with age. You 
examine him and he sounds wheezy and is taking quick short 
breaths. He states he has no chest pain and has had no recent 
illness. 
1. If you had to make a diagnosis now, what would you choose? 
(select one option only) 
Pneumonia 
Panic attack 
Asthma attack 
Heart attack 
2. How certain are you that this is the correct diagnosis? (select 
one option only) 
not at all certain (4) 
somewhat certain (3) 
fairly certain (2) 
absolutely certain (1) 
3. Would you actively wish to exclude or diagnose another 
condition? (select one option only) 
Pneumonia 
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Asthma attack 
Heart attack 
None of the above 
Other 
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4. Rate how much influence the following aspects of the scenario 
had on your chosen diagnosis. 1 = most influence, 4 = least 
influence. 
First week at university 
History of asthma 
Signs of wheezing and shortness of breath 
Absence of chest pain and illness 
SCENARIO 2 
A mother brings her 1 year old baby into the GP surgery. She explains 
her baby has developed a fever and bad cough yesterday which has 
worsened during the night. As baby cries it starts coughing and you 
notice it sounds like a bark. You take the baby's temperature and it is 
slightly raised. The breathing is noisy, but the baby does not appear 
to be struggling for breath. There is no rash on the body and throat 
and ears look normal. 
1. Given these findings only, what diagnosis would you make? 
(select one option only) 
Meningitis 
Croup 
Flu 
Pneumonia 
2. How certain are you that this is the correct diagnosis? (select 
one option only) 
not at all certain 
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somewhat certain 
fairly certain 
absolutely certain 
3. Would you actively wish to exclude or diagnose another 
condition? (select one option only) 
Meningitis 
Croup 
Flu 
Pneumonia 
None of the above 
Other 
4. Rate how much infiuence the following aspects of the scenario 
had on your chosen diagnosis. 1 = most influence, 4 = least 
influence 
Age of patient 
Fever 
Barking cough 
Absence of other symptoms 
SCENARIO 3 
A young man is brought into accident and emergency (A&E) in the 
early hours of one morning. The police had found him slumped on 
the steps of a public library. He is unshaven, his clothes are dirty 
and is not fully conscious. He is unwilling to arouse himself. He 
seems confused and cannot respond with any clarity to the nurse's 
questions (Groopman, 2007 page 55). 
1. If you had to make a diagnosis now, what would you choose? 
(select one option only) 
Alcohol excess 
Head Injury 
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2. How certain are you that this is the cause? (select one option 
only) 
not at all certain 
somewhat certain 
fairly certain 
absolutely certain 
3. Would you actively wish to exclude or diagnose another 
condition? (select one option only) 
Alcohol excess 
Head Injury 
Epilepsy 
Diabetes 
None of the above 
Other 
4. Rate how much influence the following aspects of the scenario 
had on your chosen diagnosis. 1 = most influence, 4 = least 
influence 
Patient found slumped on library steps 
His unkempt appearance (unshaven, dirty clothes) 
Not fully conscious 
Confused state 
SCENARIO 4 
A 41 year old man comes into accident and emergency (A&E) 
complaining of severe chest pain. He explains he was hiking in the 
woods when a pain in his chest stopped him in his tracks. He works 
as a forest ranger so due to his active lifestyle is trim and very fit. 
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Over the past few days he has experienced growing discomfort in his 
chest, even when resting. As a forest ranger he is used to muscle 
aches but thinks this is different. He has no history of heart 
problems (Groopman, 2007 page 42-43). 
1. If you had to make a diagnosis DOW, what would you choose? 
(select one option only) 
Muscle strain 
Indigestion 
Angina 
Anxiety 
2. How certain are you that this is the most likely diagnosis? 
(select one option only) 
not at all certain 
somewhat certain 
fairly certain 
absolutely certain 
3. Would you actively wish to exclude or diagnose another 
condition? (select one option only) 
Muscle strain 
Indigestion 
Angina 
Anxiety 
None of the above 
Other 
4. Which piece of information in the scenario influenced your 
decision the most? Rank order each option uBing the numbers 1· 
4 where 1 = most influence and 4 = least influence. 
His age 
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Patient is active and physically fit 
Chest pain even at rest 
No history of heart problems 
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8.18. Examples of cross-tabulations and statistical 
tests 
8.18.1. Diagnostic choice before va after 
DiagloIIIc dDoe beire (aIItm a lC8IWio). DiaglcBtIc dDoe .. (aslfma lC8IWio) 
Cr OIIIIIabJIaliQ"l 
Diagnstic ctdce atw 
(asttrrs sceraio) 
talc asttrrs atack 
Diagnstic ctdce prnc Cost 2 5 
I:dcre (asthrra % withn Diagnstic 
sceraio) 
TttaI 
ctdce before 28.6% 71.4% 
(asttrrs sceraio) 
% withn Diagnstic 
ctdce alar (asttrrs 40.0% 11.6% 
sceraio) 
% cHttaI 4.2% 10.4% 
asttrrs atack Cost 3 37 
% withn Diagnstic 
ctdce before 7.5% 92.5% 
(asttrrs sceraio) 
% withn Diagnstic 
ctdce alar (asttrrs 00.0'/0 86.0'/0 
sceraio) 
% ctTttaI 6.3% 77.1% 
heert atIa:k Cost 0 1 
% withn Dia;rostic 
ctdce before .0'/0 100.0'/0 
(asttrrs sceraio) 
% withn Dia;rostic 
ctdce alar (asttrrs .0'/0 2.3% 
sceraio) 
% ctTttaI .0'/0 2.1% 
Cost 5 43 
% withn Dia;rostic 
ctdce before 10.4% 00.6% 
(asttrrs sceraio) 
% withn Diagnstic 
ctdce alar (asttrrs 100.0'/0 100.0'/0 
sceraio) 
% ctTttaI 10.4% 00.6% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df C2-sidedl 
McNemar-Bowker Test a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Computed only for a PxP table. where P must be greater 
than 1. 
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TttaI 
7 
100.0'% 
14.6% 
14.6% 
40 
100.0'/0 
83.3% 
83.3% 
1 
100.0'/0 
2.1% 
2.1% 
48 
100.0'/0 
100.0'/0 
100.0'/0 
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Diagnosti: choice before (croup scenario) * Diagnostic choice after (croupscnearlo) 
erosstabulatlon 
Diagnostic choice aler 
(croup scneario) 
crOUD fu Total 
Diagnostic choice before croup Count 46 1 47 
(croup scenario) %wilhin Diagnostic 
choice before (crou~ 97.9% 2.1% 100D% 
scenario) 
%wilhin Diagnostic 
choice after (croup 100.0% 50.0% 97.9% 
scneario) 
% of Total 95B% 2.1% 97.9% 
flJ Count 0 1 1 
%within Diagnostic 
choice before (crou~ 
.0% 100.0% 100D% 
scenario) 
%within Diagnostic 
choice after (croup 
.0% 50.0% 2.1% 
scneario) 
%ofTotal 
.0% 2.1% 2.1% 
Tolal Count 46 2 48 
%wilhin Diagnostic 
choice before (crou~ 95B% 42% 100D% 
scenario) 
%wilhin Diagnostic 
choice after (croup 100.0% 100.0% 100D% 
scneario) 
%ofTotal 95B% 42% 100D% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Exact Sig. 
Value C2-sided) 
McNemar Test 1.0008 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
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Diag'llStic croce *(clabeB 
sceIlIioj 
alcdd 
s((::ess heiIj~ clablies 
Diag'llStic croce berae alcdd excess Crut 35 2 1 
(diabeB SC8'lIIio) % \/Iithn Diqmtic 
Total 
chcice beI'ae 92.1% 5.3% 2.6% 
(diabeB SC8'lIIio) 
% \/Iithn Diqmtic 
chcice after 97.2% 18.2% 100.O'A. 
(diabeB SC8'lIIio) 
% ctTotaI 72.9% 4.2% 2.1% 
heiIj irfllY Crut 1 9 0 
% \/Iithn Diqmtic 
chcice beI'ae 10.0% 00.0% .O'A. 
(claI:aes SC8'lIIio) 
% \/Iithn Diqmtic 
chcice after 2.8% 81.8% .0% 
(diabeB saraio) 
% ctTotaI 2.1% 18.8% .0% 
Crut 35 11 1 
% v.ithn Diqmtic 
chcia! beI'ae 75.0% 22.9% 2.1% 
(claI:aes SC8'lIIio) 
% \/Iithn Diqmtic 
chcia! after 100.O'A. 100.0'/. 100.O'A. 
(diabeB SC8'lIIio) 
% ctTotaI 75.0% 22.9% 2.1% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp.5ig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
McNemar-Bowker Test a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Computed only for a PxP table. where P must be greater 
than 1. 
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Total 
~ 
100.0% 
79.2% 
79.2% 
10 
100.O'A. 
:a>.8% 
:a>.8% 
48 
100.O'A. 
100.O'A. 
100.O'A. 
APPENDCIES 
Diagnostic choice before (IInginasc:enarlo)· Dlagnoalc choice der (angina scenarlo)Croastabuiation 
Di~nostic choice after (angina scenario) 
muscle strain indaestion angina anxi~ Total 
Diagnostic c hoic e muscle strain Count 5 0 2 0 7 
belore (angina % within Diagnostic 
scenario) choice before 71.4% .0% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Diagnostic 
cho ice after (angi na 83.3% .0% 5.6% .0% 14.6% 
scenario) 
% oIToIal 10.4% .0% 4.2% .0% 14.6% 
indgestion Count 0 5 4 0 9 
% within Diagnostic 
choice before .0% 55.6% 44.4% .0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Diagnostic 
choice after (angina 
.0% 100.0% 11.1% .0% 18.8% 
scenario) 
% 01 Total 
.0% 10.4% 8.3% .0% 18.8% 
angina Count 1 0 30 0 31 
% within Diagnostic 
choice before 3.2% .0% 96.8% .0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Diagnostic 
choice after (angina 16.7% .0% 83.3% .0% 64.6% 
scenario) 
% oITotal 2.1% .0% 62.5% .0% 64.6% 
anxiety Count 0 0 0 1 1 
% within Diagnostic 
choice before 
.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Diagnostic 
choice after (angina .0% .0% .0% 100.0% 2.1% 
scenario) 
% 01 Total .0% .0% .0% 2.1% 2.1% 
Total Count 6 5 36 1 48 
% within Diagnostic 
choice before 12.5% 10.4% 75.0% 2.1% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Diagnostic 
choice after (angina 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
scenario) 
% 01 Total 12.5% 10.4% 75.0% 2.1% 100.0% 
Chi.Square Teata 
Asyrrp. Sig. 
Value df (2·sided) 
McNemar-Bowker Test 4.333 2 .115 
N of Valid Cas es 48 
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8.18.1.1. Asthma scenario 
id they choose correct diagnosis before (asthma scenario)· 0 id they choose correct diagnos 
after (asthma see narlo) C rosstabulation 
Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis aler 
~asflma scenario) 
no ves Total 
Did they choose correc no Count 8 0 8 
diagnos is before % within Did they choose 
(asflma scenario) correct diagnosis before 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
(asflma scenario) 
% within Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis alEr 66.7% .0% 16.7% 
(asflma scenario) 
% of Total 16.7% .0% 16.7% 
yes Count 4 36 40 
% within Did they choose 
correctdiagnos is before 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 
(asflma scenario) 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis aler 33.3% 100.0% 83.3% 
(asflma scenario) 
% of Total 8.3% 75.0% 83.3% 
Total Count 12 36 48 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis before 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
(asflma scenario) 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis alEr 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(asflma scenario) 
%ofTotal 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Exact Sig. 
Value (2-sided) 
McNemar Test .1258 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
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8.18.1.2. Croup scenario 
'ldthey choose correct diagnosis before (croup scenario) * Old they choose correct dlagnos. 
after (croup scenario) C roasta bulatlon 
Did they choose 
correct diagnosis alEr 
(croup scenario) 
no ~_es Total 
Did they choose correc no Count 1 0 1 
diagnosis before (croup % within Did they choose 
scenario) correct diagnosis before 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis alEr 50.0% .0% 2.1% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 2.1% .0% 2.1% 
yes Count 1 46 47 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis before 2.1% 97.9% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
%within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis afar 50.0% 100.0% 97.9% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 2.1% 95.8% 97.9% 
Total Count 2 46 48 
%within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis before 4.2% 95.8% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
%within Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis alEr 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 4.2% 95.8% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Exact Sig. 
Value (2-sided) 
McNemar Test 1.0008 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
263 
DOCTORS' CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
8.18.1.3. Diabetes scenario 
o It they choose Con8Ct diagnosis before (diabetes scenario) * 0 Id they chooH correct diagnosis 
after ( diabetes scenarb) Crosstabuilltlon 
DKlthey choose 
correct diagnosis afEr 
(diabees scenario) 
no ves Total 
DKl they choos e correct no Count 47 1 48 
diagnosis bebre %witlin DKl fley choose 
(diabees scenario) correct diagnosis bebre 97.9% 2.1% 100.0% 
(diabees scenario) 
%wiflin DKl fley choose 
correct diagnosis afEr 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(diabees scenario) 
%ofTotal 97.9% 2.1% 100.0% 
Total Count 47 1 48 
%wiflin DKl fley choose 
correct diagnosis bebre 97.9% 2.1% 100.0% 
(diabees scenario) 
%wiflin DKl fley choose 
correct diagnosis afEr 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(diabees scenario) 
%ofTotal 97.9% 2.1% 100.0% 
Warnings 
No measures of association are computed for the crosstabulation of Did they 
choose correct diagnosis before (diabetes scenario) * Did they choose correct 
diagnosis after (diabetes scenario). At least one variable in each 2-way table upo 
VYhich measures of association are computed is a constant. 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp.Sig. 
Value df l2-sded) 
McNemar-Bowker Test a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Computed only for a PxP table. VYhere P must be greater 
than 1. 
264 
APPENDCIES 
8.18.1.4. Angina scenario 
idthey choose correct diagnosis before (angina scenario) * Did they choose correct dlagnos. 
after (angina scenario) C rosstabulatIon 
Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis af\9r 
(a ngina scenario) 
no ves Total 
Did they choose corree no Count 11 6 17 
diagnosis before %within Did they choose 
(angina scenario) correctdiagnosis before 64.7% 35.3% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis af\9r 91.7% 16.7% 35.4% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total 22.9% 12.5% 35.4% 
yes Count 1 30 31 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis before 3.2% 96.8% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
%within Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis af\9r 8.3% 83.3% 64.6% 
(angina scenario) 
%ofTotal 2.1% 62.5% 64.6% 
Total Count 12 36 48 
% within Did they choose 
correct diagnosis before 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
%within Did they choose 
correctdiagnosis af\9r 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Exact Sig. 
Value (2-sided) 
McNemar Test .125a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Binomial distribution used. 
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8.18.2. Certainty of diagnosis before va after 
8.18.2.1. Asthma scenario 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Mssino Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Certainty of diagnosis 
before (asthma scenario) 48 100.0% 0 .0% 48 100.0% 
• Certainty of diagnosis 
after (ashma scenario) 
Cettaln\t of cla~ls bekn (asthma scenario) • Celtaln\t of cla~ls after(alma scenario) ao.stabulatlon 
Certain y of ciaanosis after (ashma scenario) 
nOl at all some""'at allsolulely 
certain certain I,ainveeftain cArlain Total 
Certainty of ciagnosis not at all certain Count 2 0 2 0 4 
before (asthma % Wthin OIrtainty 
scenario) 01 diagnosis befoll! 50.0% 0% 50.0% 0% 100.0% 
(asthma scenario) 
% Wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis ahe, 50.0% .0% 7.1% .0% 8.3% 
(ashma scenario) 
% 01 Total 42% .0% 42% .0% 8.3% 
some""'at certain Count 2 12 5 0 19 
% wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis befoll! 10.5% 632% 26.3% .0% 100.0% 
(asthma scenalio) 
% Wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis ahe, 50.0% 923% 17.9% 0% 39.6% 
(ashma scenario) 
% 01 Total 42% 25.0% 10.4% .0% 39.6% 
lainy certain Count 0 1 20 2 23 
% wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis befoll! .0% 4.3% 87.0% 8.7% 100.0% 
(asthma scenario) 
% wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis ahe' .0% 7.7% 71.4% 66.7% 47.9% 
(ashma scenario) 
% 01 Total .0% 2.1% 41.7% 42% 47.9% 
allso/ulely certain Count 0 0 1 1 2 
% Wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosi s befoll! .0% .0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
(asthma scenalio) 
% Wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis ahe, 0% .0% 3.8% 33.3% 42% 
(ashma scenario) 
% 01 Total .0% .0% 2.1% 2.1% 42% 
Total Count 4 13 28 3 48 
% wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis befoll! 8.3% 27.1% 58.3% 63% 100.0% 
(asthma scenario) 
% Wthin OIrtainty 
01 diagnosis ahe' 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(ashma scenario) 
% olTOIal 8.3% 27.1% 58.3% 63% 100.0% 
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8.18.2.2. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
RaMS 
N Wean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Certainty of diagnosis Negative Ranks 4a 6.00 24.00 
after (ashma scenario)- Positiw Ranks gb 7.44 67.00 
Certainty of diagnosis Ties 35c before (asthma scenario) Total 48 
a. Certainty of diagnosis after (ashma scenario) < Certainty of diagnosis before 
(asthma scenario) 
b. Certainty of diagnosis after (ashma scenario) > Certainty of diagnosis before 
(asthma scenario) 
c. Certainty of diagnosis after (ashma scenario) = Certainty of diagnosis before 
(asthma scenario) 
Tes t Statisticf 
Certainty of 
diagnosis 
after (ashma 
scenario) -
Certanty of 
diagnosis 
before 
(asthrre 
scenario) 
Z -1.615a 
Asyrrp. Sig. (2-tailed) .106 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
8.18.3. Croup scenario 
Case Processing Summary 
cases 
Valid Mssina Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Certainty of diagnosis 
before (croup scenario) 48 100.0% 0 .0% 48 100.0% 
• Certainty of diagnos is 
after (croup scenario) 
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Certainty of diagnosis before (croup Icenarlo)· Certainty of dlagl10lls alar /croup scener 10) C rosstabulatlon 
Certainty ofdi<lgnosis af1er(croup scenario) 
not at all somewhat absolutely 
ceria in ceria in fai rlv c eftai n ceria in Total 
Certainty of not at all certain Count 2 0 0 1 3 
diagnosis before % w~hin Certainty 
(croup scenario) of diagnosis before 66.7% .0% .0% 33.3% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% w~hin Certainty 
of diagnosis after 50.0% .0% .0% 11.1% 6.3% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 4.2% .0% .0% 2.1% 6.3% 
somew hat cerlain Count 2 7 4 0 13 
% w~hin Certainty 
of diagnosis before 15.4% 53.8% 30.8% .0% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% w ~hin Certainty 
of diagnosis after 50.0% 70.0% 16.0% .0% 27.1% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 4.2% 14.6% 8.3% .0% 27.1% 
fairly certain Count 0 3 19 4 26 
% w~in Certainty 
of diagnosis before 
.0% 11.5% 73.1% 15.4% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% w_hin Certainty 
of diagnosis after 
.0% 30.0% 76.0% 44.4% 54.2% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 
.0% 6.3% 39.6% 8.3% 54.2% 
absolutel y ceria in Count 0 0 2 4 6 
% w~in Certainty 
of diagnosis before 
.0% 0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% w.hin C ertaillly 
of diagnosis after 
.0% 0% 8.0% 44.4% 12.5% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total .0% .0% 4.2% 8.3% 12.5% 
Total Count 4 10 25 9 48 
% w.hin C ertaillly 
of diagnosis before 8.3% 208% 52.1% 18.8% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% w.hin Certainty 
of diagnosis after 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(croup scenario) 
% of Total 8.3% 20.8% 52.1% 18.8% 100.0% 
8.18.3.1. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Ranks 
N Mlan Rank Sum of Ranks 
Certainty of diagnosiS Negatiw Ranks 7a 8.00 
after (croup scenario)- Positive Ranks 9b 8.89 
Certainty of diagnosis Ties 32c 
before (croup scenario) Total 48 
a. Certainty of diagnosis after (croup scenario) < Certainty of diagnosis before 
(croup scenario) 
b. Certainty of diagnosis after (croup scenario) > Certainty of diagnosis before 
(croup scenario) 
c. Certainty of diagnosiS after (croup scenario) = Certainty of diagnosis before 
(croup scenario) 
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Test Statisti~ 
Certainty of 
diagnosis 
after (croup 
scenario) -
Certainty of 
diagnosis 
before (croup 
scenario) 
Z -.688a 
ASY"1>. Sig. (2-taied) .491 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
8.18.4. Diabetes scenario 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Mssing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Certainty of diagnosis 
before (diabete scenario) 48 100.0% 0 .0% 48 100.0% 
• Certai nty of diagnos is 
after (diabetes scenario) 
Certainty of ciagnosis after (diabetes 
scena:io) 
not at all sanewhli 
cer1ain cer1ain fairtv cer1ain Tdal 
Certainty of ciagnosis not at all cer1ain Colllt 26 4 0 30 
befae (diabete sc_rio) % wilhin Certalrty 
of diagnos is befae 86.7% 13.3"k .0% 100.0% 
(diabete scereri 0) 
% wilhin Certlirty 
of diagnosis after 92.9% 23.5% .0% 62.5% 
(diabetes sc_rio) 
% ctTdal 54.2% 8.3% .0% 62.5% 
sanewhli cer1ain Colllt 2 10 3 15 
% wilhin Certalrty 
of diagnosis befae 13.3"/0 66.7% 20.0% 100.0% 
(diabete scenario) 
% within Certlirty 
of diagnosis after 7.1% 58.8% 100.0% 31.3"/0 
(diabetes sc_rio) 
% ctTdal 42% 20.8% 6.3% 31.3% 
fairty cer1ain COlllt 0 3 0 3 
% within Certli rty 
of diagnosis befae 
.0% 100.0% .0% 100.0% 
(diabete scenario) 
% wilhin Certlirty 
of diagrosis after 
.0% 17.6% .0% 6.3% 
(diabetes SCEl18rio) 
% ctTdal 
.0% 6.3% .0% 6.3% 
Tdal COlIlt 28 17 3 48 
% within Certalrty 
of diagnosiS befae 58.3% 35.4% 6.3% 100.0% 
(diabete scererio) 
% within Certairty 
of diagnos is after 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(diabetes SCEl18rio) 
% ctTdal 58.3% 35.4% 6.3% 100.0% 
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8.18.4.1. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Ranks 
N Wean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Certainty of diagnosis Negative Ranks 5a 6.50 32.50 
after (diabetes scenario)- Positiw Ranks 7b 6.50 45.50 
Certainty of diagnosis Ties 36c before (diabete scenario) Total 48 
a. Certainty of diagnosis after (diabetes scenario) < Certainty of diagnosis before 
(diabete scenario) 
b. Certainty of diagnosis after (diabetes scenario) > Certainty of diagnosis before 
(diabete scenario) 
C.Certaintyofdiagnosis after (diabetes scenario) = Certainty of diagnosis before 
(diabete scenario) 
Test Staldes!' 
Certainty of 
diagnoss 
after 
(diabetes 
&:enario)-
Certainty of 
diagnoss 
before 
(diabete 
&:enario) 
Z -.5na 
A!¥llP. Sig. (2~ailed) .564 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
b. Wlcoxon Signed RanksTe!i 
8.18.4.2. Angina scenario 
ea .. Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Mssing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Certainty of diagnosis 
before (angina scenario) 48 100.0% 0 .0% 48 100.0% 
• Certainty of diagnosis 
after (angina scenario) 
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Certainty of diagnosis before (angina scenario)· Certainty ofclagnosls ater (angina scenar 10) Crosstabula'on 
Cerlainty of diagnosis after (angina 
scenario) 
not atall somewhat 
certain certain lfair1v certain Total 
Certainty of diagnosis not at all certain Count 15 6 0 21 
before (a ngi na % within Certainty 
scenario) of diagnosis before 71.4% 28.6% .0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis after 93.8% 31.6% .0% 43.8% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total 31.3% 12.5% .0% 43.8% 
somewhat certain Count 1 9 5 15 
% within Certainty 
of d iagnosi s before 6.7% 60.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis after 6.3% 47.4% 38.5% 31.3% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total 2.1% 18.8% 10.4% 31.3% 
fairly certain Count 0 3 7 10 
% within Certainty 
of d iagnosi s before 
.0% 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis after 
.0% 15.8% 53.8% 20.8% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total .0% 6.3% 14.6% 20.8% 
absolutely certain Count 0 1 1 2 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis before 
.0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis after 
.0% 5.3% 7.7% 4.2% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total .0% 2.1% 2.1% 4.2% 
Total Count 16 19 13 48 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis before 33.3% 39.6% 27.1% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% within Certainty 
of diagnosis after 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
(angina scenario) 
% of Total 33.3% 39.6% 27.1% 100.0% 
8.18.4.3. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
Ranks 
N Wean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Certainty of diagnosis Negative Ranks 6a 9.92 59.50 
after (angina scenario)· Positive Ranks 11b 8.50 93.50 
Certainty of diagnosis Ties 31 c before (angina scenario) Total 48 
a. Certainty of diagnosis after (angina scenario) < Certainty of diagnosis before 
(angina scenario) 
b. Certainty of diagnosis after (angina scenario) > Certainty of diagnosis before 
(angina scenario) 
c. Certainty of diagnosis after (angina scenario) = Certainty of diagnosis before 
(angina scenario) 
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Test Statistic; 
Certainty of 
diagnosis 
after (angina 
scenario) -
Certainty of 
diagnosis 
before 
(angina 
scenario) 
Z 
-.894a 
Asyrrp. Sig. (2-tailed) .371 
a. Based on negative ranks. 
b. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
8.18.5. Excluding or diagnosing other conditions 
Case Processing Summary 
Cases 
Valid Missina Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Would you actively wis 
to exclude or diagnose 
another BEFORE 
(asthma scenario)· 48 100.0% 0 .0% 48 100.0% Would you actively wis 
to exclude or diagnose 
another AFTER (asthm 
scenario) 
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Case Processing Sunmary 
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N Percent N Percent N Percent 
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Chi-Square Tests 
Asyrrp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
McNemar-Bow ker Tes t 9.000 6 .174 
N of Valid Cases 48 
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(dlabetel Icenano 
% of Totel .0% .0% 2 1% .0% .0% 
ab ov e Co un 
% Within Would you 
actively WII h to e. 
dlagnoae another .0% .0% 00 O'k .0% .0% 
BEFORE (diabetes 
scenario) 
% Within Would you 
actively WIS h to e. 
.0% .0% 50 .0% .0% .0% dlagnole another.A 
(d ,abete s scenano 
% of To tal .0% . 0% 2.1 % . 0% .0% 
01 e' co unt 0 0 0 0 
% Within Would you 
actively Wish to ex 
diagnose another .0% .0% .0% 0% 50.0% 
BEFORE (diabetes 
Icenano) 
% Within Would you 
actively wllh 10 ex 0% 0% .0 % 0% 00.0% dlagnol. another 
(dlabetel Icenano 
% of To tal .0% .0% .0% .0% 2.'% 
m u tip. condl Coun 
% wllhm Would you 
actively Wish to ex 
dtagnoat! another 0% 0% .0 % 2.5% .0% 
BEFORE (diabetes 
scenario) 
% within Would you 
actively Wish to e. 
.0% "% .0% 100.0% .0% dlagno •• another 
(dlabe' •• • cenano 
% or To tal 0% .0% .0% 2.'% .0% 
co unt 2 
% wllhln Would you 
actively WII h to ox 
dlagnos. another 2.1 % 4 2% •. 2% 2.1% 2.1% 
BEFORE (diabetes 
scanano) 
% within Would you 
actively w,s h to e. 00 
"" 
100 0% 00 0% 100 0% 00.0% d.agnole another 
(dlabe'.s scenano 
% or To 'al 2 1% • 2% 4 2% 2.1 % 2.1% 
Chi-Square Tests 
Asymp. Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) 
McNemar-Bowker Test a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Computed only for a PxP table, where P must be greater 
than 1. 
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.0% 
.0% 
.0% 
SO .0% 
2.4% 
1% 
0 
.0% 
0% 
.0 ... 
SO .0% 
2 4% 
2. 1% 
,g 
97 .5% 
95 1% 
81 .3% 
41 
85 .4% 
1 0 0 0% 
85 .4 % 
Tol. 
00 .0% 
6.3% 
6.3% 
00.0% 
".2% 
•. 2% 
00.0% 
2. 1% 
2 . 1% 
2 
00 0% 
•. 2% 
4.2% 
40 
00 0% 
83 .3% 
83 .3% 
.a 
00.0·h, 
00 0% 
00 0% 
DOCTORS' CLINICAL DECISION MAKING 
-'d,..,CI,,",ywlohlo_ucIoor d __ twlllR)R:(q .. _q· -,d,..,cl,,",ywlohlo_ucIoor d __ tw _(89 .. _ l q 0_..,.1.., 
'fbjI yw ..... .., 10 _ co clio,... _I-. IIFIR( ave .,...ilj 
mliPo 
ml.8Cit IIr81 
-'" --
..... v rmo anions Td. 
'fbjI yw..,. ... n<VoB'" Out 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
...., to .ddea % .tll1l."«U1yw 
~_tw ..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 
fIfOfE (-va ~-I-. 0% 500% 0% OK. 0% 500% 1(1) OK. 
.... b) fIfOR:(-va 
....... 0) 
% .tll1l."«U1yw 
....... ..,lo-ula a 0% 500% OK. <iIJae _I-. IIFIR 0% OK. 2.9% 
42% 
(-va"""") 
%cI~1I .0% 2.1% 0% .0% 0% 2.1% 42% 
ave Out 0 0 2 0 0 3 5 
% IIClI1l."«U1yw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 
~-I-. 0% OK. 400% 0% OK. 810% 1m OK. 
fIfOR:(-va 
..... 0) 
% .tml."«Ulyw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 0% (JII, 867% OK. 0% 8.8% 104% <iIJae _I-. IIFIR 
(-va"""") 
%cI~1I 0% (JII, 42% .0% . OK. 6.3% 104% 
..... y Out 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
% IICml."«Ulyw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 
~-I-. 0% (JII, OK. 50 OK. OK. 500% 1m OK. 
fIfOR:(-va 
.... b) 
% IICml."«Ulyw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa OK. (JII, (JII, 500% OK. 2.9% 4.2% ~_tw IIFIR 
(-va-) 
% cI Tdll OK. . OK. OK. 2.1% OK. 2.1% 4.2% 
IUlO Out 0 0 0 0 5 1 6 
'IIolICml."«Ulyw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 
<iIJae- tw OK. OK. . OK. (JII, 8.33% 167% 1(1) OK. 
fIfOR:(-va 
__ 0) 
'IIolICml."«Ulyw 
a:t .... .." to eddI a OK. ~_tw .IFIR OK. OK. 
(JII, 8.33% 2.9% 12~ 
(-va""') 
%d~1I OK. OK. OK. (JII, 104% 21% 12~ 
ahw Qu1 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 
% IICmWUlyw 
..,. .... ,..,lo-ula a 
~-I-. OK. . OK. OK. (JII, 333% 867% 1m. 0% 
fIfOR: (-va 
... 0) 
'IIolICml."«Ulyw 
actMt..., to ectm a OK. OK. (JII, (JII, 167% 59% 63% ~_tw IIFIR (ervo .,.,.,,) 
%d~1I OK. OK. OK. OK. 2.1% 42% 63% 
mil i8 alrd t.- Out 1 1 1 1 0 26 :I) 
% IICmWUlyw 
..,. .... ,..,Io-ulaa 
~_tw 33% 33% 33% :13% (JII, 867% 1(1)0% 
fIfOR: (-va 
.... 0) 
% wmWUlyw 
.. .,....., to-=ldl a 
,m 0% ~_tw IIFIR 500lI0 333% 
500% 0% 165% 62.5% 
(-va ..... ) 
%d~1I 21% 21% 21% 21% OK. 542% 62.5% 
Ta7 -aut 1 2 3 2 6 
301 48 
% wmWUlyw 
actMt ..., to..:Ldl a 
<tv<--tw 21% 42% 63% 42% 125% 708% 1m 0% 
fIfOR:(-va 
...-0) 
'IIowml."«Ulyw 
..,. .... ...,Io-ulaa 1(1) OK. 
<tv<- _tw .IFIR 
1(I)(JII, 1(1) OK. 1111 OK. 1al.0% 1m 0% 1m 0% 
(-va-) 
%d~1I 2.1% 42% 63% 42% 125% 708% 1(1)0% 
Chi~quare Tests 
Asymp.Sig. 
Value df (2~ded)-
McNemar-Bowker Test a 
N of Valid Cases 48 
a. Both variables must have identical values of categories. 
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